Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1972



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The Mongolian People's Republic
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Japan and China—A New Stage?

By Shinkichi Eto

On July 9, 1972, two days after the installation of Japan's new government under Liberal-Democratic Premier Kakuei Tanaka, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai went out of his way to refer to that event in a speech welcoming a visiting delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen. "The Tanaka cabinet was inaugurated on July 7," said Chou, "and with regard to foreign policy it has announced that it will endeavor to realize a normalization of relations between Japan and China. This is certainly to be welcomed." Chou's speech, including his conciliatory remark directed toward Tokyo, was promptly broadcast by Radio Peking and widely disseminated in the Chinese Communist press.[1]

Slightly more than a month later, the Chinese Communist Party's central daily *Jen-min Jih-pao* devoted the entire top half of its front page to stories about the return to Shanghai of a Chinese ballet troupe which had just completed a highly successful and warmly received tour of Japan. Banner headlines played up the "enthusiastic send-off" given to the troupe by "friends from all spheres of Japanese society" and the "deep friendship between the Japanese and Chinese peoples" evidenced during the return flight from Tokyo aboard two planes of Japan Air Lines and All-Nippon Airways.[2] But what was most significant about this unusual press coverage was that it marked the first time that the Chinese party organ had given such front-page prominence to an event involving Japan without any suggestion of antagonism toward the ruling Japanese government.

Coming after eight years of unremitting abuse directed by Peking at the preceding Liberal-Democratic governments of Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato, Chou's gesture of conciliation and the subsequent abrupt change in the tone of Chinese Communist press treatment of Japan were straws in the wind pointing to a profound shift in Peking's attitudes vis-à-vis Tokyo. Both governments subsequently moved with surprising swiftness to pave the way for a top-level meeting between their respective leaders, and in late September these moves culminated in the visit of Premier Tanaka and other high Japanese government officials to Peking. There can be little doubt that the visit marks a historic milestone in the long and tortured course of modern Sino-Japanese relations.

Many factors, on both sides, have been responsible for the rapid turnabout in Sino-Japanese relations—a development that is bound to have a far-reaching impact on world diplomacy. The present article proposes, first, to inquire into the attitudes and motivations that prompted each of the two powers to reorient its policies in the direction of rapprochement; second, to look at their respective positions on the major issues between them; and, finally, to offer a preliminary assessment of what the Tanaka mission to Peking has accomplished toward resolving these issues and what effect the agreements reached appear likely to have on the future course of Sino-Japanese relations and international relations generally.

In broad perspective, the change in Peking's attitudes toward Japan can undoubtedly be seen as part of the overall reorientation of China's external

[1] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA) International Service (in English), July 9, 1972; *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), July 10, 1972.

[2] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Aug. 17, 1972. The inclusion of an airliner of All-Nippon Airways, which is an exclusively domestic carrier, in this historic international flight is probably explained by the firm's connection with Kaheita Okazaki, who is discussed in fn. 33 below.

A Professor of International Relations at the University of Tokyo, Mr. Eto has written extensively on Asian affairs. His publications include Higashi Ajia Seijishi Kenkyu *(A Study of East Asian Political History), 1968, and* Kindai Chugoku Seijishi Kenkyu *(A Study of Modern Chinese Political History), 1970.*

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diplomacy that has taken place in the last three or four years as the pendulum of Chinese politics has swung away from the ideological zeal and revolutionary fervor of the Cultural Revolution period back toward greater pragmatism and moderation.[3]

Peking's Changing World View

Reduced to its essence, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represented an attempt to elevate "spirit"—*i.e.*, ideological dedication to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung—to the highest virtue in Chinese society. The slogan then in use was *cheng-chih-t'u-ch'u* (politics first), which underlined the priority that political indoctrination was to be accorded. In domestic policy, the old notion of combining "red" (devotion to Mao's political teachings) and "expert" (specialized knowledge and expertise) was temporarily cast aside in favor of a one-sided emphasis on the former. Politics took sole command, and overwhelming stress was placed on purity of political belief. In external policy, the pursuit of revolutionary ideological goals took precedence over diplomatic action and the development of interstate relations.

These extremist policies had serious consequences both at home and abroad. Inside China, the production of manufactured goods declined by more than 20 percent according to recent outside estimates,[4] and the very administration of the country was so severely disrupted that it had to be saved from collapse by the interposition of the organizational strength of the People's Liberation Army. Abroad, the virtual suspension of Chinese diplomatic activity, coupled with policies of continued intransigence toward both the Soviet Union and the United States and of active support for Third World revolutionary movements, thrust the People's Republic into a position of extreme diplomatic isolation.

Criticism of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution first began to appear in China in 1967, but it was only after the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the spring of 1969 that the shift toward more moderate policies became more clear-cut and rapid. Since then there has been a steady toning down of the Cultural Revolution's insistence upon exclusive reliance on Maoist teachings and the primacy of "spirit"—even to the point where the party's leading newspaper has inveighed against both the myth of the "great hero" and "absoluteness" of thought.[5] The phrase "red and expert" has reappeared in the Chinese press, signifying renewed recognition of the value of intellectual and technical expertise.[6] There has also been a growing emphasis on the need for policies based on economic rationality and an increasing regard for the importance of concrete data and statistics.

The turn toward moderation and a more rational pragmatism in the PRC's domestic policies—and especially toward a primary preoccupation with strengthening the nation's economic structure—naturally led to a reconsideration of the foreign policies that had resulted in China's international isolation. In order to strengthen the economic structure and to accelerate the pace of economic development, the argument now ran, China must abandon past notions of solitary self-sufficiency and adopt policies that would facilitate the introduction of needed machinery and technology from abroad.

At this point the policy debate in Peking turned, in all likelihood, to the question of whether China should attempt a reconciliation with the Soviet Union and the latter's economically-advanced East European allies or should instead open her gates to the advanced industrial nations of the West. In the end, the Chinese Communist leadership apparently decided that the latter course would be more advantageous for China and therefore opted for the adoption of a more flexible diplomatic line.

The switch to greater flexibility also reflected an apparent underlying revision of the Peking leaders' image of the world. In place of the former image of a bipolar world, they appear to have changed over to recognition of a multipolar model of world politics.[7] This change seems to have been accompanied by a gradual revision of Peking's customary dualistic view which distinguished friend from foe by the sole criterion of ideology. No doubt what formed in the

[3] The alternation of swings to the left and to the right in the policies of the Chinese Communist Party has been discussed by the author in an essay entitled "Moderation and Radicalism in the Chinese Revolution," published in James B. Crowley, Ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970, pp. 337-73.

[4] See U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, May 18, 1972, p. 63.

[5] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Dec. 16, 1971, and Jan. 28, 1972.

[6] To the author's knowledge, the phrase "red and expert" reappeared in the Chinese Communist press for the first time after the Cultural Revolution in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, April 10, 1971.

[7] See Tatsumi Okabe, "Chugoku no Kokusai Seiji-kan (Chinese Views of International Politics)," *Kokusai Mondai* (Tokyo), No. 149, August 1972, pp. 47-51.

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minds of the Chinese leadership was a new concept of world politics as being fluid in character and driven primarily by considerations of power—an environment in which friends can turn into foes and enemies can become friends. Having come through the turmoil of their own revolution, and having further experienced the setbacks caused by the ultra-leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution, the leaders in Peking seemingly came to a recognition that ideological rigidity is not conducive to victory in the political world.

Obviously, for the more moderate elements in the Chinese leadership to have pressed such a line during the Cultural Revolution, when the winds of ideological radicalism were raging, would have been extremely dangerous. Only in the calm that followed the storm did it become possible for these elements to reassert themselves and regain a position enabling them to introduce the concrete changes in domestic and foreign policy that they had favored all along.

As the leaders in Peking proceeded to reexamine their foreign policies in the context of their revised conception of world politics, it was only natural—by reasons of geography and history—that they should give careful reconsideration to China's relationship with Japan. Moreover, this reconsideration was spurred, on the one hand, by the phenomenal postwar rise of Japanese economic power, which made Japan a potential source of industrial equipment and technology for China's developing economy but at the same time rekindled Chinese fears of a possible resurgence of Japanese militarist expansionism in Asia, and, on the other hand, by the apparent loosening of Japan's postwar ties with the United States.

In this reexamination of Peking's policy vis-à-vis Japan, the continuing Soviet threat to China was a major consideration. With 44-49 Soviet army divisions reportedly concentrated along China's northern and northeastern borders (as compared with only 21 divisions at the time of the Damansky Island clash

CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung greets Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka in Peking on Sept. 27, 1972.

—UPI photo.

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in 1969) and nearly 150 ships of the Soviet Pacific fleet cruising the vast area between the Japan Sea and the Indian Ocean and traversing the East China and South China Seas en route,[8] the Chinese leaders had to consider the danger that a continued policy of abuse toward the Japanese government might drive Japan closer to the Soviet Union. There was the further consideration that, if this were to happen and Japanese big-business interests were to become involved in joint projects for developing Siberia in response to Soviet overtures, their eagerness to gain access to the China market might be dampened.

From the standpoint of accelerating the development of the Chinese economy, Peking undoubtedly perceived that much could be gained through expanded trade and economic cooperation with Japan. So long as economic exchanges continued to be carried on solely through arrangements with private Japanese interests and not under intergovernmental agreements, they would necessarily remain unstable and restricted. On the other hand, a normalization of intergovernmental relations would permit the development of expanded trade relations on a more secure basis. From the Chinese standpoint, the desirability of expanding trade with Japan was enhanced by the fact that China's trading account with that country was in relatively better balance than her trading accounts with other industrially advanced nations, although the former still continued to be markedly favorable to Japan.

Peking also seems to have perceived internal political trends in Japan as creating a highly propitious atmosphere for moves toward a normalization of relations between the two countries. It could hardly fail to note that the Japanese mass media were almost unanimous in urging the government to move more rapidly in this direction and that the attitude of the media was reflected in widespread pro-Chinese sentiments among the public. The Chinese leaders had to consider the possibility that, if they failed to take advantage of this opportunity and continued to pursue a hard line toward Japan, the pendulum of Japanese public opinion might swing back in the opposite direction.

The Chinese leadership had of course made plain its refusal to deal with the Sato government, but as the time for that government's withdrawal drew nearer, there were increasing evidences that Peking, as a result of all the considerations outlined above, was leaning toward a reconciliation with the succeeding Japanese government. Criticisms of Japan, as measured by the frequency and volume of references in the central CCP daily *Jen-min Jih-pao* to Japanese policies considered inimical to the PRC and to various "evils" attributed by the Chinese to Japanese society, showed a sharp decline between October 1971 and May 1972 (see accompanying diagram). In particular, vehement denunciations of the "revival" of Japanese militarism became reduced to mild expressions of suspicion concerning Japan's future role in Asia. There were even indications that Peking was becoming disposed not to let Japan's Mutual Security Treaty with the United States stand in the way of a normalization of relations with Tokyo —possibly because it was beginning to see continuation of the treaty as a brake on Japanese rearmament. After January 23 of this year, *Jen-min Jih-pao* ceased publishing any further criticism of the treaty.

In sum, Peking's reexamination of its international position and policies seems to have led it to abandon the idea—to which it had subscribed in the Cultural Revolution period—that the more revolutionary or



* Frequency units represent number of references weighted by the width of column space occupied (columns run horizontally in Chinese newspapers). Hence, a single reference may account for more than one unit.

SOURCE: Content analysis of *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking).

[8] According to a recent estimate of the Japanese National Defense Agency conveyed to the author in a private communication.

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people's wars flared up and spread in the areas outside China, the stronger the PRC's security would become. Today one no longer sees any trace of such reasoning in the Chinese Communist press. Instead, the Chinese leaders appear to have concluded that the new world situation dictated a policy of expanding amicable relations with the governments of neighboring countries in order to achieve at least a provisional new balance of forces in Asia that would obviate the dangers inherent in the PRC's international isolation of recent years.

Japanese Attitudes Toward China

So much for the motivations underlying the recent shift in Peking's posture vis-à-vis Japan. In turning to the Japanese side, it is important first of all to recognize that, despite the actual history of continuing tension and warfare between Japan and China, the Japanese have long had a sense of shared destiny with the Chinese. The Japanese expression for a state of close interdependency, "shin-shi-ho-sha" (in Chinese, "ch'un-ch'ih-fu-ch'e"; in English, literally, "lips-teeth-mandibula-maxilla"), conveys the perception quite graphically. Japan and China are considered to be to each other as lips are to teeth and mandibula is to maxilla.

This sense of common destiny dates back at least to the period of the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan in the mid-19th century, though it was then mixed with a measure of contempt for things Chinese. While relations between Japan and China, both political and economic, were not particularly close then, Japanese intellectuals, viewing the declining fortunes of the Ch'ing Dynasty, reasoned that China, having been victimized by the Western powers, was a poor example to follow, but they believed that there was need to pay heed to it because Euro-American expansionism posed a common threat to the Ch'ing Dynasty and Japan, and that therefore if the Ch'ing Dynasty were to be subdued, Japan would necessarily be next. Such views were held especially by those Japanese intellectuals in whom a Confucian education had nurtured an admiration for Chinese civilization but who experienced bitter disillusionment upon visiting China and witnessing the decline of the Ch'ing regime.

The notion, then, of a complementarity of interests grew out of a Japanese awareness of the probable consequences of Western expansionist pressures and a realization that, in order to repel these forces, East Asia had, above all else, to strengthen itself. Among the Meiji leaders, it was commonly held not only that Japan should be made more powerful, but also that the development of Japan alone was inadequate, and they grew ever more anxious for a parallel strengthening of China.[9]

Prescriptions as to how such a strengthening could be accomplished varied in Japan during the final years of the Tokugawa period as well as during the Meiji era. Some maintained that the decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty was in direct proportion to its rejection of tradition and its willingness to open its ports to Western trade; others contended that the troubles of the Ch'ing Dynasty lay precisely in its strict adherence to traditional forms and ways and its failure to recognize objectively the advances that the West had achieved. With the transfer of authority from the Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji government in 1868, the latter position ultimately won out.

But the problem of bringing about change remained. Doubting the possibility of reform from within the existing Chinese imperial leadership, Japanese intellectuals of the period looked for a hero who would lead China out of her despair. Many Japanese who were active in the domestic *Jiyu Minken Undo* (Movement for Liberty and Human Rights) were equally insistent in their advocacy of an external policy which would encourage a revolution in China since they held out no hope for reform under the Ch'ing regime. (Within Japan, the movement worked for the ouster of the oligarchical regime composed of leaders drawn from Choshu [Yamaguchi Prefecture] and Satsuma [Kagoshima Prefecture] and creation of a parliamentary system.) Moreover, they at least contemplated that it might ultimately prove necessary for Japan itself to undertake the transformation of China—even if doing so required the subjugation of the Chinese.[10] In time, they grew dissatisfied with the progress of events and were ardently calling for interference or "participation" in Chinese politics. Aizan Yamaji, a socialist journal-

[9] See this writer's "Nihon-jin no Chugoku-kan—Takasugi Shinsaku-ra no Baai (Japanese Views of China—the Cases of Shinsaku Takasugi and Others)," in Committee to Edit a Collection of Articles to Commemorate the Late Dr. Noboru Niida, Ed., *Nihon-ho to Ajia* (Japanese Laws and Asia), Tokyo, Keiso Shobo, 1969, p. 68 ff.

[10] Yazo Miyazaki—an advocate of *Jiyu Minken Undo* causes and an elder brother of Toten Miyazaki, the closest and most trusted Japanese friend of the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen—articulated this perspective quite succinctly. He said: "I will search throughout China for the hero. If I do find this ideal leader, I will become his faithful subordinate; if not, I myself will assume the responsibility." For further discussion of Miyazaki, see *ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

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ist during the late Meiji and Taisho eras, stated the case in typical fashion:

Looking at China as a politician, one of course perceives a border between Japan and China. But as a Japanese, one recognizes no boundaries that separate our hearts. Japanese and Chinese are not strangers to each other. We are of the same flesh and blood. . . . Only the politicians treat Chinese coldly; the Chinese are not considered aliens by us Japanese people. This vast area consisting of the combined territories of China and the Japanese islands ought to be the arena for our activities; it is here we should breathe deeply the air of harmony.[11]

Such an outlook, to be sure, afforded the Japanese government a rationale for staging frequent acts of armed intervention and political interference in Chinese affairs—in short, for attempting to impose Japan's policies and value system on China. Nonetheless, the outlook itself reflected not hostility toward China, but a feeling of shared destiny with it, a desire to see it "stand up" in the world. This notion, moreover, enjoyed wide public acceptance.

During ensuing years, the results of Japanese undertakings in China demonstrated conclusively that it was impossible to effect a revitalization of China from the outside. In the years after World War II, recognition of this fact plus feelings of guilt at the depredations that Japan had inflicted upon the Chinese people during the 1931-45 period caused many Japanese to respond positively to the accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party in unifying China and in enhancing the country's international status—even though China had become a Communist power. Their attitudes created a growing base of support within Japan for normalization of relations between the two countries.

The feeling of a complementarity of interests, of course, constituted an underlying factor. What brought about the move of the new Tanaka government at this particular juncture was a combination of two other factors. First, Japan has recently been carrying out a reexamination of the role that it should play in world politics. Prior to World War II, the Japanese militarist government sought to function as a shaper of world events and circumstances even if it had to provoke crises to do so, but the outcome of World War II radically changed the situation. During the Occupation period, the Japanese government had but one option—to conform completely to the existing shape of things, and the governments of subsequent years chose to adopt a relatively passive approach to international affairs in line with the thinking that Naotake Sato, Foreign Minister in the Hayashi Cabinet of the mid-1930's, had set forth in a speech to the Imperial Diet in 1936. Sato had argued that if Japan did not want to be plagued by crises, she did not have to be since these crises were all products of Japan's own doing.[12] But with the restoration and increase of Japan's economic strength, there has been a mounting feeling among Japanese that Japan ought again to take a more active part in world politics.

Japan, it should be underscored, has resolved to be a pacifist state, and the current internal debate about its international role has not reflected a wish to forsake this basic principle of action in the international sphere. Nor has it mirrored even the remotest desire to provoke any international crisis or interfere with the détente moves of other powers. Rather, it has represented a belief on the part of many Japanese that Japan ought to do what it can in a positive way to influence world conditions and not merely adapt to "given" circumstances. To the Tanaka government, the normalization of relations with Peking seemed to be such an affirmative step.

Second, the attitudes of the international community toward the People's Republic of China were in the process of rapid flux. In October 1970, Canada, the North American neighbor of the United States, established diplomatic relations with Peking, and in November of the same year, Italy, the last large NATO country in Europe aside from West Germany not to recognize the PRC, followed suit. Then in July 1971, President Nixon announced that he planned to make a trip to Peking to confer with Chinese Communist leaders. This journey, which took place in February 1972, appeared to inaugurate an era of peaceful coexistence between the PRC and the United States, though formal diplomatic relations have not yet been established between the two countries. In the meantime, moreover, the UN General Assembly, on October 25, 1971, voted—by an absolute majority of 76 to 35, with 17 abstentions and 3 absentees—to seat the representatives of the PRC government in that body and to expel those of the Nationalist government. By the summer

[11] Aizan Yamaji, *Shina-ron* (A China Thesis), Tokyo, Minyusha, 1916, pp. 3-5.

[12] Naotake Sato, *Kaiko Hachiju-nen* (Eighty Years in Recollection), Tokyo, Jiji Tsushin-sha, 1963, p. 366.

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of 1972, 74 states had recognized the PRC, while 51 maintained official relations with the Nationalists.

Within Japan, these changes in the attitudes of the international community produced overwhelming sentiment in favor of a rapprochement with the PRC. The leading, opinion-forming national newspapers, in a race to obtain permission to station special correspondents in Peking,[13] all endorsed the so-called "three political principles"—not to antagonize the PRC, not to participate in a "plot to create" two Chinas, and not to interfere with the normalization of state-to-state relations between Japan and the PRC. The three opposition parties—the Socialists, the Komei, and the Democratic Socialists—sensed an opportunity to isolate the Liberal-Democratic Party and the government on the issue and commenced to do their best to create a pro-Peking mood in the country. Big business groups, frightened by warnings of a possible recession, began to pay considerable attention to the China mainland as a new market, and the flood of Japanese businessmen to Peking produced a "bandwagon" effect and more glowing reports on economic and political achievements in China in the leading Japanese dailies. Even the cautious Mitsubishi Group, which had determined not to join the scramble until the government had settled on a policy, finally decided to send a mission to Peking in the summer of 1972 in advance of the working out of a Cabinet position on the subject. As for the general public, an opinion poll published on July 28, 1972, revealed that more than 80 percent of those surveyed hoped for a normalization of ties with the PRC.[14]

The "Three Principles"

The evident desire on the part of both the PRC and Japanese leaders to achieve a rapprochement, however, did not automatically assure the fulfillment of that desire, for certain vital questions revolving around the Chinese conditions remained to be answered. In March 1971, the Japanese delegation for negotiations on "Memorandum trade," which included Yoshimi Furui and Seiichi Tagawa of the Liberal-Democratic Party, signed a joint communiqué which laid down "three principles for the normalization of Japan-China relations."[15] The succeeding July, a delegation from Japan's Komei Party led by party chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri also agreed to these three principles in a joint communique concluded with the (Chinese) Sino-Japanese Friendship Association.[16] The principles were:

(1) The government of the People's Republic of China is the sole and legitimate government of China.

(2) Taiwan is an inseparable part of the Chinese territory.

(3) In light of the previous points, the peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalist government is illegal and should be abrogated.

Clearly, these principles represented conditions that the Chinese hoped Japan would accept, but there was uncertainty in Japan as to whether Peking regarded them as preconditions for negotiations. Some Japanese held that negotiations on the restoration of state-to-state relations could not take place unless the Japanese government embraced the three principles prior to the start of talks. The proponents of this view included the Socialist Party, the Komei Party, and all the major national newspapers with the exception of the *Mainichi* chain. And since the argument ran that no talks were possible without a prior abrogation of the peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist regime, it was labeled the "Taiwan-prior-to argument" (*Taiwan-iriguchi-ron*).

Other Japanese, however, maintained that the Peking government did not regard the principles as preconditions for the opening of negotiations. They pointed out that in a number of key communiqués which the Chinese Communists had signed with visiting Japanese groups, it had been the Japanese, not the Chinese, side that had insisted upon the importance of immediate acceptance of the "three

[13] Details of relations between the Peking government and Japan's leading newspapers are discussed in Osamu Niyoshi and Shinkichi Eto, *Chugoku Hodo no Henko o Tsuku* (Reports on China Are Distorted), Tokyo, Nisshin Hodo Shuppan-bu, 1972. A summary appeared in *The Los Angeles Times*, April 14, 1972.

[14] The poll, reported in *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), yielded the following views: Question: "There are no official diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Do you think Japan should hurry to normalize relations as quickly as possible?" Results: "Yes"—58.2 percent; "Better to go ahead"—23.8 percent; "Better not to hurry"—12.0 percent; "No need of normalization"—0.2 percent; "Don't know"—5.8 percent.

[15] *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), March 2, 1971. Before the normalization of Japan-China relations in September 1972, trade between the two countries consisted of two types: "Memorandum trade" and "friendly-firms" trade. The former was conducted through the Japanese and Chinese Memorandum Trade Offices (established by a formal memorandum in 1962) and accounted for 10 percent of Sino-Japanese trade in 1971. The latter, handled by Japanese firms which the Peking government deemed to be "friendly" to China, made up 90 percent of the trade volume in 1971.

[16] *Ibid.*, July 3, 1971.

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principles." In the July 1971 document put out at the close of the Komei Party deputation's visit to Peking, for example, the Japanese had stressed the "three principles," while the Chinese had stated:

If the Japanese government will accept the above principles and take practical steps for their implementation, it will be possible for China and Japan to sign a peace treaty bringing to a close the state of war and restoring diplomatic relations.[17]

Similarly, a joint communiqué signed in October 1971 by the (Chinese) Sino-Japanese Friendship Association and a visiting delegation of the Japanese Diet Members' Association for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations had contained references by both parties to the "three principles," but only the Japanese side had taken an unambiguous stand on the "Taiwan-prior-to argument":

The Japanese side . . . resolves to exert its full effort to make the Japanese government accept these principles, and on the basis of these principles negotiate with the government of the People's Republic of China for a peace treaty which ends the state of war and restores diplomatic relations.[18]

These same skeptics also noted that Japanese visitors to the China mainland who were not wedded to the idea of acceding to the "three principles" before the start of negotiations had come away convinced that the Chinese were not adamant on the subject. For instance, Takeo Miki, an influential member of the Diet and the Liberal-Democratic Party who had journeyed to Peking in mid-April 1972, had reported:

There has been much talk [in Japan] about the abrogation of the Japan-China Peace Treaty—talk about "Taiwan-prior-to" arguments and theories about how the conversations would proceed—but my impression is that the Chinese side is more concerned about the Japanese government's fundamental policy toward China than about problems of business detail [like the timing of the Japanese government's acceptance of the "three principles"].[19]

In order to bolster their contentions further, these observers cited certain specific features of Chinese behavior. In May 1972, for example, Premier Chou En-lai had told the members of a second mission from the Komei Party:

If the prime minister of the new government wishes to come to China, we will not be able to refuse him. It has been impossible to deal with the Sato cabinet, but if the new cabinet sets out on a new path to normalization of Sino-Japanese ties, than we will welcome this.[20]

Moreover, after the formation of the Tanaka cabinet in July, not a single person of importance in the Peking government had uttered a word concerning the "three principles."

The Taiwan Problem

Apart from the question of how far Peking might require Japan to go toward acceding to the "three principles" before it would consent to talks on normalization of relations, there was also the question of how rigid (or flexible) the Chinese leaders would be in negotiating on the substantive issues involved in the actual implementation of the principles if the Japanese government accepted them. There were essentially two central issues: (1) the effect of the second principle (*i.e.*, that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China) on Japan's future relationship with the island; and (2) whether or not the transfer of Japanese recognition to the PRC would, by itself, satisfy the third principle (*i.e.*, abrogation of Japan's 1952 peace treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek government) or whether that treaty would have to be formally abrogated and, further, whether a new peace treaty between Japan and the PRC would have to be concluded.

It goes without saying that, on the Taiwan issue, the Japanese government found itself in an extremely difficult dilemma. Not only was it deeply conscious of the fact that Japan had enjoyed friendly relations as well as mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Taiwan over the past twenty years, but it also had to recognize that the Nationalist government bore no responsibility for Japan's dilemma and should not have to suffer unduly as a consequence of a normalization of Japan's relations with the PRC. The Tokyo government therefore hoped that Peking

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1971.

[19] Takeo Miki, *Chugoku Homon ni okeru Hatsugen-shu* (Speeches Concerning My Visit to China), n.p., n.d., p. 12.

[20] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Tokyo), May 24, 1972.

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would not be so rigid in its interpretation of the second principle as to insist upon the immediate and total severance of all Japanese connections with Taiwan. In taking this position, the government appeared to have the support of a majority of the Japanese public, notwithstanding the heavy preponderance of popular opinion in favor of a speedy normalization of relations with Peking.[21]

While the government had not indicated how it might go about obtaining legalization of continued *de facto* Japanese relations with Taiwan after the normalization of Japan-PRC relations, some LDP members—as a possible way out of the dilemma—had conceived a formula under which the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, following Japan's withdrawal of recognition from it as a duly-constituted independent government, would be accorded the status of a "belligerent group." Under international law, this status applies to a group in rebellion against the government of the parent state, having control of part of the state's territory and a governmental organization through which it manages the affairs of the region under its control, and maintaining its own military forces. It is immaterial whether the group seeks to overthrow the central government of the state or to establish a new state separate from the original homeland. In spite of the provisional nature of such a group, its recognition as a legal entity in international law is possible and would permit other states to engage in peaceful commerce and intercourse with it.

Admittedly, there appeared to be scant likelihood that Peking would explicitly agree to any formula according "belligerent" status to Taiwan. Nevertheless, so long as Taiwan retains its present *de facto* independence from Peking, such a solution would have certain practical advantages for the PRC as well as for Japan. This is because, under these conditions, if injury were to occur to the lives or property of Japanese nationals residing in Taiwan, the Peking government would in fact be unable to investigate the matter and take appropriate action. For this reason, those LDP members who proposed the formula saw some possibility that the PRC leaders might be willing to accept at least a tacit understanding according Taiwan something like "belligerent" status pending the ultimate resolution of the reunification issue between Peking and Taipei.

The Treaty Issue

The question of how Japan's 1952 peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government would have to be handled and the related question of whether a new peace treaty would have to be concluded between Japan and the PRC in order to end the state of war that Peking claimed still existed between the two countries raised complex considerations. This whole matter was rendered even more complex by the fact that Japanese interpretations of the scope and force of the 1952 treaty had differed over the years.

At the time the treaty was originally concluded, the Japanese government of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida insisted upon limiting its applicability to only such territory as was then under the Chinese Nationalist regime's control or might come under its control in the future. After lengthy negotiation, an understanding to this effect was embodied in an exchange of notes between the negotiators on both sides.[22] Later, when the treaty came under discussion in the Japanese Diet, Premier Yoshida made it quite clear that Japan considered the treaty not legally applicable to the mainland of China. He declared:

Since the Japan-China treaty was signed with the Taiwan regime, it has no relation to the Chinese Communist regime. As for the question of what sort of relations should [*eventually*] *be established* [*with the latter*], *I think that we had best wait for future developments before deciding.*[23]

Some five years later, however, the government of Nobusuke Kishi substantially altered this interpretation of the treaty's scope. The government now

[21] On the question, "What should be Japan's relations with Taiwan when it normalizes state-to-state relations with Mainland China?," the July 1972 *Sankei Shimbun* public opinion poll referred to earlier showed the following results: "Sever every tie with Taiwan"—5.5 percent; "Maintain trade and exchange of persons"—72.2 percent; "Stick to present relations"—2.6 percent; "Very uncertain"—14 percent; "Don't know"—5.2 percent.

[22] The notes stated that "the terms of the present treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of its government." Japanese Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Collection des Traités*, Vol. 30, No. 56, October 1952, pp. 1-2.

[23] *Dai Jusankai Sangiin Gaimuiinkai Kaigiroku* (Proceedings of the 13th Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Councillors), Tokyo, Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1952, Vol. 5, No. 43, p. 6.

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maintained that the war with China had been settled entirely by the treaty and that—as Premier Kishi told the Diet in 1957—". . . in essence, a state of war with China no longer exists." [24] In 1959 Aiichiro Fujiyama, Foreign Minister in the Kishi cabinet, reiterated this position:

As far as we the government are concerned, with the signing of the Japan-Nationalist China Treaty with the then legitimate government of China, this problem in Sino-Japanese relations was settled. Consequently, since that time we have not deemed that a state of war exists. It is a fact that diplomatic relations have not been restored [with the PRC], but on the whole we do not consider this to be a state of war.[25]

Thereafter the Japanese government's position regarding the 1952 treaty remained essentially unchanged. It again came into question, however, as Japan in recent months began moving toward a normalization of relations with the Peking government, which had demanded—in its third principle—abrogation of the 1952 treaty. In response to inquiries from the Liberal-Democratic Party's Council on Normalization of Japan-China Relations, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in August 1972, issued this rather baffling statement:

If Japan were to recognize the People's Republic of China, this would mean that the Nationalist government would be replaced by the government of the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government of China, but this would not be a recognition on our part of an altogether new nation-state (that is, the People's Republic of China). Both the China that is presently represented by the Nationalist government (that is, Nationalist China) and the China that will be represented by the government of the People's Republic of China after our recognition (that is, the People's Republic of China) are one and the same state.[26]

Despite the obfuscatory language, what this statement boiled down to was that, in Japan's view, there had merely been a shift of central governmental powers from the Nationalist regime on Taiwan to the PRC government in Peking; that the 1952 treaty, though concluded with the Nationalist regime only, was nonetheless a pact between Japan and China; and that therefore the transfer of Japanese recognition from Taipei to Peking would not require the negotiation of a new peace treaty with the PRC.[27] As to when legitimacy as the government of China would pass from the Nationalist regime to the government in Peking, Tokyo took the position that the shift would occur—so far as Sino-Japanese relations were concerned—from the moment of Japan's recognition of the PRC as the lawful government of China.

Japanese officials were aware, however, that Peking had taken a clear-cut position on the treaty issue. The Chinese Communists had declared war on Japan in 1932, during the Manchurian conflict;[28] therefore, after gaining power in 1949, they had consistently maintained that a treaty would be necessary to bring an official end to the state of war between the PRC and Japan. As far as the 1952 treaty between Japan and the Chiang government on Taiwan was concerned, moreover, Peking would have logic on its side in contending that the transfer of legitimacy from the Nationalist regime to the PRC government had really occurred in 1949, since it was then that the larger part of Chinese territory came under Chinese Communist control and since the PRC government had thereafter functioned as the central power of the state. It would follow from this that the 1952 Japanese peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government, concluded three years after the establishment of the PRC, could have no validity so far as Japan-PRC relations were concerned.

Even on the Japanese side, there had been recognition that, although Japan had never issued a declaration of war against China, a state of war had in fact existed for some length of time and might require a formal agreement to terminate it. However, if Japan were required—as a condition for the

[24] *Dai Nijurokkai Kokkai Shugiin Gaimuiinkai Giroku* (Proceedings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 26th National Diet), Tokyo, Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1957, Vol. 2, No. 15, p. 9.

[25] *Daisanjuikkai Kokkai Shugiin Gaimuiinkai Giroku* (Proceedings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, House of Representatives, 31st National Diet), Tokyo, Finance Ministry Printing Office, 1959, Vol. 2, No. 17, p. 2.

[26] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Aug. 16, 1972.

[27] It should be noted that the Foreign Ministry statement, issued a week after the installation of the Tanaka government, seemed to conflict with an agreement reportedly reached prior to the Liberal-Democratic Party's election of Tanaka as its new president between the leaders of the party's three factions (Tanaka, Masayoshi Ohira, and Takeo Miki) to cooperate on the conclusion of a peace treaty with the PRC. See *Asahi Shimbun*, July 3, 1972.

[28] See Kenichi Hatano, Ed., *Shiryo Shusei Chugoku Kyosanto-shi—1932* (A Documentary History of the Chinese Communist Party—1932), Tokyo, Jiji Tsushin-sha, 1961, pp. 22-24.

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normalization of Japan-PRC relations—to negotiate a full peace treaty to settle a war which actually ended 25 years ago, she would—as the defeated power—be placed in a highly disadvantageous bargaining position with respect to such questions as war reparations and territorial issues (although with regard to the former Peking had indicated that it did not intend to present any claims).

Tokyo's Negotiating Posture

These uncertainties further fueled a longstanding argument among the Japanese about what the Japanese posture should be at the time of negotiations with the People's Republic of China on the normalization of state-to-state relations. One group of Japanese advocated a type of diplomacy similar to that employed before the Opium War in the 1840's by those countries on China's periphery with whom China had established a tributary relationship. Under this system, the tributary power accepted beforehand the superior position of the Chinese dynasty and, by acting out the subservient role, tried its best to reap some actual rewards. In practice, this tack frequently worked to the advantage of the tributary nation. In terms of trade, protocol required that the tributary power make presentations of gifts to the dynastic court in China, but the gifts that the dynasty in turn bestowed on the tributary nation always amounted to more than what the court received.

A leading proponent of such a negotiating posture, Kaheita Okazaki, argued as follows:

If we were to consider Japan still at her point of defeat and trying to make peace, then it would not be fitting that she should issue conditions, but rather it is obvious that the terms stated by the other side should become the basis for talks. . . .

If we were to imagine that these last twenty-odd years had not passed and we were back at that moment of defeat, then [Japan's situation] would be identical to [that of] Percival when he surrendered to General Yamashita in Singapore. We cannot imagine that then peace really [would be] impossible.[29]

Another group of Japanese favored a type of diplomacy which prevails in the Western international system, *i.e.*, neither party reveals its "hand" before the negotiating exchanges begin. Under this concept, one operates on the premise that the interests of the parties differ. As in commercial bargaining, each party tries to come to terms at a point which brings the greatest advantage to itself, through tactics such as concealment of the "cards in hand" and the points that it is willing to concede.

Those who supported this kind of posture maintained that Japan possessed important cards that it could play in the negotiations, notably the economic "ace." Moreover, they contended that even if one discounted the gulf that had separated the Chinese and Japanese peoples for twenty-odd years, it ought to be recognized that foreign observers might tend to see a "tributary" type of diplomacy as obsequious and thus to perceive the drive for normalization as an effort to open up the China market rather than as a move to rectify a past Japanese policy of hostility and aggression against China. These foreign onlookers knew that Japan had the third-largest productive capacity in the world—equal to that of all the rest of Asia combined and four times that of Southeast Asia alone—and that China was a large and potentially powerful country (with a population of more than 700 million) trying to strengthen her economy as rapidly as possible. Hence, they would be inclined to conclude that Japan, having more or less exhausted the potential of the Taiwan and South Korean markets, was looking for additional outlets for its goods, and that it was willing to inflict injuries on a hapless Taiwan for the sake of its own economic benefit.

Such a judgment, the argument went on, could ultimately have adverse effects on Japan's prosperity by causing a loss of confidence in Japanese good faith. This loss of confidence, in turn, could heighten suspicions, particularly in the countries on the periphery of China, of possible collaboration between Japan and China in pursuit of Asian domination, and could strengthen resentment abroad of Japanese overseas activities. These suspicions and resentments, combined with an increase in Peking's influence over 18 million Overseas Chinese in Asia, might eventually spark movements to exclude Japanese goods and perhaps even to institute boycotts

[29] This quotation is from a speech Okazaki delivered at a symposium which was later published in *Ajia* (Tokyo), Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1972, pp. 42-43. Okazaki served as an executive in a bank in Japanese-occupied Shanghai during World War II, and after repatriation he was President of All-Nippon Airways for many years until his retirement in 1970. He has been and still is active in Sino-Japanese relations as representative of the Japanese Memorandum Trade Office.

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against Japanese nationals. Efforts of this sort could hurt badly in light of Japan's network of close ties with a wide variety of countries, both large and small. Trade statistics for 1971, for example, indicate that Japan imported nearly $20 billion worth of goods, including more than 200,000 tons of iron ore and 600,000 tons of crude oil daily, while it exported during the same period $24 billion worth of products. Hence, the retention of the trust of other countries was vital to Japan's own well-being.

The Tanaka Visit

A great many of these matters had already been firmly settled by the time Prime Minister Tanaka left Tokyo for Peking on September 25. Although in a formal statement in July he had only gone so far as to affirm an "understanding" of the Chinese position regarding the "three principles," [30] in fact Japan had in several indirect ways acceded to them in full prior to the start of negotiations. To begin with, the Sato cabinet had earlier embraced the first principle (that the PRC government would have to be recognized as the sole and legitimate government of China).[31] As for the second, the Tanaka government from time to time had "leaked" to the press acknowledgments that Japan would be forced to accept China's position that Taiwan was a part of China's territory.[32] Finally, the third principle was dealt with in Foreign Minister Ohira's statement of August 9 to the effect that the Japan-Taiwan treaty would be annulled at the time of the normalization of relations between Japan and China.[33]

This acceptance of the "three principles" in practice essentially determined the Japanese posture during the negotiations, for what remained open to discussion was really the implementation of the principles. Moreover, the fact that Premier Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira relied on Diet members Furui and Takeiri, both of whom had previously endorsed the "three principles," as liaison agents in the pre-negotiation dealings with Peking [34] made it exceedingly difficult for the government to keep its "cards" concealed.

Such a low posture on Japan's part may have been at least to some extent responsible for China's warm reception of Tanaka and Ohira. Indeed, press reports leave the impression that their reception was far warmer and friendlier than the one which President Nixon had received the previous February. Yet the posture netted Japan little in the negotiations on the implementation of the three principles.

In the joint Sino-Japanese communiqué issued on September 29 (see the accompanying box for the full text), China yielded nothing of substance but merely made some concessions on wording and phrasing. For example, the communiqué contains a clause which, in roundabout fashion, conveys Japan's acceptance of China's long-standing claim to Taiwan: "The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration." Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, in turn, reaffirms the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which called for Japan to return Taiwan to China. In other words, Japan confirmed that it regards Taiwan as belonging to China, and since Tokyo now recognizes the Peking government as the sole and legal government of China, sovereignty over Taiwan thus passes to the People's Republic of China.

As regards the matter of Japan's 1952 peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government and the conclusion of a new peace treaty with the PRC, Premier Tanaka, confronted with China's insistence on the illegality of the 1952 treaty and the need for a new peace treaty, finally abandoned the arguments that the Japanese had put forth against the requirement for a new treaty. China did, however, make a small concession in agreeing to refer to the matter only obliquely in the joint communiqué. Thus, the communiqué spoke of the end of the state of war in these terms:

The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan—the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

In short, it did not explicitly reject the Japanese contention that the 1952 peace treaty with the

[30] Jiyuminshuto Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Kyogikai (Council on Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations, Liberal-Democratic Party), *Nitchu Kokko Seijoka Kyogikai Daiikkai Sokai Kaigiroku* (Proceedings of the First General Meeting of the Council on Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations), mimeo., July 24, 1972, p. 5.

[31] *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 25, 1972.

[32] *Ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1972.

[33] *Ibid.*, Aug. 9, 1972 (Evening edition).

[34] *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Sept. 29, 1972 (Evening edition).

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Normalizing Relations

AT THE INVITATION of Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China from September 25 to 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka were Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other Government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. The two sides had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, all along in a friendly atmosphere, on various matters between the two countries and other matters of interest to both sides, with the normalization of relations between China and Japan as the focal point, and the two sides agreed to issue the following joint statement of the two Governments:

China and Japan are neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, and there was a long history of traditional friendship between them. The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan—the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself. The Japanese side reaffirms its position that in seeking to realize the normalization of relations between Japan and China, it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

Although the social systems of China and Japan are different, the two countries should and can establish peaceful and friendly relations. The normalization of relations and the development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples, and will also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace.

(1) The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People's Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement.

(2) The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation [see accompanying article, p. 12].

(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from Sept. 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to adopt all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of functions of embassies in each other's capitals in accordance with international law and practice and exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

(5) The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, it renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan.

(6) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the governments of the two countries affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

(7) The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

(8) To consolidate and develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship.

(9) In order to further develop the relations between the two countries and broaden the exchange of visits, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc., in accordance with the needs and taking into consideration the existing nongovernmental agreements.

—Official English text (verbatim) of the joint communiqué issued by the PRC and Japan on Sept. 29, 1972, as released by New China News Agency.

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Chinese Nationalists had ended the state of war between Japan and China, but it firmly maintained the Chinese position that the "realization" (*i.e.*, implementation) of the end of the state of war remained to be accomplished, meaning that a new treaty—defined elsewhere in the communique as a "treaty of peace and friendship"—would have to be concluded.

Nor did the low posture render the Chinese very forthcoming on other issues of interest to the Japanese side. According to press accounts, Premier Tanaka proposed a discussion of the problem of the Senkaku Islands, which lie between Taiwan and the southern Ryukyus and which both Japan and China claim as national territory, but Premier Chou demurred.[35] The two leaders do seem to have gone into the question of nuclear weapons and arms control; however, they apparently reached no concrete conclusions.[36] In response to a personal inquiry put to Chou, it has been reported, Premier Tanaka did receive an assurance that China would not collude with the Japan Communist Party[37]—although Tanaka later denied that any such exchange had taken place.

Results and Prospects

How, then, are the results of the Tanaka visit to Peking to be assessed? What, in the broadest terms, has each of the two powers directly involved —the PRC and Japan—gained from the understandings reached in Peking? What impact are those understandings likely to have on the future course of Sino-Japanese relations, as well as on the two powers' relations with other Asian nations and the rest of the world? So soon after the event, such an assessment must necessarily be tentative and perhaps somewhat subjective, but certain elements in the picture nevertheless seem fairly clear.

From the perspective of Peking, the gains achieved through the normalization of relations with Japan must be highly gratifying indeed. In terms of internal politics, the PRC government, by obtaining formal Japanese recognition, has bolstered its legitimacy as the sole government of China, including Taiwan. In so doing, it has not merely succeeded in further isolating its rival claimant to such legitimacy—the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan—but has acquired a solid juridical basis for challenging any residual Japanese links, direct or indirect, with that regime at whatever future time Peking deems it advantageous to do so.

Even more significant perhaps, Peking can justifiably view the rapprochement with Tokyo as having significantly strengthened the PRC's international position. From the economic standpoint, the way has been opened for the PRC to obtain freer access to Japanese supplies of capital equipment, advanced industrial technology, and financial credits so vitally needed to further the development of the mainland economy. From the political standpoint, Peking's gains are several and no less important. By reestablishing friendly relations with the PRC's most powerful Asian neighbor, Peking has dealt a damaging blow to whatever designs Moscow may have to encircle and contain China and, to that extent, has greatly enhanced the national security of the PRC. At the same time, it may reasonably see the rapprochement with Japan as attenuating the tendency of post-World-War-II Japanese governments to look toward the United States rather than toward Asia for assurances of Japan's own national security and economic prosperity.

Politically also, the normalization of relations with Japan must no doubt be viewed in Peking as a further major breakthrough in the PRC's new international diplomacy aimed at broadening its contacts with the outside world and remedying the injurious effects of the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution period. Particularly in Asia, the effects of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement may be far-reaching. Peking has good reason to expect that practically every Asian government that has not yet established diplomatic relations with it will now become more favorably disposed toward doing so. The only remaining questions are when and how, and the answers are likely to depend mainly on Peking. If the PRC adheres to its present course of curtailing assistance to rebellious movements abroad in favor of cultivating friendly relations with the established national governments, it undoubtedly stands a good chance of expanding its prestige and influence in Asia as well as elsewhere, incidentally gaining the opportunity to develop closer contacts with the 18 million Overseas Chinese residing in various Asian countries.

On the Japanese side, the rapprochement with Peking has certainly produced short-term political benefits for Premier Tanaka and his government, as

[35] *Tokyo Shimbun* (Tokyo), Oct. 2, 1972.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Akahata* (Tokyo), Oct. 3, 1972.

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well as certain gains—and possible losses—for Japan as a nation. To dispose of the former first, there is little question that the successful achievement of the rapprochement has consolidated the personal leadership positions of Premier Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira within the LDP and has markedly enhanced the Tanaka government's popularity in the country. These gains are strikingly reflected in the changed tenor of the news media, which had been overwhelmingly critical of the status-quo China policy of the preceding Sato cabinet but are now voicing warm support of the Tanaka government's normalization of Japan-PRC relations. The resolution of the China problem has also removed—at least for the time being—a major source of opposition-party criticisms of the LDP and thus appears to have significantly improved the ruling party's prospects in the coming general elections to the House of Representatives, which must be held by the beginning of 1974 but which the government is now expected to call sooner in order to capitalize on its China achievement. (It is difficult to predict whether this achievement will result in an increase in the Tanaka-Ohira faction's share of LDP representation in the Lower House inasmuch as foreign-policy questions rarely become major issues in interfactional party struggles. Moreover, even if they were to become an issue in the present case, it is doubtful that the outcome of the China mission would necessarily benefit the Tanaka-Ohira faction because there is a strong feeling among the more conservative elements of the LDP that both men—particularly Foreign Minister Ohira—were more submissive to Peking's demands, and more ready to cast aside Japan's ties with Taiwan, than was necessary.)

To turn to the gains for Japan as a nation, it must be recognized that, above all, the rapprochement between East Asia's two most powerful countries—at odds with each other for close to a century—constitutes a major stride toward the stabilization of East Asian politics and hence toward greater national security for Japan. Tension had existed between Japan and China almost continuously since 1886 when a Chinese naval force visited the port of Nagasaki and the sailors got into street fights with Japanese police; and it had been a constant obstacle to the construction of lasting peace and stability in East Asia. It would obviously be wrong to say that the understandings reached in Peking have removed that tension overnight, but they at least represent a significant first step toward dissolving the miasma of nonconfidence and distrust that has enveloped relations between the two governments and toward setting their relations on a new and more fruitful course that could turn the tide of history in Asia.

Another gain for Japan is that the normalization of relations with the PRC represents a significant accomplishment of Japan's own new international diplomacy. As pointed out earlier, since the nation's defeat in World War II, Tokyo governments had generally adhered to a low-posture, passive role in international affairs. However, as Japan gradually rebuilt its economy to become the world's third-ranking industrial power, such a role became incongruous, and there has been a steadily growing desire among Japanese to see their government assume a more positive and independent role commensurate with the nation's rising international position. The move to restore relations with China is a response to this desire, and it marks an important initial advance toward a more active participation by Japan in the affairs of Asia.

Of direct benefit to both Japan and China, of course, will be the stabilization of economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries. Since the Tanaka visit to Peking, the Japanese press has been filled with highly optimistic predictions concerning the prospects for expanded Sino-Japanese trade,[38] but it is difficult to foresee just how sizable an increase will actually occur. Factors favoring stepped-up trade are: (1) Peking's current pursuit of more rational and pragmatic economic policies designed to hasten national development and (2) the fact that the Japanese government is now ready to provide loans to underwrite Sino-Japanese trade, and that the PRC is agreeable to dealing on these terms. On the other hand, there are some limiting factors as well: (1) the continuing slow rate of the PRC's economic growth; (2) the generally low income-level of the mainland population, which restricts the ability to purchase sophisticated consumer goods; and (3) the likelihood that the PRC will seek to avoid excessive dependence on trade with Japan, which already accounts for more than 20 percent of the PRC's total foreign trade. Despite

[38] The most optimistic estimate has been made by the Mitsui Bussan Company. In August 1972, it forecast that during the five years after the normalization of relations Sino-Japanese trade would increase to 5.6 times the 1971 volume—that is from $900 million in 1971 to $5 billion in 1977. Of the total trade over the five-year period, $5 billion of China's exports would constitute scheduled repayments under its delayed-payments agreements. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Aug. 23, 1972.

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these restricting factors, the author's own estimate is that the volume of Japan-PRC trade is likely to expand at a rate of 4-10 percent annually as long as Peking's current economic policies continue to succeed.

Against these gains for Japan, certain losses have to be weighed, the most important being the damage done to Japan's relations with Taiwan. The Tokyo government had originally hoped to effect a rapprochement with the PRC in such a way as to avoid provoking anti-Japanese feeling on the part of the Chinese Nationalist regime, but this proved impossible in view of Peking's firm insistence that the normalization of Japan-PRC relations must be accompanied by the severance of all official Japanese ties with the Chiang government. The results of the Tanaka mission to Peking thus produced a far sharper reaction in Taipei than had the outcome of President Nixon's earlier talks with the PRC leaders. Although the Tokyo government still maintains that economic and cultural relations between Japan and Taiwan can continue, there are already indications that Japanese investments on Taiwan are being sharply cut back and that Japan's sizable trade with the island will also suffer as the Nationalist government, backed by popular resentment of Tokyo's new course, moves to decrease Taiwan's economic reliance on Japan as much and as quickly as possible.

Kakuei Tanaka, Premier of Japan, examines a statue within Peking's Forbidden City.

—UPI photo.

Tokyo's new understanding with Peking could also have some unfavorable side-effects so far as Japan's relations with other Asian countries and with Australia and New Zealand are concerned. Even though most of these countries publicly welcomed the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, and despite the fact that the joint communiqué issued at the close of the Tanaka visit explicitly disavowed any intention on the part of either Japan or the PRC to seek hegemony over Asia, it would only be natural for some of the governments of the area to be somewhat apprehensive that collaboration between the two most powerful East Asian states might prove detrimental to their security and national interests. It was, in part, to allay these possible apprehensions that Foreign Minister Ohira included visits to Australia and New Zealand on the itinerary of his post-Peking round-the-world mission, which also took him to the United States and the Soviet Union. Tokyo likewise dispatched special envoys to South Korea and several Southeast Asian countries with the same purpose in mind.

The effect of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement on Japan's relations with the Soviet Union is somewhat problematical. There can be no question that the reconciliation was highly unwelcome to Moscow, which fears a possible combination of an antagonistic China with its formidable manpower and vast natural resources and an economically powerful Japan with its high-level technology and abundant capital. The only bargaining card that the Russians had to deter Japan from proceeding to mend relations with the PRC was an offer of concessions with respect to Japan's claims to the disputed northern islands lying between Hokkaido and the Kurile island chain, which

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the Soviet Union annexed at the close of World War II. That bargaining card was not played, and now that the reconciliation between Tokyo and Peking is an accomplished fact, Moscow is probably debating whether a tougher or a more conciliatory line toward Tokyo would be more effective in curbing Japanese enthusiasm for close collaboration with the PRC.

Japan's reconciliation with the PRC also poses certain potential problems affecting Tokyo's relations with Washington. To be sure, Premier Tanaka was careful to inform President Nixon in advance of Japan's intentions in the negotiations with Peking, and as far as one can judge from reports in the Japanese press, the US government does not appear to be overly concerned by the outcome of the Tanaka mission. Nevertheless, Japan's explicit recognition of Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan could give rise to thorny questions regarding the interpretation of Article 6 of the Japan-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which authorizes US use of American military bases in Japan for the preservation of the security and peace of Japan and the Far East. Tokyo has hitherto agreed to interpret the term "Far East" as including Taiwan, and it has assured Washington that it does not intend to alter this interpretation. So long as the PRC continues to refrain from trying to reunite Taiwan to the Chinese mainland by force, no problem should arise, but if the contrary were to occur, Japan obviously would be placed in an awkward position.

Let us turn now to the longer-term prospects for Sino-Japanese relations. As already noted, the normalization of state-to-state relations constitutes a first step toward dispelling the lack of confidence between Tokyo and Peking and thus opens up new possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. It also eases, though it does not completely eradicate, Japanese feelings of guilt about Japan's past behavior toward China.[39] This will help in the development of more detached and objective attitudes toward Chinese affairs among Japanese intellectuals and journalists. On the one hand, taboos concerning China that have long prevailed in some quarters will tend gradually to disappear; on the other hand, those Japanese journalists who have been most laudatory of the PRC will likely find less justification than before for viewing China uncritically, especially now that the special access to China that their positions have afforded them will eventually diminish, if not vanish.

But this easing of Japanese guilt feelings vis-à-vis China carries with it certain dangers. The Japanese suffer from an intense love-hate syndrome with respect to China. Among all Japanese, to a greater or lesser extent, there is a sense of identification with China which grows out of the notion of a common destiny; however, because of this perceived bond, the Japanese are inclined to manifest hatred and contempt for China whenever its behavior dissatisfies them. An overwhelming guilt complex served as a powerful restraint on the Japanese and prevented their adoption of an overly critical attitude toward China, but now that this restraint has at least been relaxed, the pendulum of Japanese emotions could conceivably swing wildly back and forth or, even worse, toward the extreme of hatred and contempt.

The leadership in Peking seems to be acutely aware of this possibility, for it has given assistance and encouragement to pro-Peking journalists investigating Japanese excesses during Japan's occupation of China in an obvious effort to keep positive and negative feelings on the part of the Japanese people in balance. Yet there is still definite potential in the current situation for activation of the Japanese love-hate syndrome regarding China. As mentioned previously, the Japanese press has recently contained highly optimistic assessments of the possibilities for Sino-Japanese economic relations, but this optimism could prove to be unwarranted. If so, and if Sino-Japanese economic competition in Third World markets should become unexpectedly severe and/or disputes over the Senkaku Islands or over the exploitation of the resources of the continental shelf (particularly oil reserves) should arise, it is not at all impossible that popular Japanese attitudes toward China could grow exceedingly negative.

In short, the intricate and complex problems of Sino-Japanese relations cannot be resolved in a day or even in the course of one summit meeting. Dealing with them will require great patience and wisdom as well as detached analysis on both sides.

[39] The joint communiqué of September 29 included an explicit expression of these feelings: "The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself."

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"Red vs. Expert": Peking's Changing Policy

By Martin K. Whyte

Atension between the revolutionary ideologues and politicians who lead Communist polities and the technical and cultural intellectuals who serve them seems by and large to be endemic to all Communist societies. In some of these societies, this love-hate relationship, while it may not have been totally resolved, has at least been reduced to a manageable level after the original generation of ideologues-politicians and intellectuals has passed (or has been driven) from the scene. Its successors, reared for the most part in the same set of institutions, have had much more in common than did the first generation.

In China, however, no such accommodation has yet been reached. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-69 witnessed the broadest attack thus far against experts and intellectuals (as well as bureaucrats), and although the current trend is back toward favorable treatment of intellectuals, many ambiguities and uncertainties remain. This article will outline the nature of the attack on intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution, discuss the specific measures taken to deal with their defects, and examine the most recent trends in the treatment of experts.[1]

The Maoist Critique of Intellectuals

It is clear that by the early 1960's Mao Tse-tung had serious misgivings about the way intellectuals were being trained and employed in China. He saw the general educational system and special cadre schools as producing personnel who were not only poorly suited to China's developmental needs but also elitist and bureaucratic in outlook. One of the clearest expressions of his view is contained in his observations to a visiting delegation of Nepalese educators in 1964:

Our education is fraught with problems, the most prominent of which is dogmatism. . . . The school years are too long, courses too many, and various methods of teaching unsatisfactory. The children learn textbooks and concepts which remain [*simply*] *textbooks and concepts; they know nothing else.* [*They*] *do not use their four limbs; nor do* [*they*] *recognize the four kinds of grain. . . . Therefore I advise you not to entertain any blind faith in the Chinese educational system. Do not regard it as a good system. Any drastic change is difficult,* [*as*] *many people would oppose it. At present a few may agree to the adoption of new methods, but many would disagree. . . . Generally speaking, the intellectuals specializing in engineering are better, because they are in touch with reality. Scientists, pure scientists, are worse, but they are still better than those who specialize in arts subjects.* [*Liberal*] *arts subjects are completely detached from reality. Students of history, philosophy, and economics have no concern with studying reality; they are the most ignorant things of this world.*[2]

On several other occasions at about this time he made similar comments. To an educational work conference on February 13, 1964, he said:

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[1] For present purposes, one can define China's intellectuals as those who have passed a given level of formal academic training, generally at least upper middle school (*i.e.*, complete secondary schooling).

[2] Cited in Jerome Ch'en, Ed., *Mao Papers*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 21-22.

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. . . T'ai-tsu and Ch'eng-tsu were the [only] two successful emperors of the Ming Dynasty. One was illiterate and the other was able to read not many characters. Later, when the intellectuals came into power under the reign of Chia-ching, the country was poorly run. Too much education is harmful, and one with too much education cannot be a good emperor. . . . Franklin of the United States started his life as a newspaper vendor. Watt was a worker, but he invented the steam engine. . . . The present schooling system, curriculums, and methods of teaching and examination must all be changed because they trample people underfoot.[3]

Or consider his remarks to a December 21, 1965, conference in Hangchow:

It takes a total of 16, 17 or 20 years to reach the university from primary school, and in this period one never has a chance to look at the five kinds of cereals, to look at how workers do their work, how peasants till the fields, and how traders do business. In the meantime, one's health is also ruined. Such an educational system is harmful indeed. I said to my child once: "When you go to the countryside, tell the poor and lower middle peasants: My papa says that one who goes to school for several years becomes more stupid as he reads more books. Ask your uncles and brothers and sisters to be your teachers and learn from them." [4]

While the accuracy of Mao's picture of the existing educational system in these statements may be questioned, he was certainly correct in telling the visitors from Nepal that many people would oppose the educational reforms he had in mind. The issue of how to train and how to use intellectuals became a central question during the Cultural Revolution, and the schools were, of course, a primary arena of the struggle. Liu Shao-ch'i and his supporters were charged with fostering elitist educational policies which turned out graduates who were both ignorant of practical matters and honored and deferred to in decision-making. According to the Maoists, the contributions of intellectuals to Chinese society were overvalued, while the ideas and experience of the masses of ordinary workers and peasants were underrated.

To be sure, the immediate targets of the Cultural Revolution were in the main high party officials rather than intellectuals *per se*, but one of Mao's major grievances against high party officials involved their advocacy of policies which he saw as placing too much importance on intellectuals and the knowledge that they possessed. Moreover, the scope of the assault on policies favoring intellectuals was so broad, and the measures undertaken to change this situation so extensive, that few of China's experts can have escaped drastic alterations in their lives.[5]

What were the specific criticisms made of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution? These fall into four broad categories:

1. Intellectuals and experts had too much influence on decision-making within various organizations. In factories, research institutions, schools, etc., they used their claims to special expertise to protect their own status and to monopolize technical (not political) decisions. Their subordinates, given little voice in technical matters and little chance to join the ranks of experts, were inclined to follow higher decisions blindly instead of manifesting initiative and a sense of responsibility.

2. Intellectuals tended to be armchair theorists, divorced from practice and from the masses. They tended to rely on what they had absorbed from textbooks or foreign journals, instead of on what they could learn from their surroundings and subordinates. They were inclined to work on narrow topics of interest largely to themselves and other intellectuals, but of little value to society, in the hopes of gaining personal fame. When called upon to move outside this narrow framework or to perform simple tasks, they were often incapable (*e.g.*, an electrical engineer frequently could not change a fuse). Because of their poor contact with the masses, they often made decisions—such as designing bad work rules and procedures—which caused discontent and less efficient performance among those to whom these decisions applied.

[3] From the collection *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, translated in *Current Background* (Hong Kong), No. 891, Oct. 8, 1969, pp. 42-43.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[5] Point Twelve of the Aug. 8, 1966, "Sixteen Points" of the CCP Central Committee—which established the basic policy line for the Cultural Revolution—did include the statement that "special care should be taken of those scientists and scientific and technical personnel who have made contributions." (See Union Research Institute, *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1967*, Kowloon, 1968, p. 52). However, this "special care" applied only to technical intellectuals; furthermore, it is not clear how great a technical intellectual's "contribution" had to be to qualify him for such "special care." At least those involved in high-level defense work and nuclear-weapons programs seem to have benefited from the injunction in Point Twelve.

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3. Intellectuals tended to be elitist, to feel that their training and expertise entitled them to special treatment and privileges. From their childhood, they were oriented toward a career rather than toward serving in whatever capacity the country needed them. When mobilized to perform manual work, they often complained that their talents were being wasted. They cherished good posts in comfortable (generally urban) surroundings, instead of being eager to serve in remote or uncomfortable locales.

4. In light of the preceding criticisms, intellectuals were overabundant. Given the low value of the contributions by intellectuals, most organizations could get by with far fewer of them, and the rest could be sent to remold themselves or to perform more necessary tasks at lower-level jobs.

These and similar criticisms turn up again and again in the Cultural Revolution polemics in every field—in education, industry, the arts, science, and so forth. Throughout this period, "red" was glorified, and "expert" de-emphasized; knowledge gained from practice was extolled, while knowledge gained from study was devalued; and manual labor was honored, while mental labor was downgraded. Instead of producing personnel qualified as both "red" and "expert", China's post-1949 institutions were seen to be turning out intellectuals with most of the same faults as those of the pre-1949 period. The sources of the knowledge needed to direct China's revolution and modernization were declared to be Mao himself and "the masses," rather than the cadres and intellectuals in between. Intellectuals, if they were to play a useful role in society, would have to merge with the masses, carry out manual labor, and derive their ideas from these experiences. They themselves would not be a fundamental source of ideas and decisions, but would be more midwives to the birth of the ideas of the masses.

This line of thought can be carried further. Is the midwife even necessary? Are not the masses themselves, if given proper encouragement and perhaps brief training, capable of making obsolete the functions of many, if not all, intellectuals? [6] We see emerging during the Cultural Revolution an argument not very different from that voiced by Lenin in 1917 in *State and Revolution:*

Capitalist culture has created large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal service, telephones, etc., and on this basis the great majority of functions of the old "state power" have become so simplified and can be reduced to such simple operations of registration, filing and checking that they will be quite within the reach of every literate person, and it will be possible to perform them for "workingmen's wages," which circumstance can (and must) strip those functions of every shadow of privilege, of every appearance of "official grandeur." [7]

In Russia, the vision of a society without a separate stratum of mental workers and officials was quickly abandoned after 1917, but we find at least a partial reappearance of this vision in China after 1966. The concrete measures adopted to deal with the problem of intellectuals in China were (as we shall explain in depth later) of a somewhat mixed character. Some seemed designed to render intellectuals less necessary in the running of Chinese society, while others appeared to reflect a desire to retain intellectuals as a distinct stratum but to reform them and the institutions that train and employ them.

The GPCR and Its Aftermath

The Cultural Revolution's most immediate impact on intellectuals was to force many of them throughout Chinese society to "stand aside"—because they found themselves under attack as "dragons and monsters" (the label used for the new types of "class enemies" uncovered during the Cultural Revolution) or simply under suspicion. However, its effect plainly varied for individuals with different positions in society and over time. Teachers provided a healthy share of those consigned to the category of "dragons and monsters" in 1966, but after that the focus of struggle passed to other, generally more highly-placed intellectuals. On his visit to China, Ross Terrill was told by Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, that during the Cultural Revolution the Academy institutes in the natural sciences kept working, while the institutes

[6] This issue is discussed in Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Limits of 'Tradition versus Modernity' as Categories of Explanation: The Case of the Chinese Intellectuals," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, Mass.). Spring 1972, pp. 71-78. Klaus Mehnert, one of the early visitors to China during the post-Cultural Revolution "thaw," comments: "And never, anywhere, have I heard or read so many derogatory remarks about experts—technicians or engineers—as in today's China. One would also suppose they must be a gang of saboteurs or ignoramuses. The word has gone out that only the masses are creative; specialists are mocked and held up to ridicule." See his *China Returns,* New York, Dutton, 1972, p. 176.

[7] *State and Revolution,* New York, International Publishers, 1943, p. 38.

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in the arts and social sciences were, with the exception of archaeology, suspended.[8]

With the information presently available, it is difficult to trace precisely which segments of the heterogeneous lot of Chinese intellectuals were struggled against, which were simply ignored during the heat of struggle against other targets, and which continued to toil away despite these struggles; but it is clear that most Chinese intellectuals were subjected to severe criticism and personal uncertainty throughout the Cultural Revolution and the ensuing "cleaning-out of class ranks" and "struggle, criticism, transformation" campaigns. Teachers, engineers, scholars, technicians, and all other manner of intellectuals had to "pass the gate" of mass criticism. During the Cultural Revolution itself, some intellectuals (as well as a variety of cadres and officials) experienced beatings, house searches, arrests, and consignment to forced labor. During the subsequent campaigns to "clean out the class ranks" and "struggle, criticize and transform," intellectuals and cadres were criticized and dealt with according to whether they were adjudged unregenerate enemies of Maoism, persons guilty of less serious errors either of commission or of political attitude, or enthusiastic supporters of the Cultural Revolution. The unregenerate enemies generally lost their posts and in some cases suffered house arrest or confinement to forced labor camps. Those with lesser faults were treated more gently but still were not deemed worthy of a clean bill of political health. They were compelled to participate in concrete programs designed to eradicate their "remaining" defects.

Members of the faculty and staff of Peking and Tsinghua Universities work alongside local peasants in reinforcing a dam as part of land reclamation on a "May 7" cadre farm at Liyuchou.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 10, 1970, p. 47.

In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, a large number of study classes were set up to cope with a variety of problems. Leading cadres were sent in rotation to study classes in an effort to expunge remnants of support for the policies of Liu Shao-ch'i, the prime personal target of the Cultural Revolution, and to form a unified Maoist political outlook among China's post-Cultural Revolution elite. Members of competing Red Guard factions were thrown together in study classes as a means of trying reconcile their differences. And intellectuals were assigned to study classes, often with representatives of veteran workers and peasants, in an attempt to eliminate their elitist notions.

Staff-reduction campaigns were also carried out. Cadres and intellectuals who were declared superfluous to the functioning of their organizations were reassigned to lower-ranking, often manual-labor posts within these organizations, or were sent down to other units. Some accounts mention staff reductions of 40-50 percent.[9] A portion of the reassignments were temporary, with staff members going to work at lower-level posts in rotation, but many were permanent. Some of these changes contributed to the effort to rectify urban-rural imbalances, as urban medical personnel and others were reassigned to rural posts. Though all the foregoing measures had been employed periodically prior to the Cultural Revolution, now a more extensive attempt was made to subordinate intellectuals to manpower needs while attacking their hostility toward manual labor and low-status positions.

The step that has received the greatest attention outside China has been the establishment of "May 7th Cadre Schools," aimed, like the previously discussed measures, at both intellectual and administrative cadres. Such entities were not completely novel, for "cadre farms" had existed in China before the Cultural Revolution as places for cadres to do

[8] Ross Terrill, *800,000,000: The Real China*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1972, p. 70.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

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manual labor and undergo political reeducation. But in 1968 a new network of May 7th Cadre Schools was set up throughout China.[10] Since then, intellectuals and administrators have been sent to these "schools" to engage, for varying periods of time, in farm labor and political study.

The May 7th Schools differ from the corrective labor camps to which serious political offenders are confined in that the "schools" are not, in theory, considered penal or punitive, but educational. There is considerable evidence that at least in the early days this distinction was lost on some of the cadres assigned to these institutions, for there have been frequent reports that many of the first "students" felt that they were being punished or were losing status compared to other cadres.[11] However, the authorities have endeavored to improve the image of the May 7th Cadre Schools, and while the earliest "students" often stayed for two or three years, more recent reports indicate that terms of about six months are to be the norm, with no cadres to be exempted from periodic attendance.

Cadres in these schools are supposed not merely to improve their political and labor attitudes by splitting their day between farm labor and political study, but also to overcome their elitism by mingling with the peasant masses. The latter undertaking has proved to be something of a problem in practice since most May 7th Schools have been founded as separate organizations on spare or reclaimed land. Thus, elaborate visitation arrangements with neighboring communes have had to be worked out in order to provide the needed mass presence. In any case, these May 7th Cadre Schools are a new, massive attempt to provide all cadres with regular experiences of humbling manual labor.

Reform of Education

Other measures adopted since the Cultural Revolution have sought to change the manner in which cadres and intellectuals are trained and used. Here we can see most clearly the effort to downgrade the importance of intellectuals and perhaps make them less necessary for the running of Chinese society. First, a broad range of reforms has altered the educational system. In general, these reforms have followed the line that Mao Tse-tung was advocating before the Cultural Revolution. The period of schooling has been shortened—broadly speaking, from six to five years for primary school, and from six to four or five years for middle school. No longer can anyone go straight from school to university and then on to a cadre position; all students must spend at least two years in labor or military service before they are eligible for higher education. Selection for university education is based upon the recommendations of work and military units, and apparently little regard is shown for past educational levels or academic performance. In the pre-Cultural Revolution schools, students were by no means free of labor requirements, but now regular labor courses inside the schools as well as labor stints outside are more systematically built into the program. The aim is to turn out graduates who have valuable work skills, in the likely event (given the expanding enrollments of lower schools and the constricted enrollments of universities) that they will be unable to continue their formal education.

The schools have also been taken out of the control of educational professionals. Pre-Cultural Revolution teaching materials have been denounced, and new texts have been drafted—often, especially in lower-level schools, with the active participation of local workers, peasants, and cadres. The objectives have been to increase the political content of, and bring the experience of the masses into, the materials being studied. With many former teachers still under a cloud and with school enrollments expanding, it has proved necessary to recruit many new teachers. Part-time teachers for work-experience courses have been drawn from among local workers and peasants, and new full-time teachers have often been hired from among available working personnel, rather than from among the graduates of teacher-training institutions. Primary schools no longer fall under the direct jurisdiction of local offices of the Ministry of Education; they are administered by "educational leading groups," which are described as dominated by local workers or poor and lower-middle peasants assigned by the revolutionary committees of local units.

With respect to the curriculum, many traditional academic courses have been discarded or de-empha-

[10] The name of the schools alludes to Mao's May 7, 1966, directive, which denounced specialization among soldiers, workers, peasants, and students. (Mehnert, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-63, contains a translation of this directive.) However, the schools themselves were not generally created until after Mao's Oct. 4, 1968, directive on the topic of manual labor for cadres.

[11] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking) Aug. 18, 1969; Aug. 22, 1969; Sept. 2, 1969; October 14, 1969; and Oct. 17, 1969. These articles are part of a series on the May 7th Cadre Schools which is still continuing.

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sized in favor of subjects considered more in keeping with China's current needs—labor, military training, politics, basic mathematics and science, and so forth. The effect of these changes has been to eliminate many of the primary- and secondary-school courses (*e.g.*, foreign languages, history) that were considered more appropriate for those going on to higher education, and to replace them with courses appropriate to a career of labor.

The picture in higher education is a little more clouded, partly because the university reforms are still at a more preliminary and experimental stage. Mao Tse-tung has set the tone by saying that universities, particularly scientific and technical ones, are still needed, and that these should be modeled on the technical training conducted by the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant.[12] About liberal arts colleges, he has been considerably more vague, stating simply that they should take the entire society as their factory.[13] Neither of these ideas has been easy to implement.

For example, the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant takes workers from their posts, provides them with intensive training for limited periods, and then elevates them to posts as factory technicians or even engineers. Behind this approach lies an assumption that the new technical personnel will not be the armchair theorists of the past, but will be intimately acquainted with work problems and the workers themselves. The problem comes in applying such a model to national technical universities rather than to training institutions attached to particular factories. To move toward this goal, it has been necessary to establish factories and workshops within these universities or to set up alliances and training arrangements with a variety of outside enterprises.

In any event, the reform of technical universities has involved the recruitment of the student body from among those who already hold military or work posts, a reduced period of study, a curriculum trimmed of what are regarded as esoteric or superfluous courses, and extensive practical work experience. Similar changes have been carried out in arts colleges, but in these institutions it has proved much more difficult to devise types of work experience closely related to the subjects of study.

As a result of these reforms, the university graduate will now be the product of a compressed period

Workers with practical experience do on-the-spot teaching at the Shanghai Institute of Mechanical Engineering.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 12, 1968, p. 18.

of formal schooling and a longer and more intimate contact with manual labor. At least some graduates will be returning to their former organizations, where they will be expected, despite their new educational credentials, to retain their humility and willingness to labor. In theory, then, university as well as middle-school graduates will not have the sense that they belong to a distinctive stratum of intellectuals, but will still regard themselves as members of the working masses.

Once these non-intellectual intellectuals are on the job, they will encounter a variety of procedures that have been adopted to prevent them from developing elitist sentiments. We have already mentioned the periodic stints in May 7th Cadre Schools and in manual-labor posts. In addition, all cadres and intellectuals in mental-work positions are supposed to spend a regular number of days a month down at lower-echelon positions within their organizations. The making of technical decisions is not to be the exclusive province of the technically-trained but a joint effort (as was already the case before the Cultural Revolution in some units) of "three-way alliances" of cadres, workers, and the technically-trained. This measure is viewed as a means of keeping intellectuals from indulging in empty theorizing and of affording the workers a chance to express

[12] *Ibid.*, July 22, 1968.

[13] This comment is contained in Mao's 1964 talk to Nepalese educators. Translated in Ch'en, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

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their ideas. A great deal of publicity is now being given to the ability of ordinary workers to come up with useful ideas and innovations when their more highly-trained comrades have been unable to do so, and ordinary workers are being encouraged to engage in activities ordinarily thought to be the province of intellectuals—such as writing poems, essays, and short stories, and studying philosophy, including the works of Marx and Engels. Individuals with work experience but few educational credentials are also being assigned to a number of jobs usually reserved for those with such credentials, *e.g.*, the new teachers previously mentioned and the "barefoot doctors" who have vastly expanded China's medical establishment in recent years.[14] In all these ways, the principle that the academically-trained are not so important or irreplaceable is being followed in China today.

Contrary Trends

Many aspects of the recent treatment of Chinese intellectuals that we have been sketching have applied to students, bureaucrats, and others, as well as intellectuals; and many have been far from novel, reflecting programs with which the Communists experimented as early as the 1930's. But the total package has constituted a broad new effort to correct the deficiencies that Mao Tse-tung saw in the policies pursued toward intellectuals in the early 1960's. The purpose of the effort has been both to eradicate the defects of the existing intellectuals and to guarantee that future intellectuals are not so distinctively intellectual.

At the moment, however, a modification of this dual goal appears under way. Recent Chinese press reports suggest that the dialectical pendulum has swung back toward the center, with the contributions of Chinese intellectuals being given increased emphasis. The vista of a China without intellectuals, or with intellectuals no longer so important, seems to be gradually receding. What are these indications of contrary trends?

Since the close of the Cultural Revolution, the attack on "revisionism" in China has been increasingly matched by denunciations of "ultra-leftism." "Ultra Leftism" in current usage (the term is always placed in quotation marks in the Chinese media) refers to ingenious attempts by rightists to discredit "true leftists" by advocating anarchism and other more radical deviations. Liu Shao-ch'i, interestingly enough, is accused of both "revisionism" and "ultra-leftism" simultaneously, but the critics of "ultra-leftism" have clearly had in mind more immediate targets than Liu. Perhaps the most important has been the "May 16th group," which has been charged with plotting to take over national power. One of the group's more prominent figures, a former Foreign Ministry official, Yao Teng-shan, is accused of having instigated the 1967 attack on the British Embassy in Peking. Still more eminent figures, such as Ch'en Po-ta, formerly Mao's personal secretary and a member of the Politburo, have apparently been held indirectly responsible for the activities of the May 16th group.

While the precise details behind these charges of "ultra-leftism" remain obscure, it is clear that some people have been accused of advocating such things as abolishing schools completely (or at least all examinations and grades within schools), doing away with rules and regulations within factories and other organizations, ostracizing intellectuals until they have completely reformed their "bad" ideas, and similar policies. Notions of this kind are all under attack, and the campaign against "ultra-leftism" has provided the rationale for a toning down of the anti-intellectual policies of the Cultural Revolution.

Just as comments by Mao—like "the more you study, the more stupid you become"[15]—were quoted in justification of the policies of the Cultural Revolution, other remarks by him—such as "the arduous undertaking of socialist construction in our country requires the service of the greatest possible number of intellectuals"[16]—are now cited in support of the new line. His statements have also been used to bolster the contention that 90 or 95 percent of the pre-Cultural Revolution cadres are "good or comparatively good" and, rather than being excluded from their old posts, should be allowed to assume work responsibilities while they remold their ideological thinking.[17] Perhaps the capstone of this shift

[14] A variety of short-term training courses have been instituted to help the relatively uneducated acquire the skills necessary for teaching and dispensing medical care. See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Dec. 14, 1971; and Victor W. Sidel, "The Barefoot Doctors of the People's Republic of China," *New England Journal of Medicine* (Boston), Vol. 286, No. 24, June 15, 1972, pp. 1292-1300.

[15] Quoted by Chou En-lai at a Sept. 10, 1966, Red Guard rally. See *Current Background*, No. 892, Oct. 21, 1969, p. 44.

[16] *Wen Hui Pao* (Shanghai), Sept. 22, 1968.

[17] The 95-percent figure for "good and comparatively good" cadres given by Mao is cited in *ibid.*, April 12, 1967; the 90-percent figure is quoted in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 12, 1968.

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in emphasis came when Mao, confiding his regrets about the British Embassy incident to French Ambassador Etienne Manac'h and the visiting Maurice Couve de Murville, maintained that he himself was not really a leftist but a "center-leftist."[18] All these verbalizations point to a more moderate drift in China's policies toward intellectuals.

The most evident result of this moderation of policy has been the restoration of the great bulk of intellectuals and cadres to their posts, or to jobs of some sort. Mao's statements imply that at least 90 percent of the former cadres should be reinstated, but the actual ratio of reinstatements thus far seems to have varied widely. The figures reported range from "an absolute majority" to 95-98 percent.[19]

Not all those "emancipated" have been reinstated in the same jobs as before, but there are signs of a trend in this direction as well. Recent press accounts give prominence to the numbers of "old" cadres and intellectuals (*i.e.*, those serving before 1966) who have taken on leadership responsibilities and entered or reentered the Chinese Communist Party. Other stories say that technical specialists cannot work well when they are assigned to work outside their field of training, and that they should be shifted back to work in their specialties.[20] When "some comrades" complain that these trends look suspiciously like the "specialists-in-command" line that was attacked during the Cultural Revolution, they are told that they are suffering from an "ultra-leftist" misunderstanding, and that restoring intellectuals to important posts has nothing to do with the policies of Liu Shao-ch'i. If they point out that many of those who have been restored to key posts still harbor serious ideological defects, they are informed that the way to eliminate such defects is to involve the cadres and intellectuals in work, instead of isolating them, in an "ultra-leftist" fashion, until they have fully reformed. And when other critics gripe about being subjected to new work regulations and disciplinary procedures, they are informed that they have been misled by the anarchist notion that all such "methods of operation" are bureaucratic attempts to "supervise, restrict, and suppress" the masses.[21] Here again, it is claimed that new rules and regulations designed to improve organizational discipline have nothing in common with the "slave mentality" that Liu Shao-ch'i is accused of having favored.

In general, then, there has been a growing stress on the importance of the services of intellectuals, and correspondingly, less emphasis on the proposition that the thinking of intellectuals must be remolded before they can be useful. This shift in accent is also evident in the treatment of the millions of educated youths who have been sent to settle in the countryside since 1968. At first, the official line was that the attitudes of these youths badly needed to be reshaped through subjection to agricultural labor and reeducation by the poor and lower-middle peasants. Recent months, however, have witnessed increasing publicity about intellectual youths who are not so much objects of change as they are agents of change—who are using their educational backgrounds to take up posts as rural cadres, barefoot doctors, schoolteachers, and so forth.[22] Thus, the importance of exploiting the fruits of formal education is being recognized.

[18] Ross Terrill, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[19] *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), March 7 and 15, 1972; *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Jan. 26 and March 29, 1972.

[20] *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Feb. 4 and March 30, 1972.

[21] Ibid., Jan. 20, 1972; *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Jan. 22, March 5, and April 5, 1972.

[22] See, for example, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Dec. 14 and 28, 1971.

Professor Hua Lo-keng, head of the Institute of Mathematics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and vice-president of the Chinese University of Science and Technology, discusses with workers how his book Overall Planning Method *can be used to save time in checking and repair work at the Peking Hsinhua Printing House.*

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 4, 1972, p. 34.

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Probably the clearest indication of the shift in emphasis comes from occasional references in the Chinese press to work that was done poorly because the masses—rather than intellectuals and cadres, or a combination of elements—were running things. Consider the case of geological team No. 909 in Kiangsu Province, as described in a recent newspaper report.[23] Originally, great stress was placed on remolding the thinking of the technical personnel of the team through manual labor. However, sending most of the geologists down for manual labor had an adverse outcome. In the words of the report, "insufficient information was collected, and there was nobody to do comprehensive research. Consequently, they [the survey team] reached the [false] conclusion that a rare-metal mine which had been generally surveyed had no industrial value." To avoid further mistakes of this sort, geologists were put back on the job, although political reeducation and manual labor for cadres were not wholly abandoned.

The problem, however, has been more than one of simply reinstating intellectuals and other cadres in their old positions; it has also involved measures to restore their morale and persuade them to work to full capacity. A variety of published accounts reveal that technical personnel, even though reinstated, have been reluctant to exercise their abilities, and that leading cadres have been reluctant to give them important jobs—both groups apparently fearing that they will be charged with "specialists-in-command" deviations. This difficulty is being attacked by study classes and propaganda designed to counteract "ultra-leftist" deviations. Moreover, the conditions that produce timidity on the part of intellectuals are being modified. For instance, the report on the Kiangsu prospecting team mentioned above indicates that when technical personnel now make technical mistakes, the mistakes are treated simply as such, and not as evidence of political errors like "divorce from the masses" or "divorce from practice." In other words, the range of things for which experts can come under political attack has been narrowed. The report observes that this heartened the technicians on the prospecting team, who consider the change proof of "the party's concern and care for, as well as trust in, intellectuals."[24]

A variety of straws in the wind in other areas of Chinese life seem to fit in with the foregoing picture. The educational reforms have been modified somewhat in practice, with examinations and rote learning in the classroom being accepted as necessary parts of the overall program. Devotion of a minimum of 70 percent of the curriculum in rural primary schools to cultural (as opposed to political and labor) courses has been advocated. Subjects which were earlier abandoned as superfluous have now been restored to the curriculum. For example, the study of foreign languages, at one time attacked as unnecessary, has been reemphasized in recent months. Indeed, there have been experimental programs conducted in which foreign-language training starts in the first year of primary school![25] Even the May 7th Cadre Schools have undergone some modifications. Not only has the average term of stay for cadres been shortened, but in some cases provisions have been made so that cadres can keep up with their specialized training and studies while there.[26] Ch'en Yung-kuei, the party secretary of the model Tachai agricultural brigade, which was extolled after 1964 for emphasizing the political mobilization of the masses (rather than bureaucratic coordination or technical modernization), has recently endorsed a shift toward mechanization and technical modernization as a primary solution for rural production problems.[27] And there have recently been reports that in the Chinese armed forces, where the predominance of man over weapons has been stressed for roughly a decade, technical modernization and training in military skills are to be upgraded in the future.[28]

In sum, there is a variety of evidence that in the wake of the Cultural Revolution the attack on intellectuals is being increasingly tempered and balanced by a renewed accent on the importance of intellectuals, of the institutions that train and employ them, and of the products of their labor. The reasons for this shift are not entirely clear, but some of the evidence already cited leads the author to believe that the Chinese authorities found the contributions of intellectuals difficult to dispense with. While the intellectuals may not have been able to run Chinese society without the active input of the masses, neither could the masses run society without the active input of the intellectuals. So even though the Cultural Revolution has not succeeded in completely transforming the consciousness of intellectuals and removing their defects, Peking has nevertheless

[23] *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, March 30, 1972.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 12, 1969; *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, Mar. 25, 1972.
[26] *Peking Review*, No. 19, May 12, 1972, pp. 5-7.
[27] *Ibid.*, No. 39, Sept. 24, 1971, pp. 12-14.
[28] The New York Times, July 2, 1972.

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deemed it essential to use them and to give them significant roles to play. Thus, the experiences of recent years suggest that the regime cannot easily get intellectuals to stop acting like intellectuals but at the same time cannot do without them.

The Future

What can we say, then, about the prospects for China's experts and intellectuals? It would seem premature to this writer to predict that the Cultural Revolution represented a last fling at radicalism, and that the future for intellectuals is bright. While the vista of a society without a distinct stratum of intellectuals is receding from view at the moment, it may not disappear permanently. There are a couple of important reasons for thinking so.

First, the current trends toward more favorable treatment of intellectuals have been limited in nature. For instance, the quickest return to grace has been experienced by technical intellectuals, a group which—as we saw at the outset—Mao never regarded as having defects as serious as those of cultural, educational, and other intellectuals. Intellectuals of the latter sort have come out from under the Cultural Revolution cloud more slowly, and their status remains more ambiguous. In addition, the most recent policy pronouncements do not reflect a return to the pre-Cultural Revolution status quo; rather, they represent a lesser shift—to paraphrase Mao—from "left" to "center-left." The ideological defects of intellectuals are still heavily emphasized, and intellectuals are not simply being left alone to do their work, but are being required to participate in the routine of political study classes and the May 7th Cadre Schools, as well as to engage in manual labor on a rotational basis.

A second and more important reason to expect continued travail for Chinese intellectuals in the future is the dialectical or cyclical nature of change in Chinese society. Whether the events of the Cultural Revolution have instilled Maoist attitudes in Chinese intellectuals or not, they clearly have failed to resolve the red-vs.-expert problem. A separate stratum of intellectuals continues to exist and, despite the recent upheavals, to enjoy positions of higher status (although perhaps greater political risk) than the masses. Opposition to this fact of Chinese life also persists. The recent attacks on "ultra-leftism" suggest that considerable resentment toward intellectuals remains, particularly among the "new cadres" who earned their jobs through Cultural Revolution activism and now increasingly find themselves having to share power with "emancipated" old cadres and intellectuals. Thus, the powerful anti-intellectual sentiments that surfaced after 1966 still appear to be alive, ready to fuel future conflicts of red *vs.* expert and mental *vs.* manual labor. Given the pendulum swings in the past with respect to official policy toward intellectuals, the most prudent forecast would seem to be that the present conciliatory mood will prevail until grievances over the inadequacy of reform and the continuing privileged position of the intellectuals mount to dangerous levels, at which time a new effort to downplay the intellectuals and glorify the masses will most likely be initiated.

Mao Tse-tung himself lent credence to this possibility in a 1967 statement on the Cultural Revolution. He said: "The present great cultural revolution is only the first, and in the future there are bound to be others. The question of who will win in the revolution will be settled only over a very long historical period."[29] The main uncertainty is whether such a new cycle can be set in motion without Mao's personal initiative while he remains on the political scene, or without his authoritative presence when he passes from it.

[29] *Jen-min Jih-pao,* May 23, 1967.

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Mongolia's Measured Steps

By Paul Hyer

In the half century since its foundation in 1921, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) has succeeded in surmounting major external threats and internal weakness to emerge as a largely autonomous, modernizing Communist state. Although Mongolia remains heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for its defense, its foreign trade, its political ethos, and even its alphabet, the MPR has achieved recognition by some 50 governments, has gained admission to the United Nations, and engages in trade with two dozen states. Domestically, it has made great strides in mobilizing its once-nomadic population for the task of developing a mixed agrarian-industrial society. Mongolia's position is of particular interest today, when, as so often before, the Mongols once again find themselves at the crossroads of geopolitics—not, as in the 13th century, as a principal actor, but as a ringside observer of great-power rivalries which might at any moment spill over to affect the destiny of the Mongol state. The American phase-out in Viet Nam and President Nixon's visit to Peking, the continued manifestations of the Sino-Soviet split in border clashes and propaganda warfare, and Japan's recognition of the MPR and of the People's Republic of China this year—all indicate that the center of gravity in the developing "great-power quadrilateral" has shifted to the Eurasian heartland.[1]

While it is not yet clear what impact today's great-power rivalries will have on the MPR, Mongolia's vulnerability to external forces has been an essential fact of life ever since it renounced vassalage to the Manchu Empire at the time of the Chinese Revolution of 1911. In order to understand Mongolia's situation today, one must review these forces —as well as the internal factors—which shaped the MPR in its early decades. While there is no clear-cut watershed between the early stages of statehood and the contemporary era, it seems useful for purposes of this discussion to make a rough division at the year 1952, when the deceased Choibalsan was replaced as head of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party by Yumzhagyn Tsedenbal—representing a new leadership generation—who remains at the helm of the regime today.

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Sheep Among Wolves

The Mongols' search for political autonomy has been long and perilous. As part of the Manchu Empire, the Mongols had been spared absorption and assimilation by the hated Chinese because the latter were consciously restrained by the Manchus from colonizing and economically exploiting the Mongol lands. But at the outset of the 20th century, Peking awakened to the emerging challenge of Russian colonial expansion and began to thrust Chinese railroads, farm settlements, merchants, and administrators into the Mongol region. This imperial rivalry for control of Mongolia continued into the postrevolutionary era of both states, yet the Mongols of Outer Mongolia have somehow eluded the fate of their fellow peoples in the Buriat area and Tannu Tuva (now both incorporated into the USSR) and in southeastern Mongolia (now the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region within the People's Republic of China), and have arrived at a relatively secure status in the international community. The price of independence has been a strong Soviet tie, and as we shall see,

[1] See *The Military Balance, 1971-1972, London,* International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.

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even the Soviet benefactor has apparently not been above contemplating annexation of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The first attempt to establish an independent Mongolian state came in 1911, when the Mongols availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the turmoil of Sun Yat-sen's revolution to break away from China. But in 1915 Mongolia was forced into a demeaning tripartite agreement dictated by Russia and China. Four years later, while Russia was in the throes of the Bolshevik Revolution, China reoccupied Mongolia. The area was soon drawn into the Russian Civil War and was temporarily occupied by the White Russian forces of Baron Ungern von Sternberg. Finally, a new beginning and nominal independence were achieved with the establishment in July 1921 of the Provisional Revolutionary Mongol People's Government (more on this and its change in 1924 into the Mongolian People's Republic below) under the close guidance and control of Soviet Russia.[2] China, however, continued to be a potential threat.

Both the Nationalists and Communists in China paid lip service to the principle of Mongolian autonomy, but the behavior of both groups toward Mongols within China and even toward the MPR itself betrayed a deeper, more traditional desire to absorb all Mongol areas into a reunified China. Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) at first advocated Mongolian autonomy; but in fact, from 1921 on no Chinese force was in any position to challenge the Soviet-sponsored regime in Outer Mongolia, and the Mongols living in Inner Mongolia were never able to separate from China and join Outer Mongolia, both because of economic ties and because of Chinese military security considerations. Conversely, Sun's newly-established Chinese Republic lacked the power either to fully integrate Inner Mongolia into its state system or to protect the Mongol inhabitants of the area from predatory Chinese frontier warlords. As the years passed, the Chinese republican government in Nanking grew progressively less sensitive to Mongol interests, while regional forces like those of Fu Tso-yi became more intent upon colonization of Mongol lands and repression of movements seeking separation from or limited autonomy within the Chinese state.

Similarly, though Mao Tse-tung and his followers made quite liberal pronouncements regarding Mongol aspirations for self-determination during the early years of the Chinese Communist movement and through the 1930's, they too displayed an obvious reluctance to countenance the loss by China of the Mongol areas and continued to regard the MPR as a Chinese *irredenta*—an attitude more befitting traditional Chinese imperialists than Marxists. For example, in 1936 Mao told Edgar Snow that, once the "people's revolution" was accomplished, Mongolia would of its own free will return to the fold as part of a Greater China.[3]

The domination of Outer Mongolia by foreign elements, even through the 1920's, was evidenced in the country's trade—domestic and foreign. More than half of the region's internal commerce remained in Chinese hands. Three-fourths of its foreign trade was handled by foreign firms—principally from England, the United States and Germany. Soviet firms accounted for only three percent of the total foreign trade at this time, but a radical change occurred in the 1930's as the MPR government assumed monopoly control over the total economy and shifted foreign trade relations almost exclusively to the USSR. Only in the post-World War II era did Mongolia's foreign trade contacts again take on broader dimensions and complexity.

The 1930's brought a major new external threat to the MPR as Japan began to expand on the continent. This threat reached its high point with the Japanese invasion of 1939 in the region of Khalkhingol (Nomonkhan), which was repulsed thanks to a massive commitment of Soviet forces under the command of G. K. Zhukov. The Mongols have forgotten neither the Japanese threat nor their Soviet protector. However, during World War II, the Soviet Union itself formally annexed Tannu Tuva—a part of the MPR which had long been under Soviet domination—and may even have entertained notions of annexing the MPR as a "Soviet republic."[4] (Any such ideas were apparently forestalled in part by the emergence of a strong Communist China and the resulting desirability of maintaining a convenient buffer state in this region.)

The end of World War II saw the MPR move toward greater international respectability. In a plebiscite ordered by the Yalta Conference and held on October 6, 1945, the Mongols predictably voted in favor of continued independence—of course, under the protection of the USSR. The Nationalist Chinese,

[2] See Charles Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, New York, Praeger, 1968, Chapters 5 and 6.

[3] Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, Random House, 1944, p. 96.

[4] The author has encountered rumors to this effect among certain Japanese press sources.

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Yu. Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the MPRP (Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party) and Chairman of the MPR Council of Ministers, in Moscow on Aug. 14, 1969, presents the jubilee medal "The 30th Anniversary of the Khalkhingol Victory" to Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, commander of the Soviet troops which helped repulse the Japanese invasion of Mongolia in 1939.

—TASS photo via Sovfoto.

who had opposed the plebiscite, now reluctantly recognized the MPR (on January 5, 1946). Chiang Kai-shek doubtless viewed this concession as a small price to pay for Stalin's continued recognition of his own regime at a time when the Nationalist government faced a mortal threat from the Chinese Communists. However, using a border clash with the Mongols at Pei-t'a-shan (Baitagh Bodgo Mountain) in Sinkiang in 1946 as the pretext, Chiang sent no ambassador to Ulan Bator. Then, in 1951, having retreated to Taiwan and not wishing to go down in history as having given up a piece of territory which the Chinese considered part of China, Chiang rescinded the Nationalist recognition of the MPR. For their part, the Chinese Communists were quick to recognize the MPR and exchange ambassadors with Ulan Bator after seizing power on the mainland in 1949. However, the People's Republic of China, too, remained unreconciled to Mongolian independence and apparently tried, unsuccessfully, to pressure Stalin into permitting Chinese reannexation of the MPR in return for China's participation in the Korean War.[5]

The early postwar period brought two other important political developments that contributed indirectly to Mongolia's rising international stature. These were the sovietization of Eastern Europe and the decolonialization of Asia and Africa. In 1950 six East European satellites of the USSR recognized Mongolia, and in the following decade a number of newly-independent nations in the Third World also established relations, paving the way for the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic into the United Nations in October 1961.

Launching the Revolution

Throughout this long period of struggle to ward off successive external threats, the Mongols had also had to grapple with massive internal problems. At the turn of the century, the Mongol nation was declining in numbers, its culture was stagnant, the chances for political expression seemed nil, and the society was fraught with debt and poverty. The incursions by Russian and Chinese colonizers were steadily shrinking the once limitless Mongol base on the steppes and threatening the ancient homeland of the Khalkhas itself. A first chance for Mongol resurgence came in 1911 with the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty, but the opportunity was lost because of many factors—among them, the lack of leadership, unity, and a military force. This first "revolution" was swept away by Chinese authority in 1919, but the forces of divisiveness and decline continued to prevail.

The successive occupations of Mongolia by China and the White Russians during the Bolshevik Revolution set the stage for Mongolia's own Communist revolution, which was consummated in the years 1921-24. As Charles Bawden has noted, this revolution was an imitation, or by-product, of the Bolshevik Revolution and was closely guided and controlled from Moscow.[6] Given the historical setting and the limitations of the objective circumstances, it is perhaps unrealistic to wish that the Mongolian revolution had been very different from what it was, but it is tragic that reform forces in Mongolia were never permitted to work out their own destiny without the

[5] M. P. Haggard, "Mongolia: The First Communist State in Asia," in Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, 2nd rev. ed., Englewood-Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1969, p. 109.
[6] Bawden, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

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great cost of Soviet-inspired manipulations, purges and counterpurges.

The heroes of the 1921 revolution were Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan. Both men were of humble background, but—among a largely illiterate people—both had some education and, more important, also spoke Russian well—a factor which suited them for their role in giving birth to a "people's republic" under the aegis of Soviet Russia. A fervent nationalist distressed with the chaos and misery he saw among his people, Sukhe Bator had earlier gathered about him a small party of fellow ex-soldiers. Choibalsan, also a Mongolian patriot, was a dedicated Marxist who had himself organized a revolutionary group of alienated civilians and former officials and Buddhist lamas. Encouraged by the triumph of the Bolsheviks in Russia, these two—still in their twenties—decided in January 1920 to bring together the several dozen Khalkha Mongols of their two groups and form a new "People's Party of Outer Mongolia." This was the kernel of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which itself held a founding congress in March 1921 just across the border in Kiatkha, Siberia—a site dictated by the woeful lack of support for a revolutionary movement within Mongolia at the time. The movement suffered also from inadequate finances and the absence of an armed force with which to promote its revolutionary cause, and it appeared doomed to failure. However, it was rescued by the dispatch of Comintern advisers and Soviet Red Army units which helped the MPRP occupy Urga (now Ulan Bator) and set up a Provisional Revolutionary Mongol People's Government in July 1921.

Communizing the Revolution

In its early years of precarious existence, the new nation was administered by a provisional coalition government (it was only in 1924 that the nation adopted its present title—the Mongolian People's Republic) that combined the revolutionaries and various former nobles and lamas, with the Jebtsundamba "Living Buddha" as a figurehead ruler. The ruling MPRP in these early years lacked popular support, had but a narrow base in outlying areas, and was weakened by internal divisions. Throughout the 1920's power struggles and personality conflicts swirled about a major division which pitted left-wing radicals, who favored a firm Soviet alliance and a more radical socialism, against more moderate to conservative right-wing leadership, who wanted true autonomy, gradual reform, and territorial expansion to realize the ideal of a Pan-Mongolia.

Not surprisingly, the dominant force or motivation in these early years was nationalism, but to combat this trend, Soviet state security agents and Comintern personnel allied themselves with the radical young party members. By the late 1920's, when the latter group felt sufficiently secure, it began to purge its opponents from the party ranks. Blood purges were indeed successful in communizing Mongolian politics over the next two decades. By 1939 the only surviving member of the original MPRP Presidium and Secretariat was Choibalsan, who ruled Mongolia in a distinctly Stalinist style marked by additional bloody purges and a Choibalsan "personality cult."

As it Sovietized intraparty relations, the MPRP also launched an ambitious experiment of social and economic engineering designed to transform the society and culture—indeed, the whole nation—into a Soviet-style Marxist state. The first step was to abolish hereditary privileges, and the party soon stripped the old quasi-feudal nobility of its wealth, status and power. Next came a more direct attack upon the clergy of the Lamaist Church, which controlled large holdings of land and livestock and had kept large segments of the population in virtual servitude. During the 1930's, the MPRP forcibly crushed the Church—at a heavy cost of lives, administrative resources, and even economic production—to a point where it was unlikely ever to make a comeback. The attack on the Church coincided with the forced collectivization of the nomadic herdsmen, and both campaigns created such tensions and reactions that the regime felt constrained to moderate collectivization in the early 1930's and to proceed toward "socialism" in a more gradual manner.

Throughout the prewar period, the shadow of the Soviet Union stretched long over Mongolia, into virtually every corner of Mongolian life. There was a strong and continuing Soviet presence in the MPR—economic and military advisors and various political agents from the Comintern. Thousands of Mongolians, in turn, received specialized education in the USSR, and Russian became the second language of the MPR. Moscow's influence was most evident in Mongolia's formal institutions—political, social, and economic—and in the material culture of the society. In the areas of attitudes and values, the Mongols proved more resilient, retaining a strong sense of national identity despite an almost total reliance on the USSR for support and aid. However, it was

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only after World War II that changing domestic and international conditions afforded the Mongols a modestly expanded arena for expression of this latent national pride.

A Period of Consolidation

The postwar period has seen significant solidification of Mongolia's position at home and abroad. In particular, the death of Choibalsan in 1952 brought subtle but important shifts in Mongolian policies as a new generation of leadership emerged—symbolized by Tsedenbal, who replaced Choibalsan as head of the MPRP. In all areas, the new party chief has pursued policies which, while carefully designed not to unsettle relations with the Soviet Union, have been successful in enabling the MPR to assume a somewhat more independent posture in world affairs while consolidating political control and fostering economic growth at home.

To be sure, Mongolia under Tsedenbal has continued to be spiritually and militarily dependent on Moscow and to follow the Soviet lead in most international matters. This has been evidenced by Ulan Bator's dutiful echoing of Soviet reactions to the Hungarian and Czechoslovak revolutions and the problem of Yugoslavia, as well as by its support of Soviet policy vis-à-vis China and Viet Nam. Even on so sensitive an issue as the fate of the MPR— specifically, when Mao Tse-tung made disparaging statements regarding Mongolia's statehood to visiting Japanese in July 1965[7]—the Mongols apparently waited to take their cue from Moscow. The Chinese statements were condemned first in Moscow's *Pravda* on September 2 and assailed only four days later in the MPR state newspaper *Unen*.

However, in the period 1952-58, Ulan Bator clearly enjoyed the benefits of being courted by both Peking and Moscow. Capitalizing on Mongolian dissatisfaction concerning trade relations with the USSR (see below), the People's Republic of China sent thousands of Chinese to help in Mongolia's economic development projects. (It may also be that elements in Mongolia were somewhat sympathetic to Mao's Stalinist dissatisfaction with the "revisionist" policies of Soviet Party First Secretary Khrushchev.[8]) This Sino-Mongolian flirtation came to an end when the widening Sino-Soviet rift forced Tsedenbal to take sides and hew more closely to the line of his Soviet patrons. China now began to accuse the Soviet Union of "socialist imperialism" in Mongolia through both economic exploitation and the stationing of Russian troops on Mongolian soil,[9] charges which were echoed by China's ally, Albania.[10] In turn, the Russians have beamed into China's Mongolian area Mongol-language broadcasts, expressing Soviet sympathy with Mongols who are losing their lands and cultural identity, and encouraging the organization within China of subversive Mongol secret societies—the traditional *duguilang*.[11] Diplomatic contacts between Ulan Bator and Peking virtually ceased during the height of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1967-68 but have since been restored. Nevertheless, Mongolia remains mindful of the Chinese threat. The unusually demonstrative commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Khalkhingol, which the author witnessed during a 1969 visit to the area, was clearly designed by Mongolia to remind Peking that the Japanese had failed in their invasion and that any similar attempts would meet the same fate.

This resolve is buttressed by a continuing Soviet military presence in the MPR, a support which the Mongols naturally highly value. The Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was signed on January 15, 1966, specifically promises "all necessary measures, including military steps," in the event of an attack on the MPR by a third country.[12] For its part, of course, Moscow views the right to station troops in Mongolia, within close air-striking range of Peking, as a valuable asset to the security of the USSR.

Yet Mongolia is probably not as important in Soviet geopolitical considerations as, say, the Commu-

[7] William Heaton, "Mongolia: Looking Forward at 50," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), January 1972, p. 76.

[8] After Choibalsan's death in 1952, Tsedenbal was apparently unable to assume total power immediately. A faction led by D. Damba dominated politics until mid-1958 when a change of power came. Damba was then accused—without convincing evidence—of being pro-Chinese. It seems that he favored a less radical policy of change and opposed the high degree of Soviet influence. See "Plenary Session of Central Committee of Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party," *Pravda* (Moscow), as translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), April 29, 1959, p. 21.

[9] Peking broadcasts monitored in Tokyo in recent years are replete with such references. See for example, Hohehot regional broadcast for March 16, 1969, or Peking NCNA (New China News Agency) broadcast for May 13, 1969.

[10] See for example, Tirana's international broadcast in English of July 10, 1969, or its domestic broadcast of Aug. 15, 1969.

[11] Mongolian-language broadcasts of Radio Peace and Progress, originating in the USSR and monitored in the West, have from time to time made suggestions to this effect.

[12] For the text of this treaty, see *Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1966; see also R. C. Pradhan, "The Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance," *Eastern World* (London), November-December 1966, pp. 15-16.

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nist states of Eastern Europe. The thought has been expressed—and it may perhaps trouble the Mongols—that the independence of the MPR may be jeopardized by a Soviet desire to relieve present tensions in Sino-Soviet relations in order to be in a better position to confront the United States, to offset President Nixon's rapprochement with Peking, and to pursue more fundamental Soviet interests in Europe and the Middle East. In this view, the Soviet leaders might eventually be willing to relinquish their hold on the MPR in China's favor as a price for a broad accommodation with Peking and Chinese concessions with respect to disputed border areas such as the Amur River region, which is seen as having much greater strategic importance for the USSR.[13] However, this whole proposition does not accord with past Soviet behavior in either Europe or Asia. The balance of power between the Soviet Union and China remains heavily weighted on the Soviet side, and Moscow—unless forced by circumstances beyond its control—has never been willing to allow any weakening of its peripheral defenses or its own bloc of socialist states. There seems to be no compelling reason why it would do so in the case of Mongolia.

Broadening International Contacts

Yet, to have their fate so heavily dependent on the support of one nation must be agonizing at times to the Mongols. This feeling has doubtless motivated the MPR, particularly under Tsedenbal, to broaden the scope of its international contacts, both diplomatic and commercial. A major achievement of this policy was the admission of Mongolia to the United Nations on October 20, 1961. Once admitted, the MPR has actively participated in such UN agencies as UNESCO, the World Health Organization, and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and is obviously proud of her new world stature. The quest for greater legitimacy and security has also played a part in Mongolia's interest in establishing relations with Japan and with the United States. The Mongols were particularly pleased when Japan, moving toward a more independent Far Eastern policy, recognized the MPR (on February 19, 1972). Ulan Bator had removed one obstacle to this step in April 1967 by renouncing demands for war reparations

[13] The possibility of such a trade-off was noted, for example, by Robert A. Rupen in 1964. See his "How the Mongolian People's Republic is Really Ruled—Russian Influence," *China New Analysis* (Hong Kong), May 15, 1964, p. 6.

Missiles—a portion of the military support provided Mongolia by the USSR—on display during the 1971 observance of the 50th anniversary of the MPR in Ulan Bator's main square. Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan are enshrined in the mausoleum at the center.

—Photo from *Mongolian People's Republic*, 1971.

from Japan. (As it is, many of the buildings in the Mongolian capitol city today were constructed by Japanese prisoners after World War II.)[14]

Establishment of Mongolian-US relations has proved elusive. The matter was discussed in 1961 by representatives of the two countries in Moscow to no avail, and by the mid-1960's the increasing US involvement in Viet Nam had so antagonized the Communist nations as to further reduce the prospects for relations between Ulan Bator and Washington. Nevertheless, the US was apparently on the verge of recognizing the MPR in 1969 but was deterred from doing so by objections from the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan.[15] Now that President Nixon has visited Peking and Moscow, it is conceivable that the United States may finally move to establish a tie with Ulan Bator.

In seeking to broaden their international contacts, the Mongols have been careful to reassure the Kremlin of their loyalty by faithfully echoing Moscow's

[14] For the MPR statement on reparations, see *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), April 27, 1967. Thousands of Japanese troops were taken to Ulan Bator in late 1945 and early 1946; some remained for as long as 10 years. Two accounts by repatriates are: Yukio Kasuga, *Seimei Aru Tomoshibi* (The Lamp of Life), Tokyo, Jipu, 1950; and Yoshihiro Nagayama, *Mongoru No Sajin* (Mongol Duststorm), Tokyo, Nikan Rodo Tsushin, 1960.

[15] This assessment is based on conversations with US and Japanese diplomats.

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policy pronouncements—often repeated verbatim from *Pravda*. Such a simple reiteration of the Soviet line is perhaps a subtle way to escape having to formulate independent statements that might go against the Mongolian conscience. In some few instances, however, the MPR has taken an openly independent stance, as when it insisted—despite objections from Communist-bloc colleagues—on inviting certain Western delegates to the Second Congress of Mongolists, held in Ulan Bator in September 1970.

In the realm of foreign trade, too, Mongolia has not been insensitive to the dangers of excessive reliance on one country. There has been some feeling that the Soviet Union may have exploited Mongolia at times by underpaying for Mongolian raw materials while overcharging for Soviet manufactured goods. Perhaps in an attempt to assuage such feelings, the Soviet Union has on several occasions improved Mongolia's terms of trade and payment vis-à-vis the USSR.[16] On its part, Mongolia has made a conscious effort to diversify its commercial ties in expanding total foreign trade some sixfold since World War II. During the latter half of the 1950's, the People's Republic of China became Mongolia's second most important trading partner, accounting for 18 percent of total volume in 1960. This trend was abruptly reversed in 1961, however, as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. In the following year, Mongolia joined Comecon (the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), and at present the Comecon member-states account for upwards of 95 percent of total Mongolian foreign trade; in the process, the MPR has been able to reduce the Soviet share (to some 60 percent in 1966).[17] Mongolia's trade with countries outside the Soviet orbit is still quite marginal but is expanding. After President Tito's visit to Mongolia in 1968, MPR trade with Yugoslavia began to increase. Japanese trade has also been on an upswing that will doubtless accelerate as a result of the establishment of diplomatic relations this year.

The trade relationship with Comecon has also brought with it considerable foreign assistance to Mongolia's economic development in the last decade. Czechoslovakia, now the MPR's second most important trading partner, has contributed equipment for hospitals and the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, cement, leather, and shoes. East Germany, which comes next in terms of trade and assistance, has supplied diesel equipment, sewing machines and textile machinery. Hungary has furnished equipment for drilling oil and water wells; and Poland has set up plants for roofing, brick production and meat processing.



A cement works with a 100,000-ton annual capacity, constructed at Darkhan with the assistance of the Czechoslovak People's Republic.

—TASS photo via Sovfoto.

Communism Mongol-Style

Turning to the domestic scene, one finds that the MPR under Tsedenbal has advanced a long way toward becoming a tightly integrated political system. The MPRP, whose membership comprises about four percent of a total population of 1.3 million persons, continues to maintain its totalitarian political monopoly through control of education, communications, and employment opportunities. The bulk of the population is well organized in the usual groupings of youth, women, and labor, which are clearly designed to mobilize their members in support of state policies rather than to afford them a means of expressing their own aspirations and demands. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is enhanced by the fact that the Mongols, now passing through a

[16] On trade and aid relations between the USSR and Mongolia, see Joe Hart, "Mongolia: 20th Year of Economic Planning," *Asian Survey*, January 1968, pp. 21-28; also *Area Handbook for Mongolia*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 370-72.

[17] *50 Years of the MPR: Statistical Collection* (in English and Russian), Ulan Baatar [sic], Central Statistical Board under the Council of Ministers of the MPR, 1971, p. 207, and Hart, *loc. cit.*, p. 27.

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process not unlike that witnessed in the early post-colonial statehood of many other nations of Asia and Africa, are deeply aware of a glorious historical past and are naturally disposed to identify intensely with the current nation-building effort. While there has been no democratization of politics, the coupling of a centralized governmental apparatus with an integrated national economy and great advances in education and communications has meant that a large percentage of the population participates in the power structure, probably a higher percentage than in any other Communist state.

A modest liberalization occurred within the ruling MPRP in the years after Choibalsan's death, as the old military elite gave way to a new elite of technocratic civilian administrators. Tsedenbal, himself an economic specialist, symbolizes this generational shift. He was able to accomplish a cautious "de-Choibalsanization" of the party, and—like Khrushchev in the Soviet "destalinization" drive—he did it without resorting to the physical liquidations which had characterized the earlier purges of the 1930's and 1940's. There were additional demotions and dismissals in the early 1960's, apparently designed to eliminate comrades with "nationalistic" leanings likely to displease the USSR.

Mongolia entered the postwar world with considerable unfinished business in the matter of communizing the economy. Still outstanding was the completion of the painful process of collectivizing Mongolia's nomads into state farms and cooperatives. As noted above, collectivization after the Soviet model began in the 1930's but was slowed down and generally moderated when the nomads rebelled and slaughtered their livestock. However, Choibalsan and, after him, Tsedenbal pushed ahead with this process after the Second World War. By 1960, an estimated 95 percent of all Mongolian households belonged to some form of cooperative institution.[18]

Because of the difficulties involved in trying to collectivize a nomadic society, Mongolia was slow to adopt Soviet-style economic planning. It was only in 1948 that the state initiated the first of a series of five-year economic plans, aimed at developing a mixed industrial and agrarian economy. The speed at which this process could proceed has been largely determined by two factors: the rate at which capital resources could be drawn from Mongolia's Communist allies; and second, the rate at which the pastoral economy could be rationalized. As noted above, the USSR and other Comecon states have contributed significantly to Mongolia's economic development. However, such aid could only be effectively absorbed to the extent that Mongolia succeeded in its experiment—unique among Communist states—in evolving from a pastoral-nomadic to an industrialized society. Along the way, the MPR has had to come to grips with the intermediate stage of agricultural development.

Modernizing the Agrarian Base

A concern for the development of agriculture is common to all Communist economies, but Mongolia is unique in beginning almost from scratch in this area, so important for a self-reliant nation. Even those people little acquainted with Mongolia are aware of its vast steppes, the desert-like Gobi, and the harsh climate. Of the total land area of the MPR —385.5 million acres—a little over one percent is suitable for the production of hay or fodder. The greatest problem is the lack of water, and the introduction of irrigation would greatly increase the potential farming acreage. By devoting ninety percent of the cultivated land to grain, the Mongols—remarkably—have achieved self-sufficiency in grain and foodstuffs during the last decade. However, geography, climate and soil conditions guarantee that crop farming will never become a predominant element in the Mongolian economy as it has in the economies of China, the Soviet Union, and various other socialist countries.

Instead, Mongolia must continue to concentrate on the production of livestock and of such livestock-related commodities as meat, leather and wool, which together currently account for 90 percent of total MPR exports. Clearly this sector represents Mongolia's specialized role in the international division of labor among the Communist states. It was no accident that a principal topic of discussion during Tsedenbal's visit to Moscow in late 1970 was coordination of Soviet and Mongolian agricultural plans for 1971-75.[19] Planners in Ulan Bator have launched a program to process more of the country's livestock products in advance of export in an attempt to escape from the disadvantageous foreign-trade pattern of exporting raw materials exclusively while importing large amounts of consumer goods.

[18] See Bawden, *op. cit.*, pp. 395-404.

[19] *Soviet Union* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971, p. 2.

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

Electricity and modern communications—the party daily Unen*—enter the life of a Mongolian herder.*

—Photo from Mongolian People's Republic, 1971.

Improvements on traditional animal husbandry—characterized by nomadism and year-round grazing—are essential if livestock output is not to stagnate at current levels. The customary methods leave herds vulnerable to the ravages of the severe Mongol winters, resulting in high losses of livestock. As a result, the country has begun to switch from the traditional migratory pattern to a mixed grazing-corral technique in which animals remain on the range all year but are afforded enclosures and feed to tide them over the winter. The complementary effort to establish a permanent fodder base is obviously critical to the success of the endeavor.

Besides problems of rationalizing rural production, Mongolia faces a severe manpower problem. Although its population has doubled in the last 50 years, the area is still distressingly underpopulated, with a density of approximately two persons per square mile. The spatial distribution of the population is another problem as rapid urbanization denudes the countryside of workers—nearly 25 percent of the total population is found in Ulan Bator alone. There is also a serious age imbalance, with more than half the society younger than 18 years of age. Looking to the future, it should be noted that families are fairly large; several tens of thousands of mothers have been granted awards for having given birth to five or more children. At the same time, Mongolian mothers have also been heavily recruited into employment to alleviate the manpower crisis. The unfortunate result has been to leave children long hours without proper supervision, which has in turn led inevitably to broken homes, juvenile delinquency, and alcoholism in urban areas.

As Mongolia's traditional nomadic life style gives way to a more sophisticated and complex modern culture, the society remains unusually unified. The population is relatively homogeneous and free of minority problems. Those Chinese who dwell in the MPR have been basically assimilated; Russians are not settling permanently in Mongolia; and the Kazakhs—the largest single minority—have not been a source of instability. The core of Mongol culture today is the language, which is amazingly free of words borrowed from other languages—despite the politically-motivated adoption of the Cyrillic script some three decades ago. Mongol presses put out a literature which is increasing in quantity and

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quality. Writers and editors have met the challenge of expanding the vocabulary by coining neologisms from traditional roots and terms. Cultural policy still generally demands that literature and art serve the state and that intellectuals hew to established Marxist dogma. But a few courageous scholars have shown initiative and creativity; indeed, the partial relaxation of party controls in recent years has produced "lapses" from orthodoxy that would have meant death in former years.

A Growing Sense of Identity

Marxist materialism has also softened sufficiently to permit the recruitment of young acolytes at Ulan Bator's Ganden Temple for training as lamas—a gesture to Mongolia's cultural past. This action is perhaps symptomatic of another important—if diffuse and elusive—element in contemporary Mongolian culture: an irrepressible patriotism. Wherever Mongols are found today—at home or abroad—they look to the Mongolian People's Republic as the focal point of their identity as a people. It is ironic that this considerable nationalism is a constant source of embarrassment to the leaders in Ulan Bator, who feel constrained to condemn such attitudes in the name of "proletarian internationalism"—*i.e.,* allegiance to the Soviet bloc. Submission to Soviet leadership and an almost overwhelming Soviet cultural influence must be particularly galling to nationalistic Mongols. Russian is the second language of the MPR, and many Mongol specialists have been trained at Soviet universities. Yet, in conversations with Mongol students in the USSR, one is impressed that they are very conscious of their own national identity. Although the world has been filtered to them through Soviet glasses, they have begun to break out of their isolation. A new sophistication is growing, and independent judgments are being made—even if it is too early for such views to be published or reflected in policy.

In sum, the Mongols have more and more taken their affairs into their own hands and control their land to a greater degree than at any time in the past three centuries. Their broadening trade and diplomatic contacts serve to give Mongolia new prestige and to reinforce the strength of what has been its real salvation—its role as a buffer state between two estranged giants. Its improving stature on the world political scene—highlighted by admission to the United Nations and by the expanding list of nations which recognize it—makes it unlikely that Mongolia will become the victim of an aggressive "socialist imperialism" on the part of either the USSR or the Chinese People's Republic. To further guard its flanks, the MPR has entered into relations with Japan and is known to favor establishment of relations with the United States.

Romantics may bemoan the disappearance of the unique nomadic style of Mongol life, but, as Bawden notes, it was anachronistic and not well adapted to the preservation of the race in the modern world. Improvements in education and hygiene and the adoption of new forms of social, economic and political life now assure the Mongols—once in danger of becoming a lost nation—of survival. The country has attained a self-sufficiency in foodstuffs that is rare in today's Asia, although material progress still suffers from underpopulation, a shortage of technically trained manpower, and the drag of an inflated party and state bureaucracy.

Many of the obstacles to further Mongol progress toward genuine autonomy flow from the Soviet tie, but it is difficult to see a viable alternative. One need only look at the forced Chinese resettlement and creation of people's communes that is swallowing up even larger numbers of Mongols in Chinese Inner Mongolia to realize that the Mongols in Ulan Bator can ill-afford to be non-committal. The price for Soviet support has been the adoption of an ethos which is a Soviet creation and which has forced a traumatic break with traditional Mongol spiritual roots in Tibet and commercial-cultural contacts in China.

While the political fate of Mongolia remains inextricably enmeshed in the great imponderables of the Sino-Soviet relationship, such factors as historical predispositions, economic ties, and the balance of population appear likely to incline the Mongolian People's Republic toward the USSR far into the future. Nevertheless, the Mongols can be expected to continue to be Mongols first and Soviet sympathizers only as a matter of expediency.

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CHILE: Two Years of "Popular Unity"

By Paul E. Sigmund

Two years ago this past September, Salvador Allende won a surprise victory in the Chilean presidential eelctions as the candidate of a "Popular Unity" coalition that allied the traditional Marxist parties, the Communists and the Socialists (Allende's party), with various non-Marxist elements in favor of fundamental changes in Chilean society.[1] The essence of Allende's campaign posture was a promise to create a socialist, libertarian, and pluralist state—to carry out a social and economic revolution while at the same time preserving Chile's tradition of respect for legality and dedication to personal freedom.

Critics of Allende from both left and right insisted that it would be impossible for him to live up to his commitment to both these goals. They maintained that either a new social and economic order would be established at the price of Chilean constitutional democracy, or that traditional legal and institutional norms would prevail and the Allende regime would end up being one more reformist government making incremental changes but not altering the basic structure of Chilean social and economic life.

After two years in office, Allende seems to have confounded his critics on both sides. He has made important changes in the direction of state control of the Chilean economy and a more equalitarian distribution of income—and he has also preserved a basically free Chilean society. The course he has pursued has caused complex repercussions, winning him a massive increase in public support during his first year in office but getting him into deep political trouble in his second.

This "boom-and-bust" cycle in popular support for a Chilean president is no new political phenomenon. The last three presidents of Chile, Carlos Ibáñez (1952-58), Jorge Alessandri (1958-64), and Eduardo Frei (1964-70), although they could not be more different from one another and from Allende in their political views, all enjoyed a great initial upsurge of popular enthusiasm, only to face a marked erosion of support for their parties and policies during the last part of their six-year terms of office. In each case, the cause was the same: the fragile Chilean economy could not resist the inflationary pressures produced by the demands of an increasingly politicized electorate, as the chief executive's programs were blocked or watered down by a hostile or critical Congress. The political capital built up by the president's initial electoral success was devalued, like the Chilean currency, through successive defeats in congressional and municipal elections and in frequent by-elections (treated as national plebiscites in a country where elections are second only to soccer as a favorite sport).[2] In the case of all three past administrations, an acute downward cycle developed as a rising inflation rate and declining electoral support for the president's party or coalition mutually reinforced each other, so that by the

[1] In addition to the Communists and the Socialists, the *"Unidad Popular"* coalition included the main body of the Radical Party, which traditionally gets support from the reform-minded sectors of the middle class; the MAPU (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unido*), a group of left-wing Catholics which had split off from Chile's largest party, the Christian Democrats, in 1969; the tiny Social Democratic Party; and the API (*Acción Popular Independiente*), the personal organization of a wealthy left-wing politician.

[2] In Chile, which has a bicameral Congress, elections for all seats in the Chamber of Deputies and for half the seats in the Senate are held every four years, never coinciding with the presidential election; quadrennial municipal elections are also fought on national issues midway between congressional elections.

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end of the president's six-year term the perennially dissatisfied Chilean elector was ready to turn to another political and economic formula for salvation.

The same pattern seems to be repeating itself in the case of the Allende regime—but with several differences. In the first place, the timing of the cycle has been considerably speeded up. Instead of the pattern of three years of success followed by three years of relative failure, which characterized the Alessandri and Frei administrations, Allende's brilliant first year in office has been followed by a dismal and increasingly disastrous second year—raising questions about what is likely to occur during the remaining four years of his presidential term. In the second place, unlike previous regimes, this government has faced a threat from extremists on both the left and the right—in the former case including some members of Allende's own Popular Unity *(Unidad Popular)* coalition, who call for a violent overthrow of the Chilean system. In the clash of opposing ideologies, the impact and intensity of political conflict has escalated, making the stakes much higher than they have been in the past. The question for the future is whether the present quasi-stalemate (what the Chileans call *el empate politico*—the "political draw") in electoral strength, political power, and physical force can be maintained indefinitely through the skill for political compromise developed over almost a century and a half of Chilean constitutionalism, or whether the brinkmanship being practiced by both sides today will ultimately lead the system over the precipice. If, as this writer believes, the system does survive, what effect will the increasing difficulties of Chile's so-called "second model" of democratic Marxist socialism have upon other developing countries searching for a formula which combines political freedom, economic development, and social justice?

The Statute of Democratic Guarantees

The current political stalemate has its roots in the circumstances that surrounded Allende's accession to power. It will be recalled that he won the presidential election by only 39,000 votes in a three-way contest with Jorge Alessandri, candidate of the right, and Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic standard-bearer. Of the total vote, 36.3 percent went to Allende, a drop from the 39 percent which he had received in the 1964 presidential election; the fact that it was a three-way contest is what gave him his margin of victory. (The Communists later took credit for engineering the split in the anti-Allende forces by encouraging Tomic to seek their support for his candidacy, thereby alienating the right and ensuring that it would run its own candidate.[3] Had he been able to run again, the outgoing Christian Democratic president, Eduardo Frei, might have attracted the support of the right, as he had in 1964; however, Chile's constitution prohibits the chief executive from serving two terms in a row.)

Although he had won the largest share of the vote, Allende had still not been elected president, for the Chilean constitution stipulates that if no candidate receives an absolute majority, the Congress must decide between the two top-ranking candidates 50 days after the popular election. In the past, it had been customary for the Congress to confirm the frontrunner's election, but the prospect of an impending Marxist-backed social revolution on two months' notice produced a series of complicated maneuvers to influence the outcome of the Congressional vote. Shortly after the election, Alessandri, who was the runner-up, made a public statement in which he offered to resign from the presidency in the event that the Congress elected him, thus paving the way for new elections in which Frei would be eligible to run with both Christian Democratic and rightist support. Allende's response was to threaten a general strike and civil war if his victory was taken away from him.[4]

The Christian Democrats, still the largest party in Chile despite their declining electoral percentages, were the decisive group in this situation; they rejected the Alessandri offer and agreed to vote for Allende on condition that he support a series of amendments to the Constitution in the form of a Statute of Democratic Guarantees specifically protecting freedom of expression, of party organization, of the judiciary, and of the mass media; pluralism in education; and the independence of the armed forces. After extended negotiations Allende accepted

[3] See the confidential report by the Political Commission of the Communist Party of Chile reproduced in *El Mercurio* (Santiago), Feb. 3, 1972, p. 1, and *El Siglo* (Santiago), Feb. 8, 1972, p. 4.

[4] In a speech at a mass rally on September 13, Allende said: "Those who are insanely trying to provoke such a situation . . . should know that the whole country will stop, that there will not be a company, an industry, a workshop, a school, a hospital, or a farm that functions—as a first demonstration of our strength." (*El Mercurio*, Sept. 14, 1970, p. 24). The examples of the Spanish civil war, *la violencia* in Colombia, and Chile's own civil conflict in 1891 were also cited by the president of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) when it debated whether or not to support Allende in the Congressional vote. See *Ercilla* (Santiago), Oct. 7-13, 1970, p. 9.

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the Statute, rejecting only a provision that would have divested the president of the power to decide on promotions in the armed forces.

Neither behind-the-scenes efforts reportedly made by foreign business interests, nor a plot by right-wing extremists which culminated in the assassination of Army Commander-in-Chief René Schneider on October 22, prevented the Congress from electing Allende president on October 24, 1970. On November 3, he was formally inaugurated and, although a Marxist and a Freemason, attended the traditional *Te Deum* service in the Santiago cathedral celebrating his installation. He had sought power as a self-proclaimed Marxist dedicated to revolutionary changes in the social and economic system—and he had won because he had agreed to carry out those changes through the existing Chilean legal and constitutional system, respecting the established rules of the political game. His promises were based on confidence that once his Popular Unity coalition came to power and governed on behalf of the workers, peasants, and slum-dwellers, they would respond by giving his government their vote.

Allende also knew that he was compelled to respect legal procedures because otherwise the opposition might be able to persuade the armed forces to intervene and overthrow his regime in the name of constitutionalism. Conversely, the opposition—including both the rightist National Party and the center-left Christian Democrats—knew that if they made any effort to resort to extraconstitutional measures, the Marxist parties could probably deliver on Allende's threat to cause economic chaos and civil war—a threat which was more meaningful to Chileans because of the precedent of the brief but bloody civil conflict of 1891.[5] Thus, ideology, politics, and a calculation of physical force on both sides combined to produce a mutual decision to abide by the rules of the existing political system, an agreement reinforced and made specific through the Statute of Democratic Guarantees.

Allende's belief that his regime would prosper electorally was asserted at a mass rally following his inauguration. He quoted a statement of Friedrich Engels referring to the possibility of

. . . peaceful evolution from the old society to the new in countries where the representatives of the people have all power and, in accord with the constitution, can do what they desire when they have the majority of the nation behind them.

He then declared:

This is our Chile. Here at last the anticipation of Engels is fulfilled.

Promising the destruction of the monopolies and the *latifundia,* a reform of the tax system, the nationalization of banking and credit, and a takeover of foreign-owned industries and mines, he avowed that the revolution would be carried out in "our own Chilean way . . . a way to socialism with democracy, pluralism, and liberty." This would be possible, he claimed, because

. . . Chile is unusual in possessing the social and political institutions necessary to carry out the transition from backwardness and dependency to development and autonomy by way of la via socialista.[6]

Socialization Policies

Obviously Allende was sincere in these convictions. Yet how did he expect to carry out a legal transition from capitalism to socialism when the incumbent Congress was dominated by the Christian Democrats and the rightist National and Radical Democrat parties, who together held 90 of the 150 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 30 of the 50 seats in the Senate?

Allende was relying on a pre-election study undertaken by Eduardo Novoa, his legal adviser, who had explored the legal instrumentalities available to the Chilean president and concluded that the sectors of the economy slated for nationalization under the Popular Unity program could mostly be taken over through the use of existing legislation. Chilean labor legislation justified the appointment of government "interventors" to run companies for an indefinite period in cases of labor disputes. Moreover, under "Decree-Law 520"—promulgated during the short-lived Socialist Republic in early 1932—"breakdowns in supply," no matter what the cause, could lead to the "requisition" by the state of the companies involved. In addition, the Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO), which had been established by

[5] In 1891 a constitutional conflict between President José Manuel Balmaceda and the Chilean Congress led to a civil war which culminated in the suicide of Balmaceda and the establishment of parliamentary supremacy until 1925.

[6] *El Mercurio,* Nov. 6, 1970, p. 23.

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the Popular Front government in 1939, could be authorized to buy out private owners with funds made available by the Central Bank. In agriculture, the agrarian reform law adopted in 1967 could be used to accelerate the redistribution of rural land as promised in the presidential program. Novoa concluded that only in the case of the nationalization of copper would new legislation be necessary, since the formal agreements between the Chilean state and the American-owned copper companies established under ex-President Frei's Chileanization program would have to be abrogated.

This interpretation of Chilean law obviously shaped the course upon which Allende launched his government very soon after his inauguration. The first firm to be taken over—or "intervened," to use the Chilean term—was a textile factory near Concepción which had ceased to function when its owners fled to Argentina after the election. The Banco de Edwards, owned by the publisher of the newspaper *El Mercurio,* which had been Allende's bitter opponent in the election campaign, was then "intervened" for failing to obtain permission from the Superintendent of Banks for a loan guarantee from an American bank. Most other private banks were taken over by the purchase of shares by CORFO. In the case of many enterprises, strikes—often launched at the behest of unions controlled by the Socialists or Communists—led to a breakdown of supply so that a takeover could be legally justified. (The Controller General disapproved some of these takeovers, but the government resorted to a "decree of insistence" authorized by the constitution to enforce them.) Other companies were intervened after seizures (*tomas*) by the workers. The Bethlehem Steel iron mines were nationalized by purchase, as were the cement, nitrate and coal industries, and the 33 percent of the shares in the Pacific Steel Company which were in private hands.

The copper mines were nationalized by a different procedure. The Chileanization agreements of 1966, establishing part ownership of the mines by the Chilean state, had been criticized because they allowed the North American companies substantial tax reductions at a time when the price of copper was climbing to an all-time high. In 1969 Frei had negotiated an increase in Chile's portion of mine earnings, but Chileans still resented the 49-to-75 percent share of profits that went to the copper companies, even though most of it was to be reinvested in expanded capacity. Allende knew that on this nationalistic issue he could mobilize broad support, but



A nationalized bank in Santiago. The banner reads: "A Bank More at the Service of Chile and Her People —Popular Unity Committee of the Bank of London."

—Photo by H. W. Sylvester for Rapho-Guillumette.

he also was aware that the touchy question of compensation could jeopardize his already difficult relations with the United States. He therefore proposed that a constitutional amendment be adopted to legalize the takeover of the mines and regulate compensation procedures. As finally adopted in July 1971, the amendment provided that the compensation due to the copper companies would be left to the determination of the Controller General of Chile —with, however, one significant qualification: it was up to the president to fix the amount of the cumulative "excess profits" earned by the companies since 1955, the total of which was to be deducted from the compensation figure. Not surprisingly, when the final computations were made, Anaconda and Kennecott—the major foreign copper concerns—ended up owing money to the Chilean state (although the Cerro Corporation, which had only recently invested in Chilean copper, was to receive compensation).

Allende appointed as his Minister of Agriculture Jacques Chonchol, who had been director of the agrarian technical assistance program in the previous administration until he broke with the Frei government in 1968. Aided by a wave of farm seizures in the South which had been encouraged by the extreme left, Chronchol moved ahead rapidly with the takeover of the remaining lands in excess of 80 hectares (about 200 acres) of prime irrigated land, the limit set in the 1967 agrarian reform law. Under the aforementioned legislation covering labor disputes, some smaller farms were also intervened following occupation by peasants and left-wing stu-

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Armed peasants stand guard at the gate of a farm in southern Chile seized in December 1970. The signs read: "We Demand Land for Those Who Work it. Bread, Land and Socialism. We shall Triumph."

—Wide World Photos.

dents, and the owners were then pressured into selling out to the Agrarian Reform Agency. In its first year in office, the Allende government took over nearly as much land as had been expropriated in the entire six years of the Frei government, and by mid-1972 virtually no holdings over the 80-hectare limit remained "unreformed." Once again, existing legislation had been used to provide a legal or quasi-legal basis for the takeover.

Socialist Consumerism

Besides its vigorous implementation of the traditional socialist policy of state control over important sectors of the economy, the Allende government also embarked on a program of redistribution of income, which was designed to have the twofold effect of stimulating the lagging Chilean economy and earning the electoral support of the grateful recipients of added purchasing power. Allende's Minister of Economics, Pedro Vuskovic—an independent Marxist who had been associated with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) in Santiago and had directed the Institute of Economics at the University of Chile—argued that massive wage increases to the lower-income groups would not have an inflationary effect, since the additional purchasing power thus generated would stimulate industry to utilize the estimated 30 percent of its capacity which was idle at the time that Allende assumed power. Vuskovic maintained that if such wage boosts were combined with strict enforcement of price controls and a refusal to devalue the Chilean *escudo* in relation to the dollar, the inflation rate could be kept down to 10 percent in the first year and eliminated in the second year of the current presidential term. The combination of increases in wages and a decline in inflation would mean prosperity for the consumer, while the increased volume of sales would compensate the producer for the reduction of his accustomed profit margin.[7] (Undoubtedly an additional factor in Vuskovic's calculations was the favorable effect these policies could have in the municipal elections scheduled for April 1971.)

The Vuskovic policy was brilliantly successful—for a while. Tax exemptions for low-income groups were increased by raising the amount of income excluded from taxation; concomitantly, the number of inspectors assigned to check the tax returns of the wealthy was expanded. The 1971 readjustment of wages to compensate for the 35-percent inflation rate registered for 1970 was skewed in favor of the poorest groups of the population, so that those making only the minimum wage received a 40-percent wage increase and those earning between one and two times that wage received a 38 percent increase. Minimum pensions were increased by 66 percent, family allowances in the country were made equal to those in the city, and plans were announced for a vast expansion of public works—including public construction of a projected 100,000 houses.[8]

The outcome of this policy was a mini-boom in the opening months of 1971. The combination of substantial wage increases and a reduction of the inflation rate in the first three months of 1971 to 3.4 percent (as compared with 16 percent in the same period of 1970) led to a spending spree which led Chilean industry, previously in a state of paralysis following Allende's victory, to expand output of consumer goods. Production climbed in 1971 by 8.5 percent, while unemployment dropped in the greater Santiago area from 8 percent in 1970 to 5 percent in June 1971 and to a surprising 3.8 percent by December of the same year.[9]

These economic changes seemed to have been carried out without a sacrifice of political freedom.

[7] Vuskovic explained and defended his policy in a speech reported in *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Dec. 13-19, 1971, p. 2.

[8] CORFO, *Chile Economic Notes* (New York), March 1971; *El Siglo*, Dec. 9, 1970, pp. 1 and 4.

[9] *El Mercurio* (International Edition), May 15-21, 1972, p. 2.

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The opposition papers continued to publish (although without the government advertising which had aided them financially in the past), and the Christian Democrats even founded a new paper, *La Prensa,* in late 1970. Radio stations broadcast daily editorials attacking the government; and when a government-authorized wage increase led to bankruptcy and a subsequent government takeover of the Editorial Zig-Zag publishing conglomerate, no effort was made to change the editorial policy or content of its subsidiary, the prestigious news weekly *Ercilla.* There were sporadic incidents of violence in the rural areas of the South and occasional occupations of urban housing by slum-dwellers. But the Marxist totalitarian state—whose imminent emergence had been direly predicted in advertisements in *El Mercurio* before the presidential elections—failed to materialize.

Two provisions in the Allende presidential program had raised fears for the future of political freedom. The Popular Unity Program had called for the establishment of a single legislative chamber, the Assembly of the People, in which various "social organizations" would be represented, suggesting that Allende might attempt to dissolve the Congress and replace it with an assembly of hand-picked representatives of leftist organizations. Allende alluded to this electoral promise in his "State of the Nation" address in May 1971,[10] but he took no concrete steps to implement it until the following November, when he sent Congress the draft of a constitutional amendment calling for election of a single chamber in March 1973. His proposal did not include representation for social organizations and was in any event quickly shelved by the opposition-dominated legislature.

The Popular Unity program had also called for the reorganization of the judicial system. As one step toward this end, Allende, in January 1971, proposed the establishment of "neighborhood tribunals" to try petty offenses. The tribunals were to be composed of two locally-elected officials who were to come from "labor or social institutions" and one government appointee, and they were to be empowered to mete out punishments of up to one year of "rehabilitative labor." Limited as was the projected authority of these bodies, the very notion of popular tribunals vulnerable to political influence elicited such a storm of criticism that the proposal was withdrawn by the government in March.

Otherwise, notwithstanding the considerable alterations going on in the economic system, no attempt was made to change Chile's political institutions. The Popular Unity Committees established in the course of the presidential election campaign, which some had predicted might become the base of a local control structure, were allowed to die out after September 1970 as the parties returned to their normal activities and began to prepare for the April 1971 municipal elections.

The 1971 Municipal Elections

The government viewed the upcoming elections as a plebiscite on its five months in office and counted on the increase in purchasing power of lower-class groups and the absence of totalitarian repression to produce a massive popular mandate similar to that received by Eduardo Frei in the congressional elections of March 1965. The vote of confidence that Allende received in the April municipal elections was considerable but not as large as some of his supporters had hoped. Candidates of his Popular Unity coalition and a small socialist splinter group which also supported him received 49.7 percent of the vote, while the opposition received 48 percent, with the remainder going to independent candidates or reflecting invalid or blank ballots. Pro-government newspapers, by omitting the blank and invalid ballots from their calculations, were able to claim an absolute majority of 50.86 percent in favor of Allende's coalition. It was an indication of the continuing press freedom in Chile that about half the newspapers published in Santiago used the 49.7 percent figure—which was the official result reported by the Electoral Register *(Registro Electoral)* —and the other half, the government percentage. (One rightist newspaper added the votes of the Radicals and the Social Democrats, both members of Allende's coalition, to the opposition and independent vote and arrived at the headline, "Democracy 58.44 percent, Marxism 40.09 percent.")

Though the government claim of an absolute majority was debatable, the election nevertheless represented a considerable victory for Allende. The pro-government candidates got nearly 14 percent more of the vote than Allende had received in the presidential election in the preceding September. His own Socialist Party increased its electoral percentage

[10] Salvador Allende, *La Via Chilena* (First Message on the State of the Nation to the Plenary Session of Congress), May 21, 1971, translated in Paul E. Sigmund, Ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations,* 2nd rev. ed., New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 450.

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by 10 points over its percentage in the 1969 Congressional elections, gaining 22.3 percent of the vote. The Communists won 16.9 percent of the vote, a gain of one percentage point, while the Radical Party dropped from 13 percent in 1969 to 8.1 percent in 1971, weakening the non-Marxist influence in the Popular Unity coalition. The left also registered striking progress among lower-class urban women (in Chile the votes of women, who received the right to vote in 1949, are reported separately from those of men). In the Santiago working-class commune of La Granja, for instance, the women's votes for the Socialist and Communist candidates increased from 45 percent in the 1967 municipal elections to 58 percent in 1971, while in Las Barrancas the figure jumped from 32 to 54 percent and in La Cisterna from 29 to 45 percent.[11]

President Salvador Allende helps hammer roof beams in a shantytown outside Santiago as part of Chile's first "National Day of Voluntary Labor." The settlement "Campamento Ché Guevara" is run by militants of the Chilean President's Socialist Party.

—Wide World Photos.

On the other hand, the election indicated that the upsurge of support for Allende was by no means overwhelming. The Christian Democrats' percentage of the vote fell from 27 percent in 1970 to 25.7 percent in 1971, but they were still the largest party in Chile. And Carmen Frei, the former president's daughter, received 60,00 votes as a candidate for the Santiago municipal council, winning the largest electoral majority in the country. The president of the National Party, another Santiago candidate, polled the second largest majority; in the country as a whole the *Nacionales* received a larger percentage (18.5 percent of the vote) than did the Communists and, together with their Radical Democratic allies, achieved a total nearly equal to that polled by the Socialists. In all the municipal councils together, the opposition parties secured a total of 914 seats as compared to 766 won by the government. Allende had overcome his image as a minority president, but the pro-government vote was not large enough to encourage an attempt to use the constitutionally-authorized plebiscite procedure to amend the constitution along the lines suggested by the Popular Unity program.

Political Realignments

In his "State of the Nation" address in May, Allende alluded to the possibility of "replacing the present liberal constitution and bicameral system with a constitution of socialist orientation and a single chamber."[12] Aside from a constitutional plebiscite, which seemed unlikely in light of the April election results, the only way in which Allende could have hoped to win the absolute majority in both houses of Congress required to change the constitution was by encouraging a split in the Christian Democratic Party so as to bring its more left-oriented sectors into the coalition supporting his government. At a party meeting in December 1970, a division between the Christian Democrats more

[11] Dirección del Registro Electoral, *Resultado Elección Ordinaria Regidores, 1967; Resultado Elección Ordinaria de Diputados, 1969; Resultado Elección Ordinaria Regidores, 1971* (mimeographed official election results).

[12] See footnote 10.

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disposed to collaboration with the Allende government and the hard-line *Freiista* group had only been avoided by a late-night session which produced a compromise set of party officers. By mid-1971, however, the partisan passions aroused by the April municipal elections, the pressures exerted by the government on Christian Democrats in the civil service and in the nationalized sectors of the economy, and the intransigence of the Popular Unity parties manifested in their continued shrill attacks on the Christian Democratic Party and in particular upon ex-President Frei, had alienated those who earlier were favorable to collaboration with Allende. The movement of the party to a more clearly oppositionist policy was accelerated by the assassination in June 1971 of Frei's former Minister of the Interior, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, by a left-extremist group. The police quickly tracked down the assassins and killed them in a shootout (giving rise to stories that they had been eliminated to prevent their telling of their government connections), but the Christian Democrats publicly ascribed the murder of a respected leader of their party to the unwillingness of the government to crack down on armed leftist groups.

A by-election in Valparaiso in July 1971 provided the first example of a straight two-way fight between the government and the opposition parties. The Christian Democrats were reluctant to accept the support of the right, but their nominee stated that he would not reject the backing of any voter who agreed with the principles for which he stood. An earthquake rocked Valparaiso a few weeks before the election, and the government rushed in emergency assistance, distributing interest-free loans in amounts which appeared not unrelated to the impending election. The results, however, seemed to indicate that this effort had no effect on the voting pattern. The Christian Democratic candidate won with 50.14 percent of the vote to 48.2 percent for his Popular Unity opponent.

Valparaiso had always been a Christian Democratic stronghold, and the percentage received by the PDC candidate was only marginally greater than the total received by the Christian Democrats and the two right-wing parties in the April elections. Yet the fact that the opposition had won the by-election encouraged a previously gloomy Eduardo Frei to comment that "for the first time I see a glimmer of hope for the future of Chile."[13]

[13] Personal interview with the author, Aug. 13, 1971.

The election had another result less favorable to the opposition. At a marathon plenary session of the Christian Democratic Party Council after the by-election, the leader of the former "third-force" (*tercerista*) faction, Bosco Parra, supported by two members of the Chamber of Deputies and the president of the Christian Democratic Youth, attempted to persuade the Council to adopt a resolution prohibiting any type of understanding, formal or informal, with the National Party and endorsing renewed efforts at cooperation with the left. Instead the Council adopted a resolution which—while reaffirming the party's opposition to capitalism and commitment to a program of "communitarian socialism" and "full participation of the workers in the establishment, organization, and direction of the new society" —went on to describe itself as opposed to "the totalitarian and exclusive spirit" of the Allende government, which "wishes to bring the country to an absolutist regime" through such measures as "the falsely-named Assembly of the People." The adoption of the resolution led to the resignation from the party of Bosco Parra, the president and two vice-presidents of the PDC Youth, and eight members of the Chamber of Deputies. They announced the formation of a new group, the Christian Left (*Izquierda Cristiana*) which would support the Allende government. The strength of the new group was increased when the four cofounders and most prominent members of the MAPU, which had split off from the Christian Democrats in 1969 to join the Popular Unity coalition, announced that they were joining the Christian Left because of the increasingly Marxist orientation which their own movement had assumed under the direction of its new secretary-general, Rodrigo Ambrosio.[14]

The new support that President Allende received from the Christian Left was counterbalanced by a weakening of his support from the Radical Party. Like the MAPU, the Radicals had moved in the direction of Marxism as a result of their participation in the Popular Unity coalition. At the biennial Radical Party convention at the end of July, a policy resolution was adopted which described the party as "an organization at the service of the workers," declared its acceptance of "historical materialism and the class struggle as . . . a concrete reality which is observable in all class societies in the history of the world," and committed the party to "the abolition of

[14] *Ercilla*, Aug. 4-10, 1971, pp. 11-12; *El Mercurio*, Aug. 7, 1971, p. 25; *Política y Espíritu* (Santiago), August 1971, pp. 77-80.

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private property in the means of production." In protest against this statement, five of the seven Radical senators and seven of the 19 Radical deputies left the party, declaring that the resolution was "completely removed from the characteristic and distinctive ideology of our party" and ignored "the interest of the middle social strata," including the small businessman and petty landholder whom the party had always represented.[15]

The defectors formed a new Radical group which subsequently called itself the Party of the Radical Left (*Partido de la Izquierda Radical*—PIR). The leaders of the new group announced that they would support the Allende government but made clear that they had strong reservations about the Marxists' domination of the Popular Unity coalition. In particular, Allende's projected constitutional amendment to establish a single legislative chamber seemed sure to incur the opposition of the Left Radicals. Thus, although Allende had added the Christian Left to the list of his supporters in the Congress, he now had a weaker base of support for his program in the legislature than at the outset of his term of office.

Yet there is no doubt that from many points of view, the year since Allende's election had been a successful one. In the economic sphere, inflation had been held down; production had recovered from the post-election crisis; the agrarian reform had been accelerated; and large sectors of industry, mining, and banking had come under state control. In the social sphere, schoolchildren were receiving the daily half-liter (pint) of milk promised in Allende's program; workers, peasants, and slum-dwellers had more disposable income; consumption had risen by an estimated 13 percent; the share of the national income received in salaries and wages had increased from 53 to 59 percent;[16] social welfare benefits had risen sharply for the rural population; and a vast program of public housing had been undertaken. Politically, the Congress was hostile; but the opposition was still divided between the Christian Democrats and the right, and most of the government's program could be carried out under existing legislation.

Even in foreign policy, where most observers had thought the new regime would run into serious difficulties, Allende had managed to avoid a confrontation with the United States over the nationalization of the copper mines and had taken pains to reassure Washington that Chile's nonaligned position would not permit the establishment of a base in Chile by any foreign power. In July 1971 Allende met with the Argentine military president, Alejandro Lanusse, and signed a joint declaration promising cooperation on the peaceful settlement of border differences and other issues, thus allaying fears of Argentine intervention in Chile. A month later Allende visited Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia to assure these countries of Chile's continued support of Andean integration.

Trend Toward Polarization

Beginning around the first anniversary of Allende's election, however, his political and economic position underwent a progressive deterioration. In September 1971 Senator Renán Fuentealba—who at the start of Allende's administration had been the principal spokesman for those elements within the membership of the Christian Democratic Party which felt disposed to collaborate with Allende—delivered a lengthy attack on the government, accusing it of violating the Statute of Democratic Guarantees in its pressure on the mass media, of creating a climate which encouraged the defamation, persecution, and even assassination of the opposition, and of using illegal methods to assert state control over the economy. Fuentealba asserted that the government had reneged on key promises to take measures against illegal armed groups and to introduce legislation delimiting the areas of the economy that were subject to expropriation. In view of what he called the "two-faced" position of the government, he declared that the Christian Democrats would have "to use the constitutional and legal instrumentalities available to us in order to compel the government to fulfill the promises which it has freely accepted and agreed to."[17]

Fuentealba's concern about the government's nationalization program (the Christian Democrats always referred to it as *estatización* to emphasize that the takeovers were by the state, not the nation) reflected renewed apprehension raised by the Allende government's announcement in August that it planned to acquire majority control of the Paper and

[15] *El Mercurio*, Aug. 4, 1971, pp. 1 and 10; Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37.

[16] Salvador Allende, *La Lucha por la Democracia Económica y las Libertades Sociales* (The Struggle for Economic Democracy and Social Freedoms—Second State of the Nation Address, May 21, 1972), Santiago, Consejeria de la Difusión de la Presidencia, 1972, p. 63.

[17] Renán Fuenteabla, "Analisis de la Situación Política del País (Analysis of the Political Situation of the County)," *Política y Espíritu*, September 1971, p. 34.

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Carton Manufacturing Company (*Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones*) through the purchase of shares by CORFO. Paper and cellulose production had been slated for nationalization under Allende's initial program of 1970, but the Statute of Democratic Guarantees had specifically mentioned "access to supplies and materials" as a necessary prerequisite for a free press, and the Christian Democrats feared that a takeover of the only private supplier of paper (the government has its own paper factory) would lead to control of the national press. In mid-October 1971, CORFO was authorized to begin buying up shares of the paper company, but the establishment of a National Freedom Fund by private shareholders to buy shares from anyone wishing to sell has thus far prevented the government from acquiring control. (More recently, the government's refusal to permit the company to increase its prices in line with its rising costs has raised the threat of its eventual bankruptcy.)

Fuentealba's announcement that his party would use the legal means at its disposal to control the executive was followed in late October by the introduction of a Christian Democratic-sponsored constitutional amendment requiring that all transfers of private enterprises to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in accordance with legislation adopted by the Congress, and specifying that expropriation of an industry under the 1932 Decree-Law could only take place after production had ceased for 20 days as a result of "the fault of the proprietor or administrator of the enterprise," while interventions for other reasons could only occur with the approval of the Controller General and for a maximum period of six months. The amendment also declared any purchase of shares by state entities after October 14, 1971, null and void—a provision to discourage shareholders in the paper company from selling to CORFO.

Reflecting the Christian Democratic conception of "communitarian socialism," the proposed amendment likewise authorized the participation of workers in the management and profits of state enterprises and the establishment of new worker-controlled enterprises in the private sector as well.[18]

With the introduction of the constitutional amendment, the stage was set for a confrontation between the opposition-dominated Congress and the Allende government, and the consequence was a serious constitutional crisis in 1972. After passing through the normal constitutional procedures, including a vote by a joint session of Congress 60 days after its initial adoption by the two houses, the amendment was forwarded to President Allende in February 1972. Constitutional changes adopted in 1970, which had broadened the president's power to call a plebiscite, had neglected to specify the procedure which the Congress was to use if it wished to override future presidential vetoes or "observations" (the constitution gives the president the right to veto specific provisions of a bill and to add proposals of his own.) Allende argued that, as in the case of ordinary legislation, the Congress would need a two-thirds majority to override his veto. The opposition argued that the omission of specific mention of the two-thirds requirement in the 1970 constitutional changes meant that Congress would need only an absolute majority to reaffirm its own version of proposed amendments and that the president would then have to use the new plebiscite procedure to resolve the difference between the two powers. Extended negotiations between Allende and the Congressional opposition in March 1972 and again in June failed to resolve the difference in their respective interpretations. By the second anniversary of his election, Allende was threatening to appeal to the newly-established Constitutional Tribunal (where he had a 3-2 majority), which the opposition claimed lacked jurisdiction over constitutional amendments, while some legislators were alluding to the possibility of impeaching Allende for violating the constitution.

By this time Allende did not dare to resort to a plebiscite, because it was plain that his popular support had suffered a marked deterioration in 1972. A process of political polarization had developed, and this polarization had united the previously divided opposition against the government. In the debates over the proposed constitutional amendment, the National Party, the Radical Democrats, and the Christian Democrats began to cooperate directly for the first time. They also were brought together by the indiscriminate attacks upon them as "fascists" by Fidel Castro during his 35-day visit to Chile in November and December 1971.[19] In early

[18] "Texto del Proyecto de Reforma Constitucional sobre Areas de la Económica" (Text of the Constitutional Reform Bill on the Areas of the Economy), *Política y Espíritu*, February-March 1972, pp. 63-65.

[19] See in particular Castro's farewell speech at the National Stadium, translated in *The Speeches of Fidel Castro*, Vol. II, Montreal, Editions Latin America, 1972, pp. 351-77. For an analysis see George Grayson, "El Viaje de Castro a Chile, Peru, y Ecuador" (Castro's Trip to Chile, Peru and Ecuador), *Problemas Internacionales* (Washington, DC), May-June 1972, pp. 1-14.

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December, these three parties cooperated in the "March of the Empty Pots," an antigovernment demonstration staged by 5,000 women. At the University of Chile, representatives of the opposition successfully resisted attempts by the Marxist-controlled University Council to absorb the Faculty of Law into an enlarged Faculty of Social Sciences. In Congress, the opposition parties cooperated in voting for the impeachment in early January 1972 of the Minister of the Interior, José Toha, for his failure to control leftist violence. (His successor was likewise impeached on similar grounds in early July.)

Electoral Indices

The opposition parties also collaborated in avoiding three-way races in two important by-elections in January 1972, ensuring—albeit without formal agreement—combined support to back Rafael Moreno, former head of the Agrarian Reform Agency under Frei, as candidate for senator in the provinces of O'Higgins and Colchagua, and Sergio Diez, well-known for his defense of the National Party on a television panel, as candidate for deputy in the southern province of Linares.

The deterioration of the government's political support was confirmed by the results of the two by-elections. To oppose Moreno, the Popular Unity coalition nominated a Socialist deputy and union official, Hector Olivares; to run against Diez, it named the widow of an agrarian reform official who had been killed in May 1970 in connection with an attempt to expropriate the land of a *latifundista.* It was expected that Linares would elect Diez because it had always been a conservative district and because the violence in the countryside since Allende's election had further buttressed the right. The senatorial race, however, was taking place in a mining and agricultural area which the left had carried in 1971. The government parties attempted to identify the Christian Democrats with "the forces of reaction," citing their cooperation with the right-wing parties (while there was no formal agreement between the parties and the Christian Democrats had given their supporters "freedom of action" in Linares, it was understood that most would vote for Diez). The opposition candidates counterattacked by denouncing the climate of violence in the countryside, the totalitarian tendencies of the government, and the deteriorating economic situation. The result was a defeat for the government in both cases.

In O'Higgins and Colchagua, Moreno won 52.7 percent of the vote to Olivares' 46.3 percent, a gain for the anti-government parties of 4.4 percentage points over the 1971 election results. Diez, the National Party candidate in the South, received 58 percent of the vote—an increase of seven percentage points over the last election—to the government-supported candidate's 40.9 percent. Women voted overwhelmingly against the government, giving Diez a nearly two-to-one majority in Linares, and Moreno a 12,000-vote plurality in O'Higgins and Colchagua. Especially striking was a six-percent decline in support for the government in the mining communes of Machali and Sewell. Not as surprising but nonetheless noteworthy was the large Christian Democratic turnout in rural areas where land had been redistributed under the preceding government of Eduardo Frei.[20]

The Political Commission of the Communist Party prepared a confidential report following the elec-

[20] *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Jan. 17-23, 1972, p. 1; *Boletín Informativo del Partido Democrata Cristiano* (Santiago), Jan. 21, 1972, p. 3; Dirección del Registro Electoral, *Resultado Elección Ordinaria de Regidores 1971* (mimeo.).

Chilean housewives protest food shortages and rapidly rising living costs with a "March of the Empty Pots" in midtown Santiago on December 1, 1971. Besides complaining that only manure is available to fill their cooking pots, the women demand "Pluralist Democracy" and a "Plebiscite."

—Photo by Juan de Onis from *The New York Times*.

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tions, the full text of which was obtained and published by the Santiago newspaper, *El Mercurio.* The report noted that in comparison to 1971, the government candidates had lost votes in nearly every commune and that "the *Unidad Popular* masses have been adversely affected by the result." The report blamed the "preponderant participation" of the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) for the losses in Linares and predicted that in 1972 there would be "very strong inflationary pressures which could make our situation acute."[21]

Economic Problems

The inflationary pressures to which the Communist Party report alluded became increasingly apparent during 1972 as the official cost-of-living index rose in excess of five percent a month for the first seven months and then leaped a startling 22.7 percent in August. Combined with shortages of food and of replacement parts, these pressures engendered massive dissatisfaction with the government's economic policy, leading to the removal of Pedro Vuskovic as Minister of Economics in June and the announcement of a government austerity program in July. Why had Vuskovic's program, which had worked so brilliantly in Allende's first year in office, proved so disastrous in his second?

The principal reason was that it had been based upon a policy of massive government deficit-spending, which eventually produced galloping inflation and the disappearance of hard-currency reserves. Allende's first budget included a planned deficit of six billion *escudos,* but the actual 1971 deficit was more than twice that amount—almost 36 percent of the budget. If allowance is made for inflation, there was an actual decline in tax revenues in 1971, and the money supply increased 102 percent. The 1972 budget raised taxes on excess profits, private capital (*impuesto patrimonial*) and property, and also removed many exemptions from the income tax; but it still programmed a deficit of 16-billion *escudos.*[22] By early 1972 excess capacity had been absorbed, earlier stockpiles had been exhausted, and the hoped-for revenues from the nationalization of "exploitative" monopolies in industry had not materialized. The Chilean voter saw his entire wage readjustment for 1971 (based on a 22-percent inflation rate for the year) disappear in the first five months of 1972; when government spokesmen pointed out the gains he had made under socialism, he in effect replied: "I know, but what have you done for me *lately*?"

The Frei administration had left its successor $400 million in hard-currency reserves; by June 1972 there was a negative balance of $28 million in Chile's international reserves.[23] The renegotiation of Chile's debt with its international governmental creditors in April 1972 and with American private banks in June, as well as the receipt of a standby credit from the International Monetary Fund, eased the pressure somewhat. But the price of copper—Chile's principal source of foreign exchange—had dropped 20 percent, food imports were up sharply, and foreign investment had virtually ceased, so that a massive deficit for all of 1972 was almost unavoidable. Allende blamed the "imperialist economic blockade" for Chile's troubles, while Vuskovic attributed the estimated $200-million increase in expenditure for food imports to the increased consumption resulting from the government's redistribution policies. However, the opposition was quick to point out that the violent seizures of land in the countryside, along with pricing and other discriminatory practices against private agriculture, had led to a decline in domestic food production; moreover, because of bureaucratic inefficiency and political infighting, copper production in the newly-nationalized mines had fallen far short of programmed goals despite the entry of several new mines into production.[24] Opposition spokesmen also cited the Allende government's refusal to devalue the *escudo* until December 1971 (it was again devalued, with drastic multiple exchange rates, in July 1972)—a policy which made it economically unprofitable for Chilean exporters to sell their goods abroad.

An additional problem, the effects of which were likely to be felt in Allende's third year, was the lack of new investment. Not much could be expected

[21] *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1972, p. 4.

[22] Deficit figures come from Chilean government sources reproduced in "La Economía Chilena en el Gobierno de Allende" (The Chilean Economy Under the Allende Government), *Política y Espíritu,* April 1972, pp. 41 and 50. New taxes are listed in *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Jan. 3-9, 1972, p. 1.

[23] *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Sept. 25-30, 1972, p. 1.

[24] Copper production has been programmed for 862,000 tons in 1971 and 1,200,000 tons in 1972. In 1971 it reached only 600,000 tons. See *ibid.,* Nov. 8-14, 1971, p. 4. For details on the difficulties in the copper industry, see Norman Gall, "Copper is the Wage of Chile," *American Universities Field Staff Reports* (West Coast South America Series), forthcoming.

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from private investors, while the government itself was spending so much for consumption, redistribution, and outgo to meet the deficits of government-owned or intervened enterprises (estimated for 1972 at 23 billion *escudos*) that little was left for investment, which by Allende's own admission declined by seven percent in 1971. Production continued to increase in early 1972, but by the middle of the year a sharp drop in the rate of increase indicated that a serious economic crisis was likely to develop unless drastic measures were taken. Official concern over this problem was apparent in Allende's economic message of July 24, 1972, which, in addition to announcing a series of austerity measures, listed a strict order of investment priorities.[25]

By the end of September, the official inflation rate for 1972 had reached 63 percent, and serious shortages of meat, flour, cement, textiles, sugar, vegetable oils, and powdered milk had developed. A desperate attempt to curb rising economic discontent by advancing the date of the annual wage readjustment to October 1 only seemed likely to make the inflation worse—and gave rise to dire predictions that the government would resort to rationing and a drastic new currency reform after the March 1973 elections.

The government's economic difficulties had already had important political consequences. In April the Left Radicals (including Senator Alberto Baltra, who had been the Radical Party presidential candidate in the Popular Unity negotiations of December 1969 and January 1970) switched to the opposition, and the government lost heavily to the Christian Democrats in elections for Rector and Council of the University of Chile. In May the Christian Democrats received a third of the vote in nationwide trade-union elections and gained control of the Santiago provincial trade union organization (the PDC claimed that it had been robbed of the national presidency of CUT, the Central Workers' Union, as a result of electoral frauds elsewhere). In July the government-backed candidate won a by-election in Coquimbo; but in comparison with the April 1971 elections, the opposition registered an increase of 9,000 votes, almost 10 percent of the total.

More recently, there have been increasing signs of popular unrest. In August some 136,000 shopkeepers staged a one-day closing of their businesses in protest against the economic situation and out of fear of further efforts on the part of the regime to nationalize small retail establishments. In October tensions increased when the nation's truckowners and drivers staged a strike—tying up deliveries of gasoline and other products—in protest against the government's alleged attempts to take over this sector of transportation. The government responded by declaring a state of emergency in 18 of Chile's 25 provinces. At the time of writing, further shop-closings and street rioting between pro- and anti-Allende forces, particularly in the capital city, were making world news headlines.

An Assessment of the *Via Chilena*

As the government and the opposition formed rival party federations in order to confront each other in the March 1973 parliamentary elections,[26] it was clear that Allende's policy of socialist consumerism was in serious jeopardy. The *via Chilena,* Allende's second model of socialism, had been predicated on the assumption that lower-income groups, who are in a clear majority in Chile (60 percent of the population make less than twice the minimum wage[27]), would recognize the improvement in their living standard under socialism and vote in increasing numbers for "their" Popular Unity government. Furthermore, since the economic base of the opposition (through its control over industry and credit) would no longer be available to it, the Chilean Marxists had assumed that the "masses" would no longer be "mystified" by the "false consciousness" produced by the propaganda of the right. But this strategy did not foresee the continuing conservatism of a sector of the Chilean electorate, especially

[25] See *El Mercurio* (International Edition), April 24-30, 1972, p. 8, on the deficits of government enterprises; and Salvador Allende, *La Lucha . . .* (Second State of the Nation Address), p. 21, for the figure on the decline in investment. A summary of Allende's speech of July 24, 1972, appears in CORFO, *Chile Economic News,* Aug. 15, 1972, Annex, pp. 1-9.

[26] In 1972 the electoral law was changed by mutual agreement of government and opposition to permit party federations to run candidates. The government parties formed the Federation of Popular Unity, while the opposition formed two groups: the National Federation, composed of the National and Radical Democratic Parties; and the Federation of Democratic Opposition, composed of the Christian Democrats, the minuscule Democratic National Party (PADENA), and the Left Radicals. The two opposition federations were then combined into a larger grouping, the Confederation of Democratic Parties. This structure was necessary in order for the Christian Democrats and the Left Radicals to avoid too close an identification with the right-wing parties.

[27] Salvador Allende, *La Lucha . . .* (Second State of the Nation Address) p. 13.

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among the women, or the appeal of the Christian Democrats to large numbers of already politicized middle- and lower-class voters who were opposed to Marxism and refused to see the Christian Democratic program of "communitarian socialism" as a subterfuge of capitalist reaction. Nor did it take into account that the Statute of Democratic Guarantees and Chile's strong tradition of freedom of expression might provide a continuing basis for criticism of the government. Above all, it did not anticipate that the Allende government would run so quickly into the same economic problems—especially the critical problem of endemic inflation—that had eroded the political support of its predecessors.

A verdict on Allende's "second model" depends on one's definition of socialism. If it means government control of the basic sectors of the economy, the Allende government has moved very far in the attainment of this objective. If it means greater economic equality, Allende has considerably increased the purchasing power of the lowest-income groups, although much of this increase is now being eroded by inflation. If it means, as Allende says it does, respect for ideological pluralism and human liberty, there has been some cutting of corners, (*e.g.*, the economic pressures which have been brought to bear on the paper company and on opposition-controlled newspapers and radio stations); but thus far the regime has not infringed on basic freedoms, and Chile is a much freer country than many other contemporary Latin American states. If socialism means worker-participation in decision-making, the Allende government is only now beginning to take steps in this direction—as a response to continuing criticism by the Christian Democrats. Last but hardly least, if socialism means the achievement of a more rational and productive economy, the Allende regime has failed.

As Allende prepares for almost certain setbacks in the forthcoming congressional elections, perhaps he has been compelled to question whether Chile's perennial economic difficulties are indeed, as his Marxist ideology tells him, the result of capitalist and imperialist exploitation, or whether they might not be the result of excessive demands placed upon a fragile economy by a highly-politicized and impatient population—demands which neither conservatives, nor reformists, nor "revolutionaries" have yet been able to satisfy. If the pressures upon his administration continue to build up, it is conceivable that he may be tempted to turn from the second model of socialism to the first—that is, to try to achieve economic growth and social equality by abolishing political freedom. As of now, however, despite economic crisis, social unrest and a dangerous constitutional stalemate, Allende's commitment to democracy—reinforced by the continued strength of a vigorous opposition, the traditional constitutionalism of the armed forces, and a shared fear of civil war—makes it appear more likely that he will continue to seek for legal or quasi-legal methods to carry forward the socialization of Chilean society. In this situation, it is hard to see how he will be able to avoid the cyclical failures of his predecessors—thereby demonstrating that Marxism, contrary to his claims and beliefs, offers no special answers or systemic solutions to Chile's complex problems.



In April 1972 Santiago students demonstrate against a decision by the Popular Unity government to cut the education budget.

—Photo by Renato Perez for Eastfoto.

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Georg Lukács in Retrospect

EDITORS' NOTE: Several generations of intellectuals in Europe and elsewhere have seen in Georg Lukács the paradigm of a contemporary Marxist. Some indication of the reasons why is provided in the three essays presented here on Lukács' thought, outlook and person. Mr. Berki traces in both politics and philosophy the development of Lukács' consciousness from its origins in the revolutionary world of 1917 through its later adjustment to the integrated global culture of our day. Mr. Kline records personal impressions of the man and his ideas derived from several talks with Lukács during the last decade of the philosopher's life. Mr. Alexander offers us a personal memory of Lukács from the viewpoint of an American observer of Communist affairs posted at Budapest in the 1960's.

Evolution of a Marxist Thinker

By R. N. Berki

From the time that he became a Marxist in his youth,[1] the moral and intellectual consciousness of Georg Lukács underwent important changes even while preserving its identity. The continuity of his thought is to be sought in his steadfast moral commitment to a realization of the Marxian goal and in his philosophical habit of thinking and expressing himself in Hegelian categories. This continuity of basic concern is matched, however, by considerable shifts in his position, mainly in the form of changes in emphasis and in the internal arrangement of his ideas. It is possible to detect a pattern of development. On the level of political ideas, adapting Peter Ludz's insightful presentation,[2] we can talk about a dialectical tension in Lukács between the ideas of "dictatorship" and "democracy," and we can discern a constant, though halting, movement away from the former and toward the latter as the thinker and his thought matured over the decades. In Marxist political terms, this change can also be called a movement away from an extremist "sectarian" position toward the pole of "revisionism"—though we must, of course, be careful in our employment of these terms, as they have often been employed simply as terms of abuse.

On the level of philosophical ideas, also, one sees important changes in Lukács' position, and here it might be possible to talk in terms of a movement away from romantic subjectivism toward a more balanced, more realistic philosophical attitude. Though it may not appear obvious at first glance, the changes on these two levels of Lukács' thought are not merely parallel but closely interrelated. Lastly and most significantly, the development of Lukács' consciousness in politics and philosophy can be looked upon as the reflection in the thinker's mind

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[1] Having read Marx in his school years and imbibed his teaching, Lukács joined the Communist Party of Hungary in December 1918, when he was already 33. See "Mein Weg zu Marx" (My Road to Marx), in G. Lukács, *Schriften zur Ideologie und Politik* (Writings on Ideology and Politics), ed. by Peter Ludz, Neuwied, Luchterland, 1967, p. 327 (hereafter cited as *Schriften*).

[2] See his Introduction to Lukács' *Schriften* ("Der Begriff der 'demokratischen Diktatur' in der politischen Philosophie von Georg Lukács"—"The Concept of 'Democratic Dictatorship' in the Political Philosophy of Georg Lukács").

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of the evolving historical experience of the world to which he belonged.

The *fons et origo* of Lukács' career as a Marxist philosopher was the world of 1917, a period for which the Marxian teaching appeared "revolutionary" in the strict sense of the term: it was a doctrine which, to paraphrase Marx, was as yet nothing but which set out to become everything—a youthful creed confident in its millenarian promise of liberating and rejuvenating a tired, conflict-ridden world. This, to put it in figurative terms, was Marxism before the big climb. Half a century later, the situation is entirely different. Now Marxism is no longer faced by the steep hill of a hostile and alien "bourgeois" civilization, but is itself a part of the global cultural and power-political establishment. It stretches itself out on a comfortable *plateau;* its adherents, or certainly a major part of them, are no longer conspirators but officials or politicians; its philosophers are no longer dreamers in dingy attics but renowned and dignified holders of academic posts, although there has not been—and perhaps never will be—a complete integration of intellectuals into any kind of status quo, Marxist or any other. In broad terms, however, this mature period of the "plateau" can be seen to differ essentially from the earlier phase: now the emphasis is not on revolution and large-scale transformation, but on reform and the consolidation of existing gains. It is the story of this development, with its stresses and tribulations, that finds fruitful expression through the refined intellect of Lukács.

It is, alas, possible here only to indicate a few landmarks and characteristic Lukácsian formulations through which this development can be traced, and our presentation will have to be somewhat impressionistic as well as—at times perhaps—controversial. We shall have to begin by commenting briefly on Lukács' most renowned work, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (History and Class Consciousness).[3] Although he later repudiated many of the arguments contained in that book, it is worthwhile to attempt a summary and appreciation, mainly for two reasons: first, because the work has had an enormous influence on non-Marxists and quasi-Marxists and has generated what may be termed a bastard line of development from Lukács' early phase; and second, because it seems rather important to see *why* Lukács moved away from his early positions, so that we shall not be led to regard his change of attitude as something to be regretted.

History and Class Consciousness is a work which has become almost a living legend, partly on account of its content, partly on account of the acute political controversies that were taking place in the Marxist movement at the time of its first publication in 1923. Even an adverse judgment of the arguments the book contains should not blind us to its positive qualities. One would find it well-nigh impossible not to be overawed by its extraordinary intellectual power, its concentration and almost magnetic force of attraction. Of Hegel it was once said that while there was much cleverness in his *Logic,* his *Phenomenology* showed the work of a genius.[4] It can be said of Lukács that while his later work undoubtedly contains more cleverness (and wisdom), *History and Class Consciousness* is in a class of its own.

Though Lukács is not trying to be original and the influence of a great variety of thinkers on his ideas is quite visible, the philosophy he puts forward here is very much his own creation. He builds up his arguments with exquisite skill from various scattered doctrinal bricks found in the Marxian edifice. Of particular importance are the famous section in the first volume of *Capital* on the "fetishism of commodities" and Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach.* The tone, as well as the substance of Lukács' arguments, however, bears a most striking resemblance to another Marxian piece: the fiery, programmatic "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," where Marx connects philosophy and the proletariat as, respectively, "the head and the heart" of human emancipation.[5] In this phrase the whole of Lukács' message is most dramatically summarized. It is not, of course, an accident that the emphasis should be on Marx's early writings. Though some of its effects may have tended toward revisionism, the stated intention of *History and Class Consciousness* was quite the opposite. Its message is purificatory and fundamentalist, intended precisely to combat any kind of revisionist dilution of the original revolutionary meaning of Marx's thought.

[3] This work was originally published in Berlin by Malik Verlag in 1923. It was republished by Luchterhand in 1967, with a New Preface in which Lukács refutes some of his earlier conceptions. This edition was translated into English by Rodney Livingstone and published in London by Merlin Press in 1971. Subsequent references will be to this English edition.

[4] J. Loewenberg, in his introduction to *Hegel: Selections,* New York, Scribner, p. xix.

[5] Reprinted in K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Religion,* Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d., p. 58.

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A compressed summary of Lukács' arguments can hardly do justice to the subtlety and logical finesse the book displays, but an effort will have to be made. Lukács offers us a comprehensive philosophical diagnosis of the modern age and outlines what he thinks is the remedy. His diagnosis reveals the root of all our maladies to lie in the phenomenon of "reification"—by which he means a state of affairs in the world that generates a perverted view of the nature and relationship of human beings and the objects surrounding them. We look upon things as though they existed in their own right, and we misperceive human relations as though they were relations between things out in the world. Marx himself commented on the phenomenon of reification only in the field of political economy, stressing the fictitiously "independent" character of the commodity and calling attention to the misery and degradation involved in men themselves becoming "things."

Georg Lukács in 1919, when he served as Commissar of Culture in Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic and was formulating his History and Class Consciousness.

—Photo from *A Magyar Tanácsköztársaság*—1919 (The Hungarian Soviet Republic—1919), Budapest, Szikra, 1950, p. 180.

Lukács takes the argument much further. In what is surely the most fascinating part of his book, he accounts for the entire development of modern rationalist philosophy in terms of reification.[6] Rationalism, appearing in such forms as materialism, mathematical reasoning, Kantian critical philosophy, Fichte's subjective idealism, and the dialectical conception of Hegel, assumes that the whole of creation (including the creator) is intelligible, and it sets out accordingly to find the bases of total knowledge. But the enterprise fails. In some shape, Lukács argues, rationalism has to accept something as *given* and hence inexplicable—an impenetrably dark "content" which the "form" of philosophy cannot illuminate. The Kantian "thing-in-itself" is the best epitomization of this impotence of rationalist philosophy,[7] and the thing-in-itself, Lukács contends, is but a rarefied form of appearance of the "commodity" of capitalist production relations. The moral is clear: as long as this system holds sway, generating in its wake such reified conceptions as the belief in an immutable "human nature" and fixed economic and social "laws," there can be no fulfillment of the rationalist dream. Though there is much in capitalist society that goes by the name of "knowledge," this knowledge is inevitably fragmented and concerned merely with detail; and the so-called "social sciences," since they take reification for granted, have an inescapably false and ideological character.[8] The bourgeoisie as the ruling class, since it has only an "immediate" relationship to the world surrounding the human being, can never advance beyond its class position and achieve more than a partial and relative understanding of this world and of itself.[9]

What is needed, Lukács argues, is a "view of totality" which liberates the human mind from the tyranny of facts and recognizes that the *whole* of human experience is the direct or indirect outcome of man's own social activity. (It is to be noted that here Lukács entirely neglects the impact of what

[6] *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 110.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 114 ff.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 156. *Cf.* also Karl Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie* (Marxism and Philosophy), Leipzig, 1923. Korsch's work, which was published shortly after *History and Class Consciousness* and contained parallel conclusions, is usually mentioned in connection with the latter. In fact, however, Korsch's work is very different from Lukács'; it is a more readable, balanced, and scholarly work but has nothing of Lukács' intellectual charisma.

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may be termed "external nature" and appears to argue as though the man-made world was at bottom independent of anything else.[10]) This view of totality, he thinks, is implicit in Hegel's philosophy because that philosophy culminates in recognition of the identity of "subject" (the human being) and "object" (the world). But although his is the most highly developed form of rationalism, Hegel still succumbs to reification: the identity of subject and object, for him, exists only in philosophy and fails to appear in the actual consciousness of the human being who enacts history. Hegel, in other words, still assigns history-creating capacity to "world-spirit," an abstraction, instead of locating it in history itself.[11] The view of totality can only appear explicitly as the "class consciousness" of the proletariat, since the proletariat occupies the "center" of the man-made universe,[12] having created it in the first place but being excluded from its "immediate" knowledge and enjoyment. The proletariat is the "living contradiction" of capitalist society, and it must come to understand itself in total, dialectical terms. By developing its unique class consciousness and translating this into true "praxis" directed toward the complete material overthrow of the bourgeois world,[13] the proletariat becomes the "subject-object of history"[14]—that is, "man" as the self-conscious creator of his universe. But since the development of this all-redeeming consciousness is not a smooth, natural process, the revolutionary fight further requires the leadership of a group of dedicated men, the leaders and members of a vanguard party.[15] Thus we move from philosophy to organization.

Even a summary as crude and terse as this may impart some of the flavor of the fantastic idealism of Lukács' position in this book. That position has, of course, been subjected to criticism from many quarters, and as has already been mentioned, Lukács himself subsequently moved away from the most extreme and most utopian of the arguments he formulated in 1923. It may, however, be in order in this connection to call attention to two points which do not seem to have been given sufficient consideration by critics.

The first concerns the alleged "Hegelianism" of *History and Class Consciousness*. No one could seriously presume to doubt Lukács' intimate knowledge of Hegel, and of course it is true that in some sense Lukács was and always remained a "Hegelian" philosopher. Yet, paradoxical as it may sound at first, his later writings show an *increase* in Hegelian influence, and by comparison *History and Class Consciousness* seems a profoundly un-Hegelian work. Its very spirit is alien to Hegelian philosophy. What Lukács attempts to do in it is to infuse Hegelian dialectical categories with the messianic, activistic spirit exuding from Feuerbach and the young Marx. Behind that spirit stands the subjectivism of Fichte, and behind Fichte lurk Kant and the Kantian conception of an overarching ethical imperative.[16] It has rightly been said that Lukács' philosophy is "ought-ridden."[17]

At any rate, it can be argued that the empirical, historical realization of an ethical end as envisaged by Lukács is incompatible with the Hegelian dialectic. For while it *does* make sense, from the Hegelian standpoint, to view philosophical knowledge as the unity of subject and object, it may not be so reasonable to expect—as Lukács does— that actual history will play out the contradictions *and* the unification on the level of social being. Now this is by no means a "bourgeois" view of Hegel. It is interesting to note here that the Soviet philosopher Abram Deborin, who criticized Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* in a 1924 article that coincided with Zinoviev's denunciation of Lukács in the Comintern, accused the latter of the idealistic distortion not only of Marx, but of Hegel as well. Correctly, Deborin pointed out that Hegel himself had been realistic enough to see that subject and object would remain separate while at the same time being "united" in the dialectic.[18]

[10] Lukács regards external nature as a "social category." See *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 130.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 77, 146-47.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[15] ". . . the Party is assigned the sublime role of *bearer of the class consciousness of the proletariat and the conscience of its historical vocation.*" *Ibid.*, p. 41 (italics in original).

[16] See *ibid.*, p. 161.

[17] See I. Meszaros, "Lukács' Concept of Dialectic," in G. H. R. Parkinson, Ed., *Georg Lukács: The Man, His Work and His Ideas*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970. Professor Meszaros, a former associate of Lukács, suggests that peculiar conditions in Hungary at the time may have been responsible for evoking in the young Lukács the strongly moralistic attitude which, though "Hegelianized," still dominated *History and Class Consciousness*.

[18] A. M. Deborin, 'Lukács und seine Kritik des Marxismus" (Lukács and His Critique of Marxism), *Arbeiterliteratur* (Vienna), No. 9, 1924. The article is reprinted, together with numerous other contemporary documents as well as a discussion on Lukács, in F. Cerutti *et al., Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein heute* (*History and Class Consciousness* Today), Amsterdam, Verlag de Munter, 1971.

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The second point to be mentioned concerns the philosophical implications of Lukács' notion of "proletarian class consciousness." It is clear, of course, that Lukács does not mean by this concept anything that actually exists as the "consciousness" of a "class"; it has nothing, or very little, to do with what proletarians themselves might think or feel.[19] As *consciousness* it exists only in the minds of "extraordinary individuals"[20] like Marx and Lenin. Thus, the "unity of theory and praxis" is still only a theoretical unity.

The elitist, undemocratic implications of this doctrine of a purely objective, "imputed" (*zugerechnetes)* consciousness are easy to see. The point to note here, however, is the sense in which it perverts Lukács' "Hegelianism." Lukács, we may recall, criticizes Hegel for elevating "philosophy" above actual history. But here we see philosophy returning through the back door, and—observe—this is philosophy under false pretenses. It is not the (Hegelian) consciousness of spirit recognizing itself in the world "when the dusk has fallen,"[21] but the consciousness of the philosopher who *projects* his ideals onto the outside world and *attributes* meanings to actions performed by others. Thus Lukács does succeed, in a way, in "out-Hegeling Hegel,"[22] but his is a kind of Hegelianism that leads to a philosophical and political *cul de sac.*

One more word on this early period. Though *History and Class Consciousness* was repudiated by Leninists, mainly on account of its idealistic overtones, its central political message consists in its high-level justification of Leninism. Indeed, Lenin was Lukács' "world-spirit on horseback," though in Lukács' case the relationship to the political leader was much closer than Hegel's was to Napoleon. In some sense it is also true that Lukács in this book "out-Lenins Lenin" in that he argues the case for a vanguard-party more openly than Lenin does.[23] Critics like George Lichtheim are in the right, moreover, in suggesting that this messianic vanguard-conception may lead directly to Stalinism.[24] (The point will be taken up below.) Yet we must note that Lukács was far from happy—at any time—with this notion:

[19] Lukács says that the proletariat "must develop a dialectical contradiction between its immediate interest and its long-term objectives", and that the struggle the proletariat wages is also directed "against itself." *History and Class Consciousness,* pp. 71, 80. It has been suggested that Lukács' concept of "imputed consciousness" derives in part from Max Weber's "ideal type" (see F. Cerutti, "Hegel, Lukács, Korsch. Zum dialektischen Selbstverständnis des kritischen Marxismus"—Hegel, Lukács, Korsch. Toward a Dialectical Understanding of Critical Marxism," in O. Negt, ed., *Aktualität und Folgen der Philosophie Hegels*—Actuality and Consequences of Hegel's Philosophy, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1970, p. 204; see also Ludz, *op. cit.* p. xxv). However, the concept is already there in its pure form in the young Marx.

[20] *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 79.

[21] The reference is, of course, to the famous passage in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right:* "When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk." G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke* (Collected Works), Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1921, Vol. VI. p. 17.

[22] As he himself puts it in the New Preface to *History and Class Consciousness,* p. xxiii.

[23] See George Lichtheim, "Transmutations of a Doctrine," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1966, p. 23. See also his *Lukács,* London, Fontana, 1970, pp. 50-51. Lukács clearly takes Lenin's side against Rosa Luxemburg in declaring: "Freedom cannot represent a value in itself. . . . Freedom must serve the rule of the proletariat, not the other way round." *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 292.

[24] Lichtheim, *Lukács, op. cit.,* p. 51.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel from the Bollinger engraving of the portrait executed by Christian Xeller in the period 1815-18.

—The Bettmann Archive.

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he perceived its "dangers" as early as 1919[25] and insisted, in a 1924 essay on Lenin, that the vanguard-conception "presupposes the fact—the actuality—of the revolution."[26] This proviso has, of course, far-reaching implications bearing on the later development of Lukács' thought.

The erosion of Lukács' impatient, utopian messianism began as early as the 1920's. (To some extent, of course, even *History and Class Consciousness* represented an advance toward greater realism.[27]) In what may be called the middle period of his development, two factors stand out as having been decisive. One was Lukács' actual political experience in the illegal Hungarian party, with special reference to his analysis and directives prepared for the party's congress in 1928, the so-called "Blum theses."[28] In these Lukács still argued against "rightist deviationism," but now he hit out also at "sectarians" who refused to see that the struggle in Hungary must be for the realization of a "democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants," as distinguished from the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—a position which led to his condemnation for opportunism, in contrast to the Comintern's charge of idealism made against him in 1924. The other decisive factor was his becoming acquainted with Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* in 1930 in Moscow. Obviously, the first was more important than the second: without the greater maturity and realism born of actual political experience, his reading of the *Manuscripts* would not have evoked in him the kind of theoretical response that it did. From the *Manuscripts* Lukács learned that the "objectification" of the human being was not the same as his being "alienated" in bourgeois society, and that human *labor* was the agency which connected man not merely with his fellows in society but also with external nature. These points have great significance for an understanding of Lukács' later philosophical development, particularly his *Ontology.* Their influence is already visible in Lukács' massive work on the young Hegel (completed in 1938),[29] a plodding and one-sided effort which nonetheless represents an advance over *History and Class Consciousness.*

Stalinism left its scars on Lukács, just as it tainted a number of other outstanding Marxist intellectuals of the period, and it would be pointless here to engage in a kind of inquisitorial questioning into his "guilt."[30] With regard to certain things, such as the doctrine of "socialism in one country," Lukács always was, and professed himself to be, a follower of Stalin, while with regard to terroristic methods of "building socialism" as applied, for example, in Hungary in the late 1940's and early 1950's, he was a silent, though disdainful, onlooker, but not an adherent.[31] What is significant is that in the "thaw" following Stalin's death, and especially through the traumatic experiences of the year 1956, which undermined many a theoretical sacred cow up to then accepted unquestioningly by most Marxists, Lukács became confirmed in the anti-sectarian line he had first embraced in the late 1920's and sided firmly with the forces of moderation and realism. His writings from this time onward reveal the presence in his thought of a more mature, more humane, and more accommodating Marxism, and while his belief in the

[25] See Ludz, *op. cit.*, referring to an early Lukács piece, "Der Bolschewismus als moralisches Problem" (Bolshevism as a Moral Problem). See also "Die Rolle der Moral in der kommunistischen Produktion" (The Role of Morality in Communist Production), reprinted in *ibid.*, pp. 75-81.

[26] G. Lukács, *Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought* (Vienna 1924), trans. by Nicholas Jacobs, London, New Left Books, 1970, p. 26. See also *ibid.*, p. 35, and *History and Class Consciousness* (p. 42), where Lukács insists that the vanguard has to fight for and earn the trust of the masses.

[27] In 1920 Lukács allied himself with left-wing sectarians and published an article, "Zur Frage des Parlamentarismus" (On the Question of Parliamentarism), in which he argued against participation by Communists in bourgeois parliaments. (See R. Schlesinger, "Historical Setting of Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness,*" in I. Meszaros, Ed., *Aspects of History and Class Consciousness,* London, Routledge, 1971.) It was against groups such as these that Lenin directed his " 'Left-Wing' Communism—An Infantile Disorder" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works,* London, Lawrence and Wishart, Vol. 31). This essay of Lenin's later became one of Lukács' favorites and one in which he relied in his polemics against Stalinist sectarianism.

[28] G. Lukács, "Thesen über die politische und wirtschaftliche Lage in Ungarn und über die Aufgaben der Kommunistischen Partei Ungarns" (Theses on the Political and Economic Situation in Hungary and the Tasks of the Hungarian Communist Party), in *Schriften,* pp. 290-322.

[29] G. Lukács, *Der junge Hegel: über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie* (The Young Hegel: On the Relations Between Dialectic and Economy), Zurich, Europa-Verlag, 1948. Though still arguing in terms of a humanized and historicized dialectic, Lukács here bases himself on the Marxian concept of "alienated labor" and attempts to derive Hegel's own notions from economic categories. The book has nothing of the starry-eyed idealism of *History and Class Consciousness,* and Lukács does not refer to Marx's early critique of Hegel even once (see note 5). For an interesting critique of this work, see J. Hyppolite, *Studies on Marx and Hegel,* ed. and trans. by J. O'Neill, London, Heinmann, 1969, pp. 70-90.

[30] Ernst Fischer, the Austrian Communist, gives a spirited account in his autobiography of the complex reasons for the intellectuals' abdication in the face of Stalinism. *Erinnerungen und Reflexionen* (Memories and Reflections), Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1969.

[31] See the vivid description of Lukács' position vis-à-vis the party in early postwar Hungary, in T. Aczel and T. Meray, *The Revolt of the Mind,* London, Thames and Hudson, 1960, pp. 57-80.

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correctness of basic Marxian ideas is unflinching, his understanding of the means-end relationship becomes more complex and commonsensical.

We may take note of a few relevant points found in his repeated criticisms of Stalinist sectarianism. An interesting issue arises here. Lukács insists that his own "sectarianism" of the early 1920's was entirely different from, and had nothing to do with, the "bureaucratic" sectarianism of Stalin and his followers.[32] This is, of course, correct, at least as far as *intentions* are concerned: the romantic, intellectual revolutionaries of the early phase certainly did not intend, or foresee, the rigid, oppressive type of bureaucratic rule which came into being after Lenin's death. Yet the two kinds of sectarianism have important features in common, and it can be argued that the "messianic utopianism" of the early Lukács and likeminded extreme revolutionaries is a *logical presupposition* of Stalinist bureaucracy.

It is interesting to note also, in this connection, that some of the things Lukács says in condemnation of Stalinist sectarianism are directly applicable as criticisms of the theses he put forward in *History and Class Consciousness.* He calls attention, for example, to the distortion involved in the sectarian view that there are only "two classes" in modern society, and that consequently the working class deals only with "enemies."[33] Another, even more fundamental defect of sectarianism, he says, is its neglect of concrete "mediations" in the class struggle. Sectarians act as though there were an "immediate unity" of theory and praxis,[34] and this attitude leads them into fostering a "siege mentality" and perpetuating an artificial "revolutionary period." Lukács further asserts—and this has even more direct relevance to his early philosophy—that sectarians start out from a "subjectivist" position and maintain, in the fashion of Fichte and his idealist philosophy, that insofar as facts do not conform to theory, the facts be damned.[35] Now the point is not to emphasize the "responsibiilty" of romantic utopianism for bureaucratic rule. What is important, rather, is to note the *manner* in which Lukács' thought has developed, and the *angle* from which he criticizes bureaucratism in his mature phase. The moral, clearly, is that it is self-defeating and illogical to attack Stalinism now from a romantic, ultra-revolutionary point of view, since it is this point of view that helped bureaucratism come into being in the first place. The only sensible attitude, therefore, is one of moderation and realism.

Lukács maintained his commitment to Leninism right down to the end, but again the commitment was to Leninism with a difference. There was, no doubt, a certain amount of ambiguity in his position. While still subscribing, as late as 1966, to the Leninist view that class consciousness has to be brought to the working class from outside, and to the belief that today in the West the task is still the formation of a mass party,[36] he clearly had doubts about the eligibility of even this larger minority to perform the role of the classical "vanguard." Its function should be educative, not conspiratorial. What Lukács kept on stressing in Lenin was the latter's ability to perceive the presence of "mediations" in the class struggle—that is to say, Lenin's political realism. It is plainly this emphasis that enabled Lukács to reconcile his basic commitment to Lenin with his more or less explicit disavowal of many of Lenin's actual doctrines.[37]

Of particular importance here is Lukács' conviction that today we are in a "new era" in which Marxism has to find new methods and new concepts in order even to understand the changing situation, and in which there is a need to "settle with the revolutionary phrase."[38] The implications of Lukács' position are crucial for the socialist countries: they clearly point to the need for the complete desectarianization, *i.e.,* democratization, of the party. The vanguard, as Lukács said in 1924, is justified only in

[32] See the New Preface to *History and Class Consciousness,* p. xiii.

[33] See G. Lukács, "Der Kampf des Fortschritts und der Reaktion in der heutigen Kultur" (The Struggle Between Progress and Reaction in Today's Culture—1956), in *Schriften,* p. 604; also "Brief an Alberto Carocci" (Letter to Alberto Carocci—1962), *ibid.* p. 665; and "Zur Debatte zwischen China und der Sowjetunion. Theoretisch-philosophische Bemerkungen" (On the Debate Between China and the Soviet Union, Theoretical-Philosophical Observations—1963), *ibid.,* p. 686.

[34] "Der Kampf des Fortschritts . . .", *loc. cit.,* p. 607.

[35] "Zur Debatte . . .", *loc. cit.,* p. 688.

[36] T. Pinkus, Ed., *Gespräche mit Georg Lukács* (Conversations with Georg Lukács), Hamburg, Rowohit, 1967, pp. 54, 69.

[37] What Lukács is trying to do in relation to Lenin is similar to the Marxian attempt to distinguish in Hegel between "system" and "method." See especially his "Rede in der philosophischen Debatte des Petöfi-Kreises" (Address in the Philosophical Debate of the Petöfi Circle—1956), in *Schriften,* p. 601.

[38] "Zur Debatte . . .", *loc. cit.,* p. 700; Pinkus, *op. cit.,* p. 49. Elsewhere Lukács talks about a "renaissance of Marxism" today, with the task "not only to eliminate Stalinist distortions and point the way forward, but above all, adequately to encompass the new facts of reality with the old-new methods of genuine Marxism." G. Lukács, *Solzhenitsyn,* trans. by W. D. Graf, London, Merlin Press, 1970, p. 15.

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revolutionary periods. Periods of consolidation—particularly in an era of global coexistence in which the "class struggle" takes the form of "competition for men's souls" in the "battlefield of leisure time"[39]—require different attitudes and different temperaments. Here, and not in his early romanticism, lies the contemporary significance of Lukács' thought.

While we would maintain that the realistic and accommodating tendencies inherent in Lukács' mature ideas are highly significant for their bearing on the development of socialist states, it must be admitted that his diagnosis of advanced capitalist society holds considerably less interest. Here, his judgments—such, for example, as the contention that capitalist exploitation today is in the form of "relative surplus-value," or that there is large-scale "manipulation" of the masses, who are being turned into "consumers"—are clearly second-hand and reveal a lack of intimate acquaintance with the concrete situation. Besides, Lukács' conceptual base, articulated in terms of his classical Hegelian Marxism, appears visibly too narrow to be able to accommodate the various novel features of advanced capitalist society.

In this connection, we may mention an interesting side issue related to what was referred to earlier as the "bastard line of development" issuing from Lukács' early ideas. Lukács was, undoubtedly, the first to call attention, from a Marxist point of view, to the phenomenon of "dehumanization" in bourgeois society, as distinguished from exploitation. Although he talks in *History and Class Consciousness* about "thinghood," or reification, and not about "alienation" (which he learned only from Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts*), the two concepts are closely related and, for certain purposes, identifiable. Thus it is true that Lukács' early work was instrumental in setting the radical intellectual atmosphere which—helped along by the publication of Marx's *Manuscripts* in the 1930's—tended to concentrate attention on "alienation" as *the* underlying chief defect of bourgeois society. In a sense, therefore, Lukács is certainly a spiritual forefather of Western "socialist humanism,"[40] and in particular his influence was all-important in the development of the Frankfurt School of German philosophical Marxism, which—though it began publishing its ideas in the Weimar era—has retained and perhaps even increased its theoretical significance in the postwar, and especially the post-cold-war, period.

The point is, however, that while the Frankfurt School owed much to Lukács in terms of its early inspiration, the conceptions developed by its adherents drew upon other, non-Marxian currents of thought, most notably from the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger and from Freudian psychoanalysis. Thus, as far as the diagnosis and critique of advanced capitalist society are concerned, the theories, for example, of Adorno, Fromm and Marcuse are much more sophisticated, colorful, and in a sense "relevant" than anything Lukács has to say.

[39] "Zur Debatte . . .", *loc. cit.*, p. 706.



Karl Marx as photographed by Pinkau and Gehler of Leipzig.

—The Bettmann Archive.

[40] There is no room here to deal adequately with the numerous modern currents of thought, such as existentialism and the sociology of knowledge, which have been decisively influenced by Lukács' early ideas, including those from his pre-Marxist phase. As regards his influence in shaping the sociology of knowledge, see the discussion in M. Watnick, "Relativism and Class Consciousness: Georg Lukács", in L. Labedz, Ed., *Revisionism*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1962.

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

Lukács in his last years, when he was working on his Ontology of Social Being.

—MTI (Hungarian Telegraph Agency).

On the other hand, it is to be borne in mind that this kind of radical "humanism" has its closest point of contact with Lukács' *early* thought, and that the implied extremism and elitism of Lukács' early doctrine of an "imputed consciousness" comes to the fore more explicitly in the conceptions of some of the new radicals.[41] In comparison with the thought of Fromm and Marcuse (not to mention the advocates of even more romantically-inclined theories), therefore, the rather pedestrian and narrower Marxism of Lukács appears to be a good deal saner as well as more realistic.

But let us return to Lukács. The later development of his thought has even more far-reaching implications than his already-mentioned criticisms of sectarianism would suggest, although the perspective we are adopting at this point is a long-term one. The most important and certainly most interesting departure in Lukács' thinking in his mature period is his increasing preoccupation with the subject of "ontology." Our comments will to some extent have to be speculative here, as the whole of Lukács' *Ontology of Social Being* has not yet been published.[42] Nevertheless, one can venture a few appreciative remarks, primarily on the basis of the two chapters already out[43] and Lukács' revelation in articles and interviews, as well as on the basis of some of the work of Lukács' disciples in recent years. The latter reference is to the "Budapest School" of Marxist philosophy, a group composed of former students and associates of Lukács whose interpretations of Marxism have had the master's *imprimatur*. The aim of the school, as Lukács said shortly before his death, is "to give a concrete and relevant account of structures and structural changes in the historical-ontological process whose correct understanding Marx's methods were intended to bring about."[44] Its most important representatives are Mihály Vajda, György Markus and Agnes Heller, and of particular relevance here is Agnes Heller's *A mindennapi elet* (Everyday Life),[45] itself a massive work of social ontology with features showing a close resemblance to Lukács' own formulations in the hitherto published parts of the *Ontology.*

Now Lukács' very concern with "ontology" is suggestive. Nothing, on the surface at any rate, can be any farther from the dynamic, effervescent idealism of *History and Class Consciousness;* and nothing,

[41] See, for example, E. Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom,* London, Routledge, 1942; H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man,* London, Routledge, 1964, and "Repressive Tolerance," in R. P. Wolff *et al., Critique of Pure Tolerance,* Boston, 1965; A. MacIntyre, *Marcuse,* London, Fontana, 1969, esp. Ch. 8.; R. N. Berki, "Marcuse and the Crisis of the New Radicalism; From Politics to Religion?", *Journal of Politics* (Austin, Texas) Vol. 34, No. 1, February 1972.

[42] The complete work will be published by Luchterhand in Autumn 1974 and Spring 1975, as Vols. 13-14 of Lukács' *Works.* One chapter (on Marx) is to appear in November 1972.

[43] G. Lukács, *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins: Hegels falsche und echte Ontologie* (Toward an Ontology of Social Being: The False and the True Ontology of Hegel), Neuwied, Luchterhand, 1971. It is of interest to note the extent to which Lukács' understanding of Hegel changes. In this work he puts much greater emphasis on Hegel's realism. See especially p. 82.

[44] G Lukács, "The Development of a Budapest School", *Times Literary Supplement* (London), No. 3615, June 11, 1971, p. 663.

[45] Budapest, Akademiai K., 1970.

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let it be added, can be regarded as a less natural, less organic development of Lukács' early Hegelian ideas. But changing times bring about different preoccupations. Climbing the hill may have required fanatical millenarianism; reclining on the plateau renders a search into the abiding "structures of being" plausible and logical. Turning away from the "facts" was as appropriate when *History and Class Consciousness* was written as starting out from the concepts of "everyday life" is now. At certain points, to be sure, there is a continuity leading from Lukács' early work to his mature conceptions. The dialectical interconnections of Being are stated, though not stressed as much, in *History and Class Consciousness*.[46] But it is in the *Ontology* that Lukács shows signs of having digested a more genuine, more rounded Hegelianism. Here his conceptions reveal themselves as reminiscent not merely of Hegel, but of Aristotle as well. It is not an accident that revolutionary Marxism should have stressed the difference between Hegel's "method" and his system"; it is not an accident either that establishment Marxism should strive, through the thought of Lukács, to develop a "system" of its own. It is through his ontological concerns that Lukács finally assumes the mantle of the Hegelian philosopher, taking account of the situation with the arrival of dusk.

The most significant point in Lukács' ontology is its acknowledgement of *limits* on the human being. Here is the fruit of Lukács' wrestling with the theoretical implications of the Marxian category of "labor." Through a better understanding of labor as man's "metabolism with nature," he clearly recognizes the role of external nature in determining man's life. This determination, of course, is not total: Lukács now recognizes a "double determination" of human beings—in part by natural necessity, in part by man's ability to rise up to the challenges of nature and to choose between alternatives.[47] Pointedly, Lukács now defines man as a "responsive being," not simply as a "laboring," "productive" being.[48] The social existence of man, in other words, is still seen as separate, but no longer as independent. The end of reification, Lukács says in an article written in 1963, reveals man as the subject of the social process, though not one who is "without limits and almighty."[49]

Moreover, Lukács' view leads him to a recognition of the important truth that human knowledge, even in ideal conditions, is necessarily imperfect, limited. The "teleology" involved in the laboring process means that although the aim is set, determined by the human being, the result always brings with it an element that was unforeseen.[50] Finally, Lukács comes to see that the contradictions of human development are ontological and not simply the effects of reification. As he puts it, "as the humanization of man is a process full of contradictions, man's becoming ever more human must always produce its opposite pole, until the process of humanization is completed. In a certain sense, however, it is never completed . . . ."[51] The political significance of such a view is obvious, even if some time should be required for it to impregnate the organization of life in those societies where it is appropriate. In sum, the changing consciousness of Lukács has enriched Marxian philosophical thought at every point of its development, but its last contributions may in the long run prove to be the most far-reaching.

[46] See, *e.g.*, pp. 153-54.

[47] Pinkus, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 95.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 105, 110.

[49] "Zur Debatte . . .", *loc. cit.*, p. 692.

[50] Pinkus, *op. cit.*, p. 13; *Zur Ontologie* . . ., p. 61.

[51] Pinkus, *op. cit.*, p. 108. Cf. Heller's extremely interesting discussion of the development of "freedom", *op. cit.*, pp. 178-79.

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Impressions of the Man and His Ideas

By George L. Kline

I had the good fortune to meet and talk with Georg Lukács during three visits to Budapest—first in September 1960, again in November 1964, and for the last time in September 1967. The first two conversations took place in Lukács' fifth-floor apartment overlooking the Danube; each lasted about two hours and a half. The third, much briefer conversation was crowded into the twenty-minute intermission at a symphony concert. (Rostropovich was performing as cello soloist with the Budapest Symphony Orchestra, and Lukács was very eager to hear him.)

During the first conversation, Lukács and I were occasionally joined by his wife. She had died by the time of my second visit, and we were alone on that occasion. Our third, very short conversation at the Rostropovich concert took place in the presence of several of Lukács' former students and colleagues, including Agnes Heller.

I arrived in Budapest for the first time in late September 1960 with no letter of introduction or other entrée to Lukács. Having just spent six weeks in the Soviet Union, where current telephone directories were virtually "bibliographical rarities," I was pleasantly surprised to find a 1959 Budapest directory hanging by a stout chain in the nearest telephone booth, and even more surprised to discover that "Academician György Lukács" was plainly listed therein.*

Mrs. Lukács answered the telephone. I identified myself as an American philosophy professor interested in Hegel and in Lukács' Hegel studies. She passed the receiver to her husband, who asked me if I could stop by at five that afternoon for a talk. I assured him that I could. All our conversations, beginning with that one, were in German. Lukács told me that he customarily wrote his philosophical works directly in German, although he of course used Hungarian "on the street" and in some of his personal correspondence.[1]

Lukács' spoken German was fluent, syntactically sophisticated, and lexically rich. But during our 1960 conversation he sometimes hesitated before choosing the verb with which to end a typically long and involved sentence. His wife would often volunteer an appropriate verb, but Lukács invariably rejected her suggestion and chose some other verb instead. For example, if he said something like: *"Wir versuchen, auf diese primitiven Tatsachen des Lebens zurückzugehen und die komplizierten aus den primitiven zu ———"* (We are trying to go back to these primitive facts of life and to ——— the complicated in terms of the primitive), Mrs. Lukács would suggest the verb *erklären* (explain), but Lukács would substitute *begreifen* (comprehend).

The Lukácses were considerate and hospitable hosts. They served coffee and brandy, which he and I sipped as we sat on the narrow balcony high above the Danube, across from Gellert Hill. Lukács smoked cigar after cigar. The sunset sky turned deep red-orange. When I admired the view, Lukács re-

* "György" is the Hungarian form of the German "Georg." As noted in this article, Lukács wrote mainly in German and hence is better known under the German first name.—Ed.

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[1] Lukács mentioned that, despite having lived for a dozen years in Moscow (1933-45), he knew very little Russian. I noticed, however, that when I used an occasional Russian term, such as *stikhiinost* (spontaneity) or *partiinost* (partyness), he seemed to understand. Mrs. Lukács, who had had to deal with Moscow saleswomen and minor officials on a day-to-day basis, had become fluent in Russian.

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sponded with what was, I suppose, a standard Magyar *plaisanterie:* "Yes, Budapest is a beautiful city—except for its buildings!"

Lukács had a magnificent personal library. I would estimate it at upward of 12,000 volumes, almost all in German. He owned the collected works of every major German thinker and writer.[2] When our discussion turned to Spinoza's philosophy and I recommended the 1957 study by H. F. Hallett, Lukács admitted that he didn't know the book. "Nowadays," he explained, "I read only the classics [*Klassiker*—classical authors]." This may have been true in general, but it must be qualified in at least two respects. First, Lukács obviously followed contemporary German *belles lettres,* as evidenced by his 1966 remark, "When I consider the whole of [German] literature of the past twenty years, . . ."[3] Clearly he had read it all, including relatively minor authors such as Heinrich Boll. Second, among the *Klassiker* Lukács' definitely included Lenin, whose portrait was prominently displayed in his apartment.[4]

Some time before this first conversation, Lukács had completed the 1700-page manuscript of the first part of his *Ästhetik* (Aesthetics): It was being considered for publication by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, which had held it for seven months without giving any hint as to when a decision might be forthcoming. Lukács wrily remarked in this connection that there was a joke current in Vienna to the effect that once you got as far as the south *Bahnhof* (railroad station) you were almost in Egypt. He added that one could adapt the joke to his own situation by rewording it: "Once you get your book manuscript to a Budapest publisher, it is almost in print!"

Both Lukács and his wife said that they very much hoped to see the work published but were not at all sure that they would.[5] History, as Lukács put it, does not concern itself about men's subjective hopes and fears. We like to think that historical changes will be rapid enough so that we can live to see their outcome; but usually they are not, and we don't.

Lukács spoke often, in both our 1960 and 1964 conversations, of the present time as being a "transitional period" (*Übergangsperiode*). In talks with others in 1966, he expressed his confidence that radical protest movements would eventually be successful, though only after *decades* of effort.[6] And shortly before his death Lukács pointed to the "many historical examples of attempts at change that were [initially] defeated but influenced events generations and even centuries later."[7] In short, his was a distinctly Olympian view!

Lukács told me in 1960 that anyone who had known "socialist countries" such as Hungary and the Soviet Union in 1950 would find them almost unrecognizable, so great had been the economic, social, cultural, and political changes in the course of one decade—this notwithstanding the considerable slowing down of the process of "liberalization" following the "Hungarian events" in 1956. He agreed with my assessment that, as of the fall of 1960, Poland was much freer—culturally, intellectually, and politically—than either Czechoslovakia or Hungary. (At this, Mrs. Lukács interjected, in all seriousness, that nevertheless Romania and Albania [!] were much *less* free than Hungary.)

I told Lukács that I had recently met Leszek Kolakowski in Poland and had been much impressed by his intelligence, erudition, and sensitivity. Lukács concurred in my evaluation of Kolakowski's qualities as a thinker, but he added the stern warning that Kolakowski's—and indeed every—revision of Marxism must be vigorously criticized and combated.

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[2] George Lichtheim has observed: "Lukács rarebly cites non-German writers even when they happen to be Marxists or Hegelians. On the evidence of his [*Ästhetik*] one might be pardoned for supposing that he had never heard of R. G. Collingwood" (G. Lichtheim, *Lukács,* London, Fontana/Collins, 1970, pp. 116 f).

[3] Theo Pinkus, Ed. *Gespräche mit Georg Lukács* (Conversations with George Lukács), Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1967, p. 54 (hereafter cited as *Gespräche*). This book records conversations which Lukács had with Austrian and West German Marxists and Communists in Budapest in September 1966.

[4] To the end Lukács showed an unabated enthusiasm for Lenin both as a theorist and as a politician. Indeed, Lukács considered Lenin the last historical figure to have combined creative mastery of Marxist theory with revolutionary political leadership. See *Gespräche,* pp. 49, 71.

[5] In fact, both of them did, although Mrs. Lukács died the year after its publication in 1963 by Luchterhand (Neuwied and West Berlin), under the title *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* (The Specific Character of the Aesthetic), as Vols. XI and XII of Lukács' *Werke* (Works). The first published volume in this edition of Lukács' collected works— projected in a total of 14 (or 15) volumes—was Vol. IX: *Dis Zerstörung der Vernunft* (The Destruction of Reason), which appeared in 1962. Most of the ten volumes which have been published thus far are reprintings of earlier works, some provided with new prefaces by Lukács. *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen,* however, saw its first publication in the *Werke.*

[6] *Gespräche,* p. 73.

[7] Donald Shanor, "Searching for Socialist Democracy: A Talk with György Lukács," *The New Leader* (New York), Oct. 18, 1971. p. 14.

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He insisted that he himself was not a revisionist of any kind.[8]

During our first meeting, Lukács spoke frequently and with feeling about Stalin—whom he had, of course, known personally in Moscow—and about the "dominion of Stalinism" (*die Herrschaft des Stalinismus*). He suggested that the attempt to overcome Stalinism in the "socialist countries" was being carried out with essentially Stalinist methods, and that this fact drastically limited its effectiveness."[9] I understood him to be referring to a "controlled" de-Stalinization "from above."

In his writings and recorded statements published after 1960 Lukács added a certain amount of detail to the general indictment of Stalinism that he voiced in our conversation. In the Preface to the 1967 German edition of *History and Class Consciousness,* for instance, he asserted that Stalin's "sectarian" practice was "aimed at protecting the given power relations against all reforms; its objectives were conservative and its methods bureaucratic."[10] Again, in his 1966 conversations with Austrian and West German Marxists and Communists, Lukács declared that Stalinism reduces the "correct" Leninist conception of "partisanship" or "partyness" (*Parteilichkeit—partiinost*) to a caricature, and that Stalinist systems subject "all statements" to manipulation and "bureaucratic control." Referring back to the era of "popular fronts" in the mid-1930's, he explicitly repudiated the brutal Stalinist assumption that "people who had signed no proclamation [*e.g.,* denouncing fascism] were for that reason thoroughgoing reactionaries."[11]

It should be noted that these and other strictures against Stalinism had been voiced at least a decade earlier—with greater force and eloquence and through channels much more readily available to their own countrymen—by such Polish Marxists as Kolakowski. And unlike Kolakowski, Lukács seemed quite insensitive to the possible links between the persistence of what he called "Stalinist methods" and the official attacks on Marxist revisionism in such countries as Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In November 1964, I arrived in Budapest directly from Belgrade, where I had learned that the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences planned to honor Lukács on the occasion of his 80th birthday (in 1965) and hoped that he would come to Yugoslavia for the ceremonies. When I told him of this, he replied that he feared he would not be able to go. "For me," he said, with more than a trace of regret, "the time of long trips is past" (*"Die Zeit der grossen Reisen ist für mich vorbei").* He added that he was uncertain how much longer he would be able to work but that he planned to keep going steadily just as long as humanly possible.

During my visit he was alert and in good spirits. In fact this was our best conversation—philosophically the most penetrating, the most stimulating, and the closest to a genuine dialogue. There were several reasons for this. For one thing, the ice had been broken in 1960, and in a sense we were able to pick up where we had left off. For another—and more important—Lukács was deeply involved in the writing of his last major work, *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins* (Toward an Ontology of Social Being)[12] and was clearly eager to discuss some of its leading ideas with me.

The most original and promising of these ideas seemed to me to be Lukács' concept of "fields of mediation" (*Vermittlungsfelder*) — roughly, the linked or interlocked groupings of socio-economic activities which "negate," include, and go beyond

[8] As early as 1919, Lukács defended Marxist methodological orthodoxy as the "scientific (*wissenschaftliche*) conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth (*die richtige Forschungsmethode*) and that its method can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders"—*i.e.,* Marx and Engels. To this he added: "It is the conviction, moreover, that all [revisionist] attempts to surpass or 'improve' [this method] have led and must lead to oversimplification (*Verflachung*), triviality and eclecticism." This passage appears near the begining of the essay, "What is Orthodox Marxism?," which was first published in 1919 and later incorporated in Lukács' first major Marxist work, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (History and Class Consciousness), originally published in 1923. When a new German edition of this work was published in 1967 by Luchterhand, Lukács reemphasized this particular passage by quoting it in a new Preface written for that edition. The German text of the passage as quoted in the Preface can be found in Lukács' *Werke,* Vol. II, p. 28. I have quoted the English text from Rodney Livingstone's translation of the book, published as *History and Class Consciousness,* London, Merlin, 1971, p. 1. (However, this translation puts the word "method" in the plural; I have restored it to the singular, as in the original German.)

[9] Lukács again emphasized this point repeatedly in his 1966 conversations recorded in *Gespräche: e.g.,* see pp. 51, 82, 89, and 123. Shortly before his death, when asked by a Western visitor what government, in his opinion, was "realizing socialism," Lukács replied: "No government at all. In the socialist lands, Stalinist ideology has not lost much ground." (See Shanor, *loc. cit.,* p. 14.)

[10] Quoted from 1971 English-language edition (see above), p. xiii.

[11] *Gespräche,* pp. 89, 117.

[12] The first two chapters (totalling 130 pages) of the work were published under this title by Luchterhand in 1971 (hereafter cited as *Zur Ontologie*).

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the elements or aspects of social and economic "being" to which they apply. If I understood Lukács correctly, he meant that, for example, the activities involved in *growing* a food product would constitute one "field of mediation" (presupposing the prior ones which resulted in the techniques, machinery, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, etc. used in modern agriculture); the activities involved in the *processing* of the food product would constitute another; and those involved in *transporting* and *marketing* the finished product would constitute a third.

Unfortunately, the term *Vermittlungsfelder* does not figure in the two chapters of *Zur Ontologie* thus far published.[13] Even the term "mediation" (*Vermittlung*) appears only sporadically in these two chapters, which are devoted to the "truth and "falsehood" of Hegel's ontology.[14] The concept of *Vermittlungsfelder* presumably will figure importantly in the as yet unpublished portions of the "Ontology," under such chapter headings as *Arbeit* (Work) and *Reproduktion* ([social] reproduction). The related expression, "complex of [social] processes," does appear occasionally.[15]

Lukács' example of a socio-economic process which passes through several interlocked "fields of mediation" was the production and distribution (in South America, Hungary, and points between) of the coffee we were drinking as we talked. (In his role as host, Lukács added, deprecatingly: "I don't know whether this coffee is good or bad." In my role as guest, I assured him that it was excellent.)

At the time of our earlier conversation (in 1960), Lukács had apparently not yet conceived the project of writing an "ontology of social being."[16] Rather he was then planning to write a work on social ethics, a kind of Marxist updating of Aristotle's *Politics* and *Nicomachean Ethics* combined with Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. By 1964 he had decided that such an ethics required a preliminary "ontological" investigation of social existence as such. In September 1967, when I saw him for the last time, it was clear that the work on ontology had become a self-contained and central project, and that the ethics had been indefinitely postponed.[17]

In his last decade, Lukács seems to have turned with increasing respect and admiration to two of the *philosophische Klassiker*, Aristotle and Hegel. He spoke warmly of the intellectual achievement of both thinkers in our conversations, particularly in 1964. In the published chapters of *Zur Ontologie*, he remarks that Hegel, unlike many of the latter's celebrated contemporaries, was no "dreamer or visionary" but a "philosopher with a strong and encompassing sense of reality [*Wirklichkeit*], a hunger for genuine reality perhaps more intense than that of any other thinker since Aristotle."[18] Lukács adds that, although Hegel's philosophy appeared to put an end to philosophical development, in fact Hegel was a "discoverer of virgin land, an initiator of epoch-making significance." Similarly, he observes that Aristotle—who was long considered to have given definitive answers to philosophical questions—actually appears "in our day as an exceptional innovator, who in countless fields was the first to open the path—although not infrequently in false or confusing ways—to new insights."[19]

In our discussions Lukács sometimes seemed to be using the word *Ontologie* in an excessively broad, almost inflated sense. There is a similar instance in the *Gespräche* as well, *i.e.*, when he speaks of the "ontology of commodity-exchange" (*Ontologie des Warenaustausches*).[20] Why did he use the term at all? Partly, I think, because of his "return" to Hegel and Aristotle; partly because, like them, he wanted to stress the stable givenness of what is—even in

[13] The terms *Vermittlung* (mediation) and *vermitteln* (to mediate) occur repeatedly in *History and Class Consciousness*, along with such expressions as *Reihe der Vermittlungen* (series of mediations) and *Vermittlungskategorien* (categories of mediation). See *Werke*, Vol. II, pp. 364, 332. In most contexts the *Vermittlungsprozess* (process of mediation) is treated as primarily theoretical or cognitive (Hegel would have said "speculative"). In *Zur Ontologie*, the process is seen as primarily practical or active/social.

[14] *Zur Ontologie*, pp. 101-02.

[15] *Ibid., pp. 101, 109, 111*. See also *Gespräche*, pp. 13, 14, 108. The expression "complex of social processes" appears in *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 203 (for corresponding German text, see *Werke*, Vol. II, p. 391).

[16] The expression *gesellschaftliches Sein* (social being or social existence) occurs in *History and Class Consciousness* (see *Werke*, Vol. II, pp. 347, 348, 349, 374). There, however, it is not used systematically, but rather in commonsense contrast to *gesellschaftliche Erkenntnis* (social knowledge) or *gesellschaftliches Verhältnis* (social relation)—the latter an expression much used by Marx.

[17] In 1968, Lukács' West German publisher, Luchterhand Verlag, listed a work entitled *Ethik* as the eventual 15th and final volume of his collected *Werke*. In response to a 1972 inquiry, however, Luchterhand has admitted that no manuscript on ethics has turned up among Lukács' papers.

[18] *Zur Ontologie*, pp. 26 f.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 71. In 1966 Lukács referred to Aristotle as a "great genius in ethics" (*Gesprache*, p. 121).

[20] *Gesprache*, p. 14. Earlier, Lukács had quoted a passage from *Capital* in which Marx spoke of the "nature of the exchange of commodities" (*Natur des Warenaustausches*): see *History and Class Consciousness*, p. 178; German text in *Werke*, Vol. II, p. 363. Marx's less pretentious expression strikes me as the functional equivalent of Lukács' more pretentious one.

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the face of the dialectical flux of human history—a concept to which, as a Marxist, he was committed.

Another technical philosophical term that appears rather suddenly in Lukács' writings of the late 1960's is "teleology," usually in the rather stiff and old-fashioned expression *teleologische Setzung*—literally "*teleological positing*," but in fact synonymous with the English expression "purposive act." The announced title of the first section of the first chapter in Part II of *Zur Ontologie* is "Work as Purposive Activity" (*Die Arbeit als teleologische Setzung*). The expression also occurs repeatedly in the *Gespräche* [21] and occasionally ni the 1967 Preface.[22] There was little talk of "purposive activity" in the early Lukács, though he sometimes used the word "decision" (*Entscheldung*) in an ordinary sense.[23]

On the whole, I found Lukács' "Hegelian" discussion of *Vermittlung* and *Vermittlungsfelder* interesting and congenial. But from time to time the Engels-Lenin side of Lukács showed through in a disconcerting way, as for example when he spoke—quite seriously—of the cognitive and artistic "reflection" (*Widerspiegelung*) of social or natural reality. At one point he listed a galaxy of Elizabethan dramatists who were highly esteemed by their contemporaries—such as Marlowe, Ford, and Webster—and went on to assert that of all the Elizabethans only Shakespeare was still a living force in English literature and culture" . . . because *his* reflection of Elizabethan social reality was the correct one" and *their* "reflections" of that reality were somehow "less correct."[24]

There was, of course, little opportunity for serious philosophical discussion during my last, very hurried encounter with Lukács in the early fall of 1967. Having had astonishingly good luck in getting a ticket for the long-sold-out Rostropovich concert, I had no difficulty in locating Lukács during the intermission. He was chatting with Agnes Heller and two or three other members of the "Budapest Marxist Circle," an informal group composed of his followers and former students. We talked for fifteen or twenty minutes, mainly about his *Ontologie*. He told me that the book had moved slowly but was finally done, except for the last chapter, which was to be entitled "*Die Entfremdung*" (Alienation). Lukács said that he was in the midst of a thorough reworking of that chapter in the light of searching criticisms and objections he had received from Agnes Heller and other associates, and that he hoped to have the revisions completed within the next few months. He insisted that he would not be satisfied with the book until his circle of friendly but outspoken critics was also satisfied.

Whether critical readers outside the "Budapest Marxist Circle" will also be satisfied with the book as Lukács left it will not become apparent until at least 1973, when the full text of *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins* finally sees the light of print.

My three conversations with Georg Lukács and my study—though admittedly somewhat unsystematic—of his philosophical writings have left me with the vivid impression of a scholar and thinker of probing intelligence, with a keen critical sense, enormous erudition, and considerable synthetic powers. As a person I found him hospitable, courteous, and on occasion quite charming. Only infrequently during our talks did he show signs of intellectual rigidity or tendentiousness—although there is much tendentiousness and more than a little intellectual rigidity in the writings of his "Stalinist" period. In any event, I consider myself extremely fortunate to have had these opportunities—few and fleeting as they were—to engage him in conversation on a wide spectrum of topics both political and philosophical.

[21] *Gespräche*, pp. 11 ff, 58, 60, 61, 65 f, 95, 100, 112.

[22] See *Werke*, Vol. II, pp. 22, 27.

[23] See, *e.g.*, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein:* in *Werke*, Vol. II, p. 362.

[24] A similar comparison of Shakespeare with the three lesser Elizabethans, but minus the claim about Shakespeare's "correct reflection" of social reality, also occurs in *Gespräche*, p. 26.

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Memories of a Brief Encounter

By Edward Alexander

When I first arrived in Budapest in August 1965, it was a city with many ghosts of the recent past. Some were visible, such as Noel Field, unmistakable with his great height and silver hair, whom I would often pass while driving to the Embassy, watching his gaunt and lonely figure as he took a morning stroll on a quiet Buda street.

Others were only talked about: former police chief Gabor Peter was working in the outskirts as a tailor; László Rajk's widow, Julia, bitterly seeking justice for her executed husband, was employed in a library; former party chief Ernö Gerö, now blind, was living on Freedom Hill; Mátyás Rákosi's sister was getting letters of complaint from her exiled brother that his food parcels were not arriving in the Soviet Union; and Zoltán Vas, former aide to Imre Nagy, was writing a massive biography of Louis Kossuth. There were many, many others whose names evoked either the purge trials of 1949, which followed the Communist takeover of Hungary, or the Revolt of 1956.

There was also György Lukács.

While I had little if any interest in meeting or talking with the others, Lukács frequently became a focus of conversations with Hungarian intellectuals. During the next twelve months, I asked writers, philosophers, and sociologists questions about his health, his state of mind, his work, and his current status. Most everyone agreed that he was no longer *persona non grata,* and I learned that he was known to give an occasional unpublicized lecture at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Some even said government figures sought the old man's advice and listened in rapt silence as he lectured them on politics and economics, and on his favorite subject —interpreting and adapting Marx to contemporary problems. But when I asked about seeing Lukács, the consensus was that I should consult first with officials. I did, in very low key, and was usually greeted with a reaction of surprise that there should be any interest in the aging Marxist philosopher. I explained that Lukács, although a Marxist, was still esteemed in Western intellectual circles, that he was still a subject of lively discussion (Susan Sontag's *Against Interpretation,* containing a chapter on Lukács, had recently appeared), and besides, would it not be an engaging way to spend an hour in Budapest? I soon won the informal consent of several cultural and Foreign Ministry officials and made the first move. I sent Lukács a book, enclosing a brief note identifying myself and requesting an appointment.

Three days later, on a Monday morning, the Embassy switchboard operator rang and informed me in excited Hungarian: "Professor Lukács is on the telephone and wants to talk to you. I can't believe it." A soft but firm voice, speaking in English, came on and commanded me (no question who was in charge) to appear at his apartment the next Friday, November 21, at 10:30 a.m.—and not to be late.

Lukács lived on the top floor of a five-story apartment house overlooking the Danube from the Pest side. I parked my car at 10:25 a.m., and because the elevator was not on the ground floor, I decided to walk up. I had heard that German was his language, and the thought of discussing Marx in German was forbidding; yet, since he had spoken in English on the phone, that seemed to be one hurdle overcome. But what was I to say when we stood face to face? How does one begin with the foremost living Marxist thinker? Perhaps with his role in 1956, to convey that his participation in the Imre Nagy

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government was still remembered? In the years since then, he had lived in virtual isolation, with his wife to care for him until her recent death. That, too, might be a proper opening—an expression of sorrow over her passing. I was now on the third floor.

I recalled reading an interview with Lukács in a Czechoslovak magazine, another in an Italian paper, but could remember almost nothing. On the fourth floor, I suddenly had the answer—Thomas Mann! Despite divergent political views, Mann and Lukács had had the highest intellectual regard for each other, and in *The Magic Mountain* Mann had modeled the character of Naphta after Lukács. As I continued up the last few steps, I remembered some of Hans Castorp's impressions of Naphta when he first saw him walking with Settembrini—small, thin, ugly, hooked nose, thick lenses, elegant dress.

It was exactly 10:30, and I stood before a door bearing Lukács' nameplate. I rang, and almost immediately the door opened. Before me stood Naphta, very old and remarkable small. He extended his hand and said in English, "I am Lukács. Welcome. You are the first American diplomat to visit me. You walked up? I always do, too. The exercise is good for me at my age. Come in, please." I followed him through a dimly-lit corridor to his study. The windows looked out on Gellert Hill, atop which the Soviet Liberation Monument was silhouetted against a gray sky. I turned to Lukács and thanked him for giving up his valuable time to see me. His deeply wrinkled face seemed to smile as he beckoned me to a chair. He took his place behind a desk cluttered with papers, magazines and manuscripts.

I studied his face in the light from the window, which highlighted his wrinkles even more. Mann's description was still fairly accurate, but somehow I had no impression of ugliness, merely of excessive old age, much like that of the High Lama in the film "Lost Horizon." Lukács bent forward and reached for a short cigar on his desk. Having heard that he was never without one, I had brought along a White Owl—all I could get at the Embassy. I offered it to him. He dropped his own, seized mine, and said with pleasure, "Ah, an American cigar!" We were off to a good start. It was short-lived, however.

"First of all, my young friend," he began, "this book you sent me. I won't hold it against you, but you will please take it back." (The book, a study of Lukács' ideas in philosophy, had been written by one of his former students then in the United States, who had inscribed it "To my master" and sent it to me with a note requesting that whenever possible I deliver it personally.) The old man had marked several sections with slips of paper and now read them out loud to me, commenting after each one on either the fallaciousness of the argument or the inaccuracy of the facts. His comment on the final excerpt was the sharpest: "This is nonsense, nothing but nonsense. He is an idiot, outside of being a poor scholar. Take it back!" He shoved the book toward me. I was at a loss for words, but Lukács abruptly changed the subject.

Without warning, he suddenly launched into a vigorous attack on United States policy in Vietnam. "I apologize to you, and please do not think it is impolite of me to criticize your country and your President," he began; but having said that, he went on to question the whole spirit and direction of postwar US international policy. Ever since the end of World War II, he said, the United States had had the erroneous impression that the new world order required a *Pax Americana*. This concept was as much of a mistake as John Foster Dulles' so-called policy of rolling back communism. What is more, he went on, the rollback would have been unsound if it had been a true policy, but since it never took place nor was even attempted, it could not even be called a policy. "Look at Africa and its emerging nations," Lukács continued. "You are wrong to think this postwar phenomenon is of Communist inspiration. This is the stream of history, and no power in the world can stop it. The Roman Empire worked well but suppressed national genius, and it wasn't until the fifth century, when the Vandal barbarians sacked Rome, that a new historic era opened—the era that revealed Giotto and Dante and led finally to the art of Michelangelo. What Africa will produce 100 to 500 years from now we don't know, but it will produce, you can be sure. It is the stream of history."

Returning to the present, Lukács said that a major problem for the United States in Vietnam was that the small country was in the hands of military men, whom he described as "generally stupid." He had words of praise for Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy, the latter mostly for acting cautiously in the Cuban missile crisis "when he correctly estimated the atomic capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union." In the olden days, he went on, if one man had a cannon that fired one mile and another had one that fired one-and-a-half miles, the second man always won the battle.

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"Today, the United States is the one with the bigger cannon. You have atomic superiority over the Soviet Union and can wipe out Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. The Soviet Union has less, but what's the difference? It can equally well wipe out New York, Chicago and San Francisco. There is no longer any advantage to war. Old (sic) Bertrand Russell has been trying hard to convince the world of that."

At the mention of Russell, I asked what Lukács thought of his fellow philosopher's activities in the world of politics and war. (The "Paris trial of American Officials," which Russell had been instrumental in organizing, was about to take place.) Lukács smiled. "When Russell was young, he wrote all his books. Now, in his old age, he is active in world affairs. With me it is the opposite. I spent the first half of my life doing things—in capitalist countries, I should add. Now, I am writing books." As for the coming "trial," Lukács said he viewed it as simply a spectacular way of attracting attention "to a terrible situation." He looked at me kindly. "I am not going to denounce the war, or even you for waging it. I try to see things in a historical sense. Remember, I am a Marxist scientist. Nevertheless, the war is wrong, and so is the *Pax Americana.* Look at de Gaulle in Algeria. His problem was quite different from yours. That, too, was a hopeless situation, but with an important difference: he had to worry about two or three million Frenchmen in Algeria. You don't have any such problem in Vietnam."

His mind must have skipped ahead a few escalatory stages, for he said rather abruptly: "By the way, don't think the Soviet Union will allow you to attack China. Socialist states must for ideological reasons stay together, even while they are hurling insults at each other. If you attack China, the Soviet Union has no alternative but to attack you. That will be unfortunate because you and the Soviet Union must get together."

A bent, elderly woman entered with a tray of Hungarian black coffee. "This is my housekeeper," Lukács explained as he pushed aside a pile of papers to make room for the tray. "I depend on her to take care of me ever since my wife died." I commented on his English, which, although reflecting German grammatical constructions, was rich in vocabulary and fluent. He waved to the bulging library surrounding us on sagging bookshelves.

Two days before, when I already knew of my appointment, I had sounded out a Hungarian sociologist as to what subjects I could properly bring up in my conversation with Lukács. One topic I proposed was contemporary Hungarian problems. My friend laughed. "Let me warn you right now, the old man will do all the talking. You will just listen—and get an earful." Now, as I sat there watching Lukács drink his coffee, I ventured a question. Hungary, I remarked, was talking very seriously about a new economic road which would be a departure from the patterns of the past, and the same thing was happening in neighboring Communist states. How, I asked, did Lukács view Hungary's role in Eastern Europe?

Without hesitation Lukács adjusted his thick-lens glasses, and the words poured out. "As a Marxist scientist, I watch history with great patience, because history moves very slowly. It doesn't interest me whether we have economic or other reforms this year or the next. It will take twenty or thirty years for Hungary to get out of its present predicament. The knife is at our throat because we are poor and

Lukács in his Budapest study.

—Photo from *Magyar hirek* (Budapest), July 10, 1971, p. 4.

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have no raw materials. Romania, on the other hand, can export her raw materials, such as petroleum and wood. We can only export ready-made products that involve competing with you on the world market. We have much to do yet, but we have time. Remember that socialism is only fifty years old. And don't forget that it took France about eighty years to realize the aims of the French bourgeois revolution—when MacMahon was President.

"But how relative everything is, you know. Take freedom. In America you always talk about freedom everywhere—that you have it and we don't. My dear fellow, what is freedom? Is it not relative, too? Do you have political freedom in the United States when, in order to run for the Senate or the Presidency, you must have millions or have access to money. Freedom comes in strange ways and in strange times and places. Take the election of Karl Liebknecht to Parliament in the Germany of Wilhelm II.[1] Yet, in the Germany of Adenauer and Erhard, would Liebknecht have had a chance?"

I returned to the earlier question, sharpening it slightly by inquiring into Hungary's relations with the Soviet Union. At this point Lukács said he did not wish to get into present political problems. But the temptation was apparently too great. He puffed on his cigar several times and began anew:

"Stalin's death was a major event, but the 20th Party Congress was a turning point in socialist and world history. When Khrushchev denounced Stalin, the events that overtook the Communist movement were vast but predictable. Do you want to know what I think of Stalin? His greatest merit came from something he accomplished with the utmost brutality —the industrialization of the Soviet Union. Without that industrialization, Hitler would have swept through the Soviet Union and dominated Europe. The United States could not have changed that. As for the rest of Stalin's work, let me say once again, I am a Marxist scientist, and from that point of view Stalin distorted Marx beyond recognition."

My third try produced success. Would he comment on Hungarian events in the year 1956 and on the man who had dominated the political scene since then? Lukács nodded. "I knew János Kádár long before 1956. I saw him often and knew his work in the party. I liked him. He never tied himself down with bureaucracy. He is the same today. I don't know the men around him, but I do know Kádár. In my opinion, he is a good choice for this difficult role since 1956. One reason for my high opinion of him is that he is a man who listens to advice. He understands the Hungarian people."

Having elicited this much, I went a little further and asked about Imre Nagy in 1956. Lukács responded: "Already in 1953 when he became Premier, Nagy showed himself to be a clever man but not a great politician. His primary interest lay in agrarian problems, which he could not solve. Against Rákosi, Nagy could not last long. I had already retired from active life in 1950 to work on my books. In October 1956, Nagy asked me to take part in his government. Nagy and the Central Committee argued that it would attract the intellectuals if I joined the government. And so, for a few days, I was a minister in the cabinet of Imre Nagy. However, even if Nagy had won his struggle, I would have retired anyway in January or February 1957 and returned to my books."

I now put a series of questions to Lukács—about his arrest and deportation, with Imre Nagy, to Romania; his release and return; and finally, whether the execution of Nagy was not a blunder in the light of the world reaction that followed. Lukács singled out the last question: "It was a great mistake to kill Nagy. There was an easier solution, more acceptable, and events have proven I am right. Nagy should have been imprisoned in an unknown place for several years and then allowed to return quietly to Budapest to live. Do you know who is now living here? The most hated man of 1956, Ernö Gerö. After the October events, he was taken out of Hungary to the Soviet Union, but later returned. He always had trouble with his eyes. Now he is completely blind and walks with a cane through the streets of Budapest. People recognize him, but no one says anything. I can assure you, if Rákosi were to return, it would be no different. That is what should have been done with Nagy." (A subsequent conversation with a retired political figure of the era elicited the information that the Soviet decision to execute Nagy had been taken at the urging of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.)

It was already noon, and I reminded myself that an 81-year old man should not be overtaxed. Yet Lukács showed no signs of fatigue. I arose to take leave, but he impatiently waved me back to my

[1] Karl Liebknecht, together with Rosa Luxemburg, was a founder of the left-socialist Spartacus League, which transformed itself into the first German Communist Party in December 1918. He had been elected to the Reichstag as a Social Democrat in 1912. Both Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were arrested and murdered in January 1919 during the abortive Communist uprising against the socialist Ebert-Scheidemann government established following the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

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chair. I asked if he were working on a book. "I am always working on a book. My last one, on esthetics, was published in Germany and Italy in two volumes, and the first volume has appeared in Spanish. I am hoping for an English edition, but we cannot find a translator. At present, I am working on a book entitled *The Ontology of Social Being,* which is concerned with interpreting Marx in the light of the present world. As I have told you, I am a Marxist scientist, and I constantly apply the Marxist method to today's problems. In the United States you have the problem of what to do with leisure time. Here, we are constantly seeking ways to reduce work-time and raise wages. Both problems must be resolved by Marxist methods. Your great sociologist, C. Wright Mills, understood this. What a tragedy that he died so young. He was unusual. In the United States you have a great disadvantage: you cannot understand my approach to Marx because you have not read basic Marx. But you have an even greater disadvantage because your immigrants arrived in the United States and immediately set up the bases of a capitalist system. In Europe, we experienced, first, the feudal system and, then, its conflict with the capitalist system. For that reason, we have greater perspective."

Lukács encouraged me to ask more questions. When I turned to American literature, he expounded at length on the literary origins of several writers. Lukács described Melville, one of his favorite authors, as unique in displaying an original American talent. Sinclair Lewis, on the other hand, would not have been possible without the French realists, such as Flaubert. Eugene O'Neill, another writer he esteemed, owed a great debt to Ibsen and Strindberg. As for postwar American literature, he saw the influence of Proust and Joyce as predominant.

I arose again, determined this time to leave. He, too, stood up and accompanied me to the door. I mentioned *Against Interpretation* and its chapter on him, and inquired if he would like a copy. He asked that I send it to him. We shook hands, and I watched him walk back to his study filled with Marxist polemics, history, and now the aroma of an American cigar.

No sooner had I gotten downstairs than I realized that Mann had not even been mentioned. In fact, as I began to review the lecture—what else could one call it?—I thought of all the things I had wanted to bring up but hadn't, because of the mesmerizing effect the old man had had on me. Although I never again had an opportunity to talk with him, we were to meet one more time—briefly and unexpectedly.

In March 1967, Zoltán Kodaly, Hungary's great musical educator and composer, died and was honored by a state funeral. Thousands gathered at Farkasreti Cemetery to pay their last respects. Much more than just a famous composer, Kodaly represented the conscience of the nation; he had been its intellectual and moral leader, uncompromising and courageous. Now, virtually every prominent Hungarian was on hand. I was standing in a group which included writer Gyula Illyes, who by common agreement would inherit Kodaly's mantle. Successive groups of honor guards made up of Hungary's composers, conductors, writers, artists, and government leaders took their turn standing for a few silent moments at the catafalque. When the eulogies ended and the crowd moved on to the gravesite for the final ceremony, I brushed against a small figure moving in the opposite direction. I excused myself and then looked down into the withered face of a very old man. It was Lukács.

I greeted him by name. He leaned for a moment on his cane, peered at me through his thick lenses, nodded, and resumed the long walk to the cemetery gate. As I watched him taking his bird-like steps, the words of a veteran of Hungary's political struggles came back to me: "What unites us is that we are all Magyars. We disagree, we fight, we even revolt, but deep within we are bound together. If you want proof, go to the funeral of any of our intellectuals, and see for yourself who will be there. It will surprise you."

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Books

Political Change in East Germany

By Thomas A. Baylis

PETER CHRISTIAN LUDZ: *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany.* Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1972.

IT HAS ALWAYS been something of an anomaly that the Communist nation enjoying the highest level of economic development and heir to the richest tradition of Marxist thought and action has also been regarded as the most dependent and sycophantic of the Soviet Union's East European allies. There was thus a readily understandable motivation for Walter Ulbricht's effort to mitigate this impression by presenting East German society as it was developing in the mid-1960's as a model for socialism in advanced industrial countries. In the most important book yet published on the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Peter Christian Ludz offers an interpretation of the process of political change in that country as it appeared during the most optimistic days of Ulbricht's "Developed Social System of Socialism." He cautiously suggests that an understanding of the changing social system of the GDR may indeed have a great deal of relevance for the study of other economically advanced Communist polities.

The Changing Party Elite in East Germany is presented as a "critical-empirical" investigation largely eschewing the "descriptive historical method" in favor of the "systematic analysis" of empirical data. It might better be described as an eclectic mix of empirical findings with often brilliant intuitive interpretation and analysis, the end result providing a framework for understanding GDR politics that has strongly influenced subsequent German research and found growing recognition among American students of communism. The present edition of Mr. Ludz's book is an "abbreviated and revised" but "not updated" version of the 1968 German original. Thus the reviewer has the unusual advantage of being able to examine the author's important arguments with the benefit of several years' hindsight. Since Ludz wrote, the Socialist Unity Party's extensive program of economic reform and organizational change, to which Ludz attached a great deal of significance, has largely been liquidated, and Ulbricht, quite possibly because of his ideological *hubris,* has been retired. His regime has given way to one composed largely of his coworkers and protégés, yet one that is in many respects more conservative and bound to the party apparatus than his own was, and certainly more diligent in affirming its loyal subordination to the example of the Soviet Union.

It is Ludz's central purpose to illuminate fundamental changes in East German society through a careful examination of three quite different dimensions of change affecting the Socialist Unity Party (SED) elite just prior to and during the period of economic reform. Rejecting the applicability of the totalitarian model to contemporary Soviet-type societies, Ludz argues that East Germany's present political system can be described as a form of "consultative authoritarianism" in which terror and total party dominance have given way to more subtle forms of social control—forms which acknowledge the emergence of "quasi-pluralistic" forces and the usefulness of co-opted expertise. In this reading, the GDR's social and political system has more in common with the "liberalizing" Communist states than is normally supposed, with the independent dynamic of domestic economic and technical development operating to modify the character of the party leadership and the organization and style of its rule.

Ludz investigates "trends of continuity and change" in (1) the organization and functions of the SED and its organs, (2) the sociological characteristics of members of the Central Committee, and (3) the ideological system. These diverse dimensions are explored with the assistance of organization theory, statistical elite analysis,

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and an "immanent-critical" examination of ideology. The book, like its author, is the product of a mixture of philosophical and sociological traditions: the obvious influence of Ludz's deep grounding in Hegelian and Marxian thought coexists with the self-conscious utilization of a wide range of contemporary American and German sociological theory. For the most part this marriage is a happy one, although it contributes to a certain denseness of prose. In general, Ludz succeeds in combining an impressive theoretical sweep with a meticulous and admirable attention to detail.

AT THE CORE of the book is the argument that the development of an advanced industrial society in the GDR has brought into being an increasingly differentiated elite and one that is fundamentally divided between what he calls the "strategic clique" of veteran party leaders and an "institutionalized counterelite" of experts. The dichotomy is similar to the familiar one between "apparatchiki" and "technocrats," but it is drawn here with unusual subtlety and detail and hedged in by careful qualification. It comprises differences not only of function but also of age and education, all of which find their reflection in divergent visions of socialist society.

The first group is made up of veteran functionaries with limited education but long experience in party organizational and ideological work. It holds what Ludz terms an essentially "static" view of society aimed primarily "at securing its position of power and thus at controlling the processes of organizational change in society." The second group includes younger experts with advanced specialized educations, as well as philosophers and ideologists of diverse backgrounds, who provide the elements of an ideological rationale for the group as a whole. Those in the second group are more "open" to social change and conflict than those in the first, as well as more ready to seek an adjustment of party rule to fit the requirements of a modern social and economic order. The counterelite is by no means an *oppositional* group; its conflict with the strategic elite is largely a latent one. Both share a "conservative" commitment to maintaining the essentials of the existing order; however, the counterelite is anxious to make that order more flexible and functionally effective. The strategic elite continues to dominate the commanding heights of the SED Politburo and Secretariat, as well as the regional first secretaryships and the GDR State Council, but it has found itself obliged to concede influence to the counterelite throughout the rest of the party and state structure, and gradually to "professionalize" its policy-making.

Ludz's first substantive chapter seeks to demonstrate the emergence of critical changes in the SED's structure and perspectives, including the quiet acknowledgment of the legitimacy of previously tabooed social conflicts, improvement of the party's communications and information system, and a shift in the focus of its concerns from political power *per se* to economic and social policy. He persuasively describes the tensions between the psychological and administrative survivals of the party's earlier character as a *Geheimbund,* or clandestine revolutionary band, and its present status as a mass-membership organization. Most importantly, he attempts to show the gradual "transformation" of the Central Committee from an "exclusively acclamatory and declaratory organ" to a "cooperative, transmittable, and—above all—consultative assembly," using as

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evidence detailed accounts of successive CC plenums and CC-co-sponsored economic conferences. In the reviewer's opinion, the author accords too much weight to the latter since their sponsorship by the CC appears to be only nominal. On the other hand, the expansion of the role of the CC *as a plenary body* (distinct from "its" apparatus) appears real, if less dramatic than Ludz suggests.

An extended chapter is devoted to a statistical analysis of the social-background and career characteristics of Central Committee members. While some American social scientists may find the analysis technically unsophisticated and others may regard it as excessively drawn out, the chapter brings together a great deal of carefully-assembled and useful data. Ludz demonstrates in detail the growth in the proportion of CC members with advanced education and performing specialized technical and economic functions. In perhaps the most novel and interesting section, he examines the vertical and horizontal mobility of members and candidates both before and after being named to the Central Committee. However, his assertion that the different "functional areas" represented are relatively "insulated" from one another, and that therefore the "interchangeability" long characteristic of Communist functionaries hardly obtains any longer, needs to be put more precisely. Interchangeability between ideological, economic, political-organizational, and police-military *roles* is, indeed, diminishing; but interchangeability between the governmental, party, economic, and educational *bureaucracies* remains high and is a conscious principle of SED cadre policy.

IN HIS CHAPTER on ideology, Ludz explores the phenomenon he calls "institutionalized revisionism." This refers to the recasting by individual writers of the standard interpretation of official doctrine, sometimes in highly inventive ways, with the intention not of subverting but rather of reinforcing its foundations and making it more appropriate to contemporary industrial society. Institutionalized revisionism is tolerated by the regime as a kind of non-authoritative ideological experiment, to be later discarded or accorded official approval as the circumstances demand. Ludz distinguishes between "ideological and utopian" and "systems theory" variants of such revisionism: the efforts of philosophers Wolfgang Heise and Georg Klaus to reinject an interpretation of alienation into the ideology serve to illustrate the first variant; and the application to society of cybernetics concepts by Klaus and legal theorist Uwe-Jens Heuer, the second. The special object of Ludz's interest and sympathies is Klaus, whom he designates the GDR's "ideologist of technocracy." As he has done elsewhere, Ludz makes clear his conviction that a doctrinal revision like Klaus's, oriented toward technological rationality, offers a far more "relevant" alternative to conventional Communist ideology than the utopian, democratic-socialist visions of Robert Havemann or the reformist Czech philosophers.

It may be suggested, however, that the congeniality of an ideological doctrine to advanced technology and Western systems theory is less apt to determine its potential influence than the degree to which it fires the imagination and idealism of men rendered cynical by abuse of the received dogma. This writer is inclined to believe that Ludz in general overemphasizes the significance of technology and its elite offspring in comparison to other potential sources of change in Communist systems. However anachronistic it might appear, it has been the resurgence of nationalistic and particularistic feelings, the tensions growing out of official efforts to control the production of intellectuals, the short-term resentments of aggrieved consumers and workingmen, and the conflicts and emotions of individual Communist leaders that, in varying combinations, have produced the most spectacular changes in Communist societies since 1945.

To be sure, changes in elite structure, political organization, and ideology that are rooted ultimately in technological development may work more profound social changes in the longer run. But Ludz's study covers only a limited period, and in retrospect it is evident that in 1968 he shared the excessive optimism of many observers of the Soviet bloc of that period in overestimating the degree of influence the "institutionalized counterelite" was likely to acquire. Like others, Ludz also does not acknowledge sufficiently the degree to which the attitudes and postures of members of the technical elite within the party leadership may diverge from one another. It is arguable that at least two partially opposed perspectives can be found among the GDR's leading economic specialists: one favoring market-like devices for stimulating performance, coupled with greater autonomy for lower-level economic officials; the other advocating the heightened use of detailed and sophisticated mechanisms of central planning and control. While this division,

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paralleling one noted by observers of the Soviet elite, has not yet been consciously articulated to the fullest degree, it is clear enough to suggest that the direction of technocratic influence in the GDR is ambiguous, and that this influence is likely to make itself felt through a complex variety of shifting coalitions.

Nevertheless, it would be an error to assume that the GDR's present phase of retrenchment means the end of the broader trends Ludz perceives. The great merit of his book lies in his demonstration that the transformation of "totalitarianism" into "consultative authoritarianism" is a pervasive process taking place simultaneously on many levels of party, state, and society, and in ideology as well as in practice. Change of such a character is not likely to be halted by momentary shifts in political leadership or even by the apparent cementing of the tutelary relationship between the Soviet Union and the GDR. It is true that the formal organizational reforms of the New Economic System have been largely rescinded, that the degree of penetration of the Central Committee by well-educated technical specialists has been modestly reduced, and that experiments in the direction of "institutionalized revisionism" have been at least temporarily subordinated to the uncritical ideological celebration and imitation of the Soviet example. Yet changes suppressed in one sector have a way of surfacing in others. The dependence of the "strategic clique" on expert consultation and cooptation, the stirrings of political self-consciousness among diverse groups in East German society, and subtle pressures on behalf of infusing content into the existing shells of participatory institutions all continue.

In sum, not only is Professor Ludz's analysis of the multiple dimensions of elite and societal change in the GDR a penetrating interpretation of the evolution of the system, but it also confirms the relevance of the GDR's experience for other Communist societies entering an advanced stage of economic development.

Communist Perceptions of International Law

By Oliver J. Lissitzyn

KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI: *Soviet Public International Law: Doctrines and Diplomatic Practice.* Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1970.
WILLIAM E. BUTLER: *The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea.* Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
HUNGDAH CHIU: *The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1972.

THE EXPANDING ROLES of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in world affairs have drawn increased attention in the West to the distinctive attitudes of the two Communist powers with respect to international law—an interest that is reflected in the recent appearance of numerous articles, monographs and studies concerning these attitudes, including the three books under review.

By far the most ambitious of the three, Professor Grzybowski's 560-page study represents the first attempt since the publication of T. A. Taracouzio's major study in 1935[1] to provide an all-inclusive and up-to-date analysis of Soviet doctrines and practices related to international law—a monumental task which the book, unfortunately, does not fully measure up to. The other two volumes are much slimmer, more modest in scope—and more successful. All three, however, do have certain features in common. All recognize the desirability of a comparative approach and the need to relate law to policy; all try to interweave doctrine and practice. All conclude that the Communist governments' approach to international law is highly pragmatic, and that they seek to use it to promote

[1] *The Soviet Union and International law,* New York, Macmillan, 1935.

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policy goals. All are reasonably objective and provide good bibliographies.

Before we take a closer look at the books under review, a couple of general observations may be in order. First, study of the attitudes of particular states toward international law—especially of those states governed by totalitarian regimes—can be most fruitful if the scholar keeps in mind the differences between words, actions, and motivations or policies. The importance of the difference between words and actions is fairly evident; the significance of motivation may be less apparent, but any study that does not take it into account is bound to be formalistic and static. For motivation determines the relative importance of international law in a state's policy, and it also helps to clarify the direction in which a state will try to influence development of the law. Although they are not explicitly discussed, the differences between these various elements seem to be understood and taken into account by all three authors, but perhaps in varying degrees.

Second, it may be useful to bear in mind still another distinction which is of particular importance in dealing with Marxist ruling elites. All governments implicitly recognize the existence of two levels of norms—the level of positive international law and the level of non-legal ideology. In non-Communist countries, the latter may be equated with "the national interest" or "morality"; for Communist governments, it is officially-interpreted Marxism. The failure to recognize this distinction sometimes leads observers to confuse justifications cast in terms of legal norms with those formulated in terms of overriding ideological principles. An outstanding example of the latter is the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine whereby the Soviet leaders sought to justify the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Brezhnev Doctrine does not put forward legal arguments addressed to international lawyers. It is addressed to Marxist "true believers" and their sympathizers; and it seeks to justify the Soviet action in terms not of law but of Marxist doctrine. However, not all examples of confusion between the two levels are equally clear. It is the task of the analyst to untangle and explain the two strands.

Grzybowski's discussion of the Brezhnev Doctrine suffers not only from failure to point out these two levels, but also from sharing the widespread assumption that the Doctrine is entirely defensive in intent, having as its objective the preservation of Soviet hegemony over "the socialist commonwealth" in East-Central Europe. Defensive intent, however, is hardly consistent with the insertion of these paragraphs in the famous *Pravda* article of September 26, 1968, which enunciated the Doctrine:

Formally juridical reasoning must not overshadow a class approach to the matter. . . . One who does it . . . begins to measure events with a yardstick of bourgeois law. Such an approach to the question of sovereignty means that, for example, the progressive forces of the world would not be able to come out against the revival of neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic of Germany, against the actions of butchers Franco and Salazar, against reactionary arbitrary actions of "black colonels" in Greece, because this is "the internal affair" of sovereign states." [2]

This language, in an article intended to be authoritative, suggests that the Brezhnev Doctrine is open-ended and could be used to justify offensive action.

Another distinctive Soviet doctrine, that of "just war," is more difficult to classify as to intended level. Perhaps it stands on both levels. In any case, Grzybowski's treatment of the doctrine is hardly adequate. He fails to point out its origin in authoritative Stalinist formulation in *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course* (1938),[3] or to explain that, after a period of relative neglect, it was again authoritatively reformulated in 1967 to include *wars fought by the revolutionary classes to repel the attempts of the reactionary forces to perpetuate or reestablish their rule by force of arms* . . . and not only "wars of national liberation."[4] This resuscitated doctrine, like the Brezhnev Doctrine, appears to be open-ended and intended for possible use in justifying armed assistance to Communist revolutionaries anywhere.

Apart from its failure to distinguish between the two levels referred to above, Grzybowski's book suffers from other shortcomings. The treatment of some topics is simply inadequate or incomplete. For instance, though the concept of "unequal treaties" is mentioned repeatedly (pp. 41, 448, 513), there is no real effort to analyze the interpretations placed on it by Soviet writers or to give specific examples of its

[2] As translated by Novosti Press Agency; in *The New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1968.

[3] English translation, New York, International Publishers, 1939, pp. 167-68. Emphasis added.

[4] *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU*, translation published by the Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Canada as *Supplement* to the magazine *Soviet Union Today*, 1967, p. 62.

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application in diplomatic practice. (This topic is treated much more satisfactorily in Hungdah Chiu's book—pp. 60-71.) Nor is there adequate discussion of Soviet positions relating to the international protection of human rights or the emerging law of outer space. On other points, the book is misleading, as in its implication (p. 97) that United States claims against the Soviet Union were settled in 1933.

Despite the book's claim to comprehensiveness, moreover, there are important omissions. For example, the author fails to clarify whether extradition treaties between socialist states provide for an exception in the case of persons charged with "political offenses" (p. 275). He likewise fails to point out that the Soviet Union has expressly reserved the right to require prior authorization of the passage of foreign warships through its territorial sea (pp. 152, 156). And there is no mention, in the lengthy section on diplomatic relations and immunities (pp. 300-20), that the Soviet Union is a party to the 1961 Vienna Convention on that subject.

In addition, the book is marred by some outright factual errors. For instance, it is not correct that the Geneva Conventions of 1958 denied the right of states to extend their territorial waters beyond a distance of 12 miles offshore (p. 149); and the principle that every state holds sovereignty over the airspace above its territory is wrongly attributed to the Warsaw Convention of 1929, to which the Soviet Union is a party, instead of to the Paris Convention of 1919, to which the Soviet Union never adhered (p. 159). Finally, Grzybowski fails to recognize that the Soviet position in regard to treaty reservations changed significantly between 1952 and 1958 (pp. 427-32).[5]

Despite its many faults, Professor Grzybowski's study nevertheless must be credited as a serious effort to perform a task of perhaps too vast a scope. His book does provide a mass of information as well as some valuable insights, especially in its concluding chapter (Ch. 10). It is undoubtedly useful but must be employed with considerable caution.

IN CONTRAST TO Grzybowski's massive volume, William Butler's study of Soviet positions in the sphere of the international law of the sea conforms to the author's view that detailed monographic inquiries into particular areas of the law are an essential stepping-stone toward overall comparative studies. His book is admittedly not comprehensive, omitting some topics and treating others only briefly, but among its valuable features is a concern for historical perspective which serves to focus attention on the continuity of some Tsarist and Soviet interests and approaches.

The author rightly stresses the subtleties of Soviet legal positions and the difficulties of understanding them, as well as the importance of "signals" in indicating possible changes in these positions. He is critical of the tendency among Western scholars not only to exaggerate the importance of Soviet doctrine and to slight that of practice, but also to overlook the diversity of views among Soviet jurists. He notes shifts in Soviet legal positions as the interests and power situation of the USSR have changed. One of his conclusions is that there is little basic difference between Soviet and Western attitudes and approaches to the law of the sea on the practical level, but he is cautious in assessing current trends.

There are a few minor defects. Butler seems to overlook the point (p. 62) that anchoring in a foreign territorial sea is not "innocent passage" (except in emergencies), and he fails to note that the Soviet objection to the search of Soviet merchant vessels by British warships in 1939 (p. 173) was in part based on the claim of special immunity for "state vessels." Again, he does not explain that the stopping and searching of foreign vessels in the Mediterranean by the French in 1958-60 (p. 184) was limited to a special zone established because of the fighting in Algeria, and he fails to relate the French action to the concept of contiguous zones for security purposes, which was unsuccessfully proposed by Poland at the 1958 Geneva conference on the law of the sea. In his discussion of Soviet attitudes with respect to naval maneuvers and nuclear tests on the high seas (pp. 187-89), the author makes no mention of the missile tests which the USSR carried out over ranges of several thousand miles into the Central Pacific from 1960 on, although a relatively recent example was presented in *Soviet*

[5] In the period of 1948-52, the Soviets adamantly insisted that every state, by virtue of its sovereignty, could attach any reservation it pleased to its ratification of a multilateral treaty regardless of objections by other parties. By 1958, this untenable position was quietly but very significantly qualified by conceding that another party, if it objected to a reservation, had the right not to regard the treaty as in force between it and the reserving state. This change brought Soviet doctrine in line with the prevalent trend in the international community. See Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, *The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 87-88.

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Statutes and Decisions,[6] a periodical then edited by Butler.

INASMUCH AS THERE has hitherto been much less scholarly attention paid to Chinese Communist than to Soviet positions in the sphere of international law, the recent appearance of Professor Hungdah Chiu's study of the PRC's attitudes with respect to treaties and of other works focusing on the Chinese approach to the role of law in foreign relations is especially welcome.[7] Chiu's monograph is an unpretentious but scholarly work. Unlike Luke Lee's earlier work on the same subject, which consisted of a series of case studies,[8] the book is a systematic treatment, under familiar rubrics, of Chinese Communist positions in the particular field of treaty law. The six chapters deal, respectively, with "The Position of Treaties in International Law and Municipal Law," "The Nature and Scope of Treaties," "Conclusion and Entry into Force of Treaties," "Objects of Treaties," "Interpretation of Treaties," and "Suspension and Termination of Treaties." Texts of several types of international agreements entered into by the PRC are appended. Both doctrine and practice are competently utilized.

Again, there are some minor shortcomings. In some of the author's comparisons of Chinese and Western positions, the latter are oversimplified (for example, on the issue of the invalidity of treaties entered into under duress, p. 29), and too little attention is given to "semi-official" agreements such as those concluded between Chinese and Japanese fishery organizations in the absence of intergovernmental relations. The author's discussion of procedures for invoking the doctrine of changed circumstances under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (p. 102) entirely overlooks the important provisions of Article 66 and the Annex to the Convention. In the reviewer's opinion, Chiu also underestimates the influence of Soviet treaty doctrine and practice on the Chinese positions.

The author concludes that in many respects "Communist China's treaty law and practice are not widely different from those of the West," but that such differences as do exist are "profound." He is inclined to regard these differences as due to Chinese policy needs rather than to Communist ideology (p. 119).

The three volumes reviewed here are but a minute sample of the burgeoning literature on the attitudes and practices of Communist governments with respect to international law. Yet they provide good illustrations of both the weaknesses and the accomplishments found in this literature. So far, it must be said, no truly adequate comparative studies of the attitudes and practices of the major Communist governments in relation to those of Western states —even in such well-defined fields as the law of the sea—have appeared. Furthermore, while the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are understandably receiving considerable attention, little has been written on the attitudes of the governments of smaller Communist states (particularly regrettable is the lack of attention thus far paid to Castro's Cuba and the German Democratic Republic).

It is to be hoped that this situation will change in time, for as negotiation gradually replaces confrontation in relations between "the two camps," the importance of both divergencies and similarities in attitudes toward international law is likely to grow.

[6] Vol. VI, p. 357 (1970).

[7] See especially the admirable study of James C. Hsiung, *Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice*, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1972.

[8] Luke T. Lee, *China and International Agreements: A Study of Compliance*, Leyden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1969.

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Defeat at Tannenberg

By Ronald Hingley

ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN: *August 1914*. Translated by Michael Glenny, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972.

SOLZHENITSYN'S latest novel, *August 1914,* was conceived as the first installment in a grand corpus of work which the author has been incubating for the last third of a century, and which may require a further twenty years to complete. The general theme of the composite *oeuvre,* we gather, is to be the disintegration of old Russia and the emergence of the new. Compared with this ambitious chain of novels, of which we here have the first link, all the novelist's other work is—in his own submission—of secondary importance, something to which he has been "sidetracked" by the peculiarities of his biography and "the richness of contemporary impressions." This declaration, which Solzhenitsyn makes in the postscript to the Russian edition of *August 1914,* invites the reader to observe what is new about this novel and to consider what its claims may be to supersede or eclipse his earlier works.

In his most notable previous fiction—*One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle*—Solzhenitsyn has shown himself to be a meticulous documentarist. He has drawn on his imagination to present existing reality rather than to create new worlds, using the novel to purvey what are, in effect, transmuted personal memoirs of his own experiences as a concentration camp inmate, as a prisoner in a scientific research jail, and as a patient in a Tashkent hospital. Solzhenitsyn, like Dostoyevsky, likes to portray humanity under strain. He has shown superb skill in creating an atmosphere of brooding claustrophobia in settings where death—lingering or sudden—lurks around every corner. These have served him as an admirable background against which to highlight the problem, so central to his writing, of human integrity. Furthermore, in each work one could find a particular hero who seemed to be roughly equatable with Solzhenitsyn himself. A final aspect of his longer novels has been a comparatively shapeless and plotless structure.

August 1914 preserves all the above features. By choosing as his theme the Battle of Tannenberg, the catastrophic Russian defeat by the Germans, the author has ensured that death, suffering and waste hang no less menacingly over his latest work than over its predecessors. An air of doom-laden inevitability lowers over the fortunes of the Russian Second Army from the time when its units, victims of inept orders from on high, are shown marching into an East Prussia deliberately deserted by the enemy until the void suddenly turns into an encircling trap. Malign or absurd authority is represented by the Emperor Nicholas II, by Grand Duke Nicholas (the Commander-in-Chief), by Zhilinsky (Commander of Army Group North West), and by a clutch of inept staff officers. And the central individual—the man of integrity who appears in some sense to represent the author himself—is also present in the shape of Colonel Vorotyntsev, a staff officer with a roving mission from GHQ to tour the fronts.

For his documentary content, Solzhenitsyn has depended on intensive research, a process admittedly hampered by lack of access to many necessary materials. So keenly is he attached to factual detail that he presents much of it raw, quoting verbatim from the archives of the period Orders of the Day, newspaper announcements, and even commercial advertisements. By including italicized scenario-sketches and introducing—in the Russian edition—certain typographical vagaries, the author now reminds us of John Dos Passos, now conjures up—somewhat half-heartedly—the atmosphere of Soviet literature in the 1920s, when Futurism was still a going concern. As the above details indicate, Solzhenitsyn is, for the first time in a major work,

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grappling with material not personally experienced. He has set himself, in fact, to write a historical novel about an event which occurred a few years before his birth—an event from which the writing is separated by over half a century. This, of course, is analogous to the task which Leo Tolstoy undertook in *War and Peace*. That masterpiece, though, spans more than a decade, whereas Solzhenitsyn's narrative—quite typically—chooses to concentrate on the occurrences of only a dozen days.

A PREOCCUPATION with Tolstoy pervades *August 1914,* as it pervades so much of Solzhenitsyn's other work. The sage of Yasnaya Polyana even appears in person as a minor character, being featured in one of the innumerable flashbacks. And the spirit of *War and Peace* hovers over much of the military narrative. But Solzhenitsyn is less disposed than was Tolstoy to regard history and warfare as subjects for philosophical analysis. History is ultimately irrational, he allows one character—seemingly conceived as a mouthpiece—to argue. And he will have no truck with Tolstoy's contention that it is not generals who lead armies, not presidents or leaders who run states and political parties; he observes that "all too often the twentieth century has proved to us that it *is* such men who do these things."

With Tolstoy, Solzhenitsyn shares that admiration for the simple Russian peasant which the author of *War and Peace* embodied in his idealized *muzhik,* Platon Karatayev. Solzhenitsyn has a simple peasant called Blagodaryov, who serves as Vorotyntsev's batman. However, Blagodaryov, unlike Karatayev, is no cardboard bumpkin, but a carefully and sympathetically portrayed character, so that at least in this one minor respect Solzhenitsyn is Tolstoy's superior.

As this theme reminds us, a main concern in *August 1914* is the "unmeasurable strength latent in the Russian people." We also read again and again, in one form or another, of the vigorous, inexhaustible spiritual strength of Russia that lay hidden under these soldiers' tunics and made them so fearless. Ill-led by incompetent generals who owe their promotion to the favor of the court; marched here, there and back again to no purpose through endlessly countermanded orders; bereft of food, water and ammunition; often coming under the fire of his own troops . . . the uniformed *muzhik* can stand up to all this and more. Nor is he to be bested, in the end, by the efficient and organized German.

This thesis is forcefully presented, and I would not dream of trying to refute it. Everyone knows that the Russian peasant makes a brave soldier; it has been demonstrated often enough both before and after Tannenberg. Nor does Solzhenitsyn's fervent Russian patriotism do him any dishonor. The trouble is that similar sentiments have been expressed innumerable times before, as anyone even superficially familiar with Russian literature will remember. I see very little new in Solzhenitsyn's restatement of these old Slavophile, Narodnik-type truths: certainly nothing which, from a literary point of view, triumphantly justifies so elaborate a tapping of a well-worked vein.

When it comes to Solzhenitsyn's dovetailing of War (front-line activities) with—in effect—Peace (civilian life in the Russian hinterland), we find no grand panorama, no skillful interlacing such as Tolstoy provides. The civilian scenes are, all of them, far weaker than the military—none more so than those in the sequence of seventy pages with which the novel opens. Here is routine, tedious, desultory writing such as one associates with the notoriously uninspired Fedin. Here, for the n-th time, we find yet another Russian novel which starts with a train journey, or rather with a cart journey merging into a train journey. As always, we are given information on the first male character's facial hair ("the triangle of his clipped, russet moustache") as a means of evoking Human Interest before the inevitable desultory sequence of flashbacks—describing his past, his father, his family life and so on, as a prelude to dropping this particular set of characters flat and taking up another equally lifeless array of temporarily spotlighted figures. Having long ago christened this style of Russian writing *"Father Was A . . . (otets byl)"* from the formula most commonly invoked to introduce the endless flashbacks, I am saddened to find myself yet again expected to remember some Zhenya who resurfaces on page 551 after nothing has been heard of her for five hundred pages—expected, moreover, to distinguish her from some equally unremarkable and long-neglected Ksenya.

There is no relish in noting faults so familiar and so gross in the work of an author whom one respects as a noble and courageous man: one who—in *The First Circle,* if nowhere else—also comes near to showing himself a great novelist. As we know, Solzhenitsyn has in the past risen above greater trials than adverse criticism. One cannot help hoping,

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therefore, that he may yet rethink his latest approach to the craft of fiction-writing. One hopes, too, that he will not be misled by the acclaim which (to judge from the reception of other translated Russian writers of the Soviet period) tends to be accorded almost automatically in the West to any work by an author whose name one perhaps cannot pronounce; whose pages abound with vodka, samovars and philosophical discussions conducted by personages with names ending in -ovsky, -enko, or -ovich; and who—above all—is known to be the object of political persecution.

Unfortunately, these things, on their own, do not make a novelist. Nor, in the present instance, can they rescue a below-standard work by a novelist of justly recognized stature.

The Marxism of Ernest Mandel

By Howard Sherman

ERNEST MANDEL: *Marxist Economic Theory.* New York, Monthly Review Press, 1968.
ERNEST MANDEL: *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, 1843 to Capital.* New York, Monthly Review Press, 1971.

ERNEST MANDEL, a Belgian Marxist, has written two related books which together form one of the best expositions of Marxism ever produced.[1] Despite their titles, they do not focus on esoteric economic theory; rather, they are broad explanations of Marxist views with respect to economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, and history, presented in a single, integrated treatment of the social sciences. This review essay will concentrate mainly on the overwhelming strengths of Mandel's presentations (since the reviewer, as a Marxist, agrees with Mandel's general outlook) but will take issue with Mandel on certain points of detail. Four main areas will be discussed: Marxist methodology, the history of precapitalist systems, the contradictions of capitalism, and the contradictions of Soviet socialism.

Mandel stresses, as have all non-dogmatic Marxists beginning with Marx, that the only orthodoxy in Marxism is its method, and *not* the acceptance of any particular dogmas about what has been or what should be. He says:

Marxist economic theory ought not to be regarded as a completed outcome of past investigation but rather as the summation of a method, of the results obtained by using this method, and of results which are continually subject to re-examination.[2]

In line with this view, he tells us what he is about to do:

The scientifically correct position is obviously that which endeavors to start from the empirical data of the science of today in order to examine whether or not the essence of Marx's economic propositions remains valid.[3]

He thus eschews the two approaches most often encountered in books on Marx. On one hand, he shuns the Soviet dogmatic approach, which assumes that Marx is always right and "proves" its propositions by copious quotes from Marx. On the other hand, he avoids the dogmatic conservative critic's approach, which assumes that Marx is always wrong and uses voluminous quotes from Marx —always taken out of context— to prove that he is not worth discussing. Mandel gives *no* quotations from Marx; all his sources are academic scholars.

As to the Marxist method itself, Mandel emphasizes the materialist view that a society's politics, culture, and history are all to be understood in terms of the economic base. This analytical proposition distinguishes Marxism from those theories which explain history in terms of supernatural or

[1] *Marxist Economic Theory* (hereafter referred to as *Theory*) first came out in French in 1962; *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, 1843 to Capital* (henceforth referred to as *Formation*) initially appeared in French in 1967.

[2] *Theory*, p. 18.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 17. Emphasis in the original.

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other factors outside of the endogenous model of society itself, and equally from those theories which treat history as an inexplicable, random series of events. Mandel also stresses the dialectic perspective, which looks at all social phenomena (1) in the context of historical development (*e.g.*, capitalism is regarded as a system with a beginning and end, like all systems in the continuing evolution of society); (2) in the context of functional interaction with other social phenomena (*e.g.*, political behavior is seen in the light of the economic system); and (3) in terms of the conflicts and tensions that lead to change (*e.g.*, the class struggles between the nobility and bourgeoisie that led to the French revolution).

Mandel argues that Marx, on this methodological base, produced a synthesis of sociological, political, and economic theory, and that other methodologies are inadequate to this task:

Recently the American sociologist Talcott Parsons has tried to effect a comparable synthesis. Within the framework of a highly formalized sociology and a general theory of action, he treats the economy as a special feature of a "social system" specialized in increasing the "adaptability" of the wider system. This attempt at a synthesis can be considered a failure for three fundamental reasons: its largely unhistorical character, its inability to grasp the basically contradictory nature of every "social system" . . ., and its rather clearly apologetic tendency in relation to the reality of present-day capitalism (monopoly capitalism, which has closely integrated the state with itself . . .).[4]

[4] *Formation*, p. 389.

THE FIRST FOUR chapters of Mandel's *Theory* are devoted to the history of precapitalist economies. This part of his work is highly impressive. It is not merely profound and insightful in analysis; it is also—unlike most social science today—a delight for any reader to go through. Mandel explains all the basic Marxist categories, such as labor, value, money, and capital, yet he does not do so in a dry, theoretical manner. Rather, he follows his own announced method and develops them all historically. Thus we learn about money amongst African tribes, Pacific islanders, and—eventually—the emerging British commercial society during the transition to capitalism. Similarly, he traces the forms of labor and exploitation of labor in various societies, emphasizing in each one, to be sure, the kinds of class conflict encountered. It is a *tour de force* and one of the most striking applications of Marx's method ever encountered by this author. (Indeed, it is an especially good introduction to Marx for students).

Most of this book deals with what Mandel perceives as the conflicts and tensions of economic life under modern capitalism in Western Europe and the United States. Very little of his discussion involves the wearisome fooling with formulas beloved by most economists. To the contrary, the great bulk of it consists of quite lively descriptions of actual historical happenings and trends. For example, he sketches what he deems to be the mechanism through which the worker is exploited in present-day capitalist societies, the periodic crises of overproduction leading to mass unemployment, the domination of the economy by monopoly power, the domination of the state by monopoly capital, the state's support of monopoly capital (especially the "state as guarantor of monopoly profits" [5] and monopoly capital's use of the state to spread imperialism around the world).

This attempt to demonstrate the contradictions of capitalism not mainly through formalized theory but primarily by historical description, analysis of interaction among social institutions, and detailed examination of conflicts among socio-economic classes constitutes the volume's great strength, yet it is also, to some extent, its weakness. While Mandel is for the most part very convincing, he does not adequately cope with some of the more difficult questions of theory (a task which was, to be sure, not his fundamental goal). As a result, the book contains a few sections—*e.g.*, his treatment of periodic cycles of unemployment—where even Marxist economists may find him somewhat vague. In discussing cycles, a subject to which Marx made such a powerful contribution, Mandel fails to provide a satisfying synthesis (though his empirical description is excellent); moreover, he is unduly harsh with other Marxist theorists like Paul Sweezy.[6]

PERHAPS MANDEL is at his best in his insightful critique of the Soviet economy. He offers us vivid descriptions of War Communism, the period of the New Economic Policy, and the years of rapid

[5] *Theory*, p. 389.

[6] The present author has tried to spell out the full Marxist theory of cyclical unemployment in several articles and books, the most recent being *Radical Political Economy: Capitalism and Socialism from a Marxist-Humanist Perspective*, New York, Basic Books, 1972, Chapter 7 and Appendices 3, 4, and 5.

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industrialization. He maintains that the Soviet economy has certain strengths, such as a more rapid rate of development than the capitalist countries, growing social services provided free of charge, and so forth. He also discerns its main weaknesses, particularly its continued division into a relatively affluent elite and a mass of less-well-paid citizens. "The contradiction between the non-capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois norms of distribution," he observes, "is the fundamental contradiction of every society transitional between capitalism and socialism." [7] In other words, there is public ownership of the means of production, but individuals still receive differential wages according to work done (at least in theory) and must use these wages to buy consumer goods. It is this mode of distribution that perpetuates many evils (which are not merely leftovers from capitalism): the monopolization of political power by a small clique, the employment of discrimination as a tool of power, alienation of the ordinary worker, a continued psychology of personal aggrandizement, and even militarist drives (*e.g.*, the invasion of Czechoslovakia) to preserve the leaders' power and prestige.

My only real quarrels with Mandel here are semantic ones. For example, since he is a leader of the Trotskyite movement and detests Stalinism, he cannot bring himself to call a society of the Soviet type "socialist." He calls Soviet-type economies "societies transitional between capitalism and socialism." Similarly, he defines "socialism" as the final stage where there are no wages or prices or markets, and where workers labor collectively and receive according to their needs. It seems to me that the more usual designations of "socialism" for any society like the Soviet Union in which the means of production are publicly owned, and of "communism" for a society with public ownership *and* abolition of wages and prices, are more useful for scientific reasons. Moreover, they are just (or almost) as acceptable from a political standpoint.

In my terminology, the Soviet Union would qualify as socialist, but as representative of a backward type of socialism. After all, the Soviet state came into being during a civil war in a country with an undemocratic political tradition, a poor educational system and a high degree of illiteracy, and a relatively underdeveloped economy. The backwardness of the economy gave rise to a draconian drive to industrialize, which continually reinforced the need of the leaders for a dictatorship to carry through their programs. Since these circumstances do not pertain today in the United States and Western Europe, one could then agree with Mandel that the advent of socialism in these areas, involving the elimination of the economic power of a few giant corporations and the transfer of power over the economy to the public, would automatically mean an increase in political democracy at all levels. One could also concur with his view that public ownership constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for the abolition of alienation and power drives, and that a society of free goods (*i.e.*, a "communist" society) is essential to the achievement of this end.

The position that socialism, or the transition to socialism, is a prerequisite to but does not ensure the ending of alienation underlies Mandel's exceptionally interesting treatment of the Marxist debate on alienation.[8] In the course of his analysis, he criticizes Soviet dogmatists for claiming that alienation has been eradicated in the Soviet Union merely through the establishment of public ownership of the means of production. At the same time, he upbraids those commentators who claim that all industrial societies generate the same amount of alienation.

Another instance where the content of Mandel's discussion seems correct but his semantics are confusing occurs in his discourse on the end-of-value theory and the end of all political economy under socialism.[9] He underscores over and over that in a Soviet-type economy, not to speak of a pure "communist" economy, prices are set by the planners rather than by a supply-and-demand mechanism in the market. In this sense, he maintains, the law of value no longer controls prices. And he quotes Preobrazhensky to the effect that "with the liquidation of the law of value in the domain of the economy, the old political economy is also liquidated." [10]

While the point is obvious, the terminology is troubling. Today, Soviet reformers (such as Novozhilov) talk about the law of value still operating, but they have in mind something quite different from what Mandel does. They mean that to make rational or optimal decisions, the planners must calculate for themselves the relative values of all outputs (to decide what to produce) and all inputs (to decide what technology

[7] *Theory*, p. 572.

[8] *Formation*, Chapters 10 and 11.
[9] *Theory*, Chapter 18.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 729.

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to use). Also, they insist—and Mandel himself shows that Lenin realized—that Marx's equilibrium equations are still necessary for socialist planners, not as a description of what the market may or may not produce, but as a normative guide to planning.

The non-dogmatic Soviet economists have been expounding these arguments against the dogmatic Stalinist idea that a socialist economy could produce anything at any time that a dictator ordered it, without objective constraints or attention to the maximization of welfare or minimization of costs. Surely, Mandel would agree with the non-dogmatic position. If he wishes to call the concerns of planners in such a conception "engineering economics" rather than "political economy," he may have a good point. (Yet it would appear that the broader *political* economy itself would still exist until the final abolition of all class distinctions under pure communism—a long way off. Perhaps Mandel himself would agree, since he has provided such an excellent political-economic dissection of the Soviet Union from a Marxist perspective.)

To sum up, then, Mandel's little book on the formation of Marx's thought is a clear and scholarly exposition—in fact, the best available—of how Marx's economic theories evolved. Mandel's major work on Marxist economic theory is a well-written introduction for anyone new to the subject—particularly rich in historical and institutional data but light on formal economic theory. It also provides a great many worthwhile, if critical insights, into the societies of the United States and Western Europe on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other.

Peking's African Strategy

By Lucius Beebe

BRUCE D. LARKIN: *China and Africa, 1949-1970,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.

FOR MORE THAN TWO decades the People's Republic of China (PRC) has cast a calculating eye on the manifold opportunities offered, first, by a rebellious colonial Africa and later, by a struggling and politically unstable, though largely independent, continent. During the 1950's, Peking enthusiastically applauded the revolutionary developments in Egypt and the more radical and certainly more violent independence movement in Algeria. Then, after virtually severing her fraternal ties with Moscow in 1960, China embarked on a much more active and ambitious program in the central portion of the continent. Guinea and Mali were early recipients of Chinese aid, but the principal target of Peking's efforts was the newly-independent Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly, the Belgian Congo). The Chinese saw the chaotic internal situation in the Congo as an opportunity to bring into being a regime amenable to Peking's influence and thereby spark a revolutionary tide throughout the continent. The Chinese strategy for accomplishing this objective was to develop compatible relationships with countries adjoining the Congo—*i.e.,* Tanganyika, the Republic of the Congo [Congo (Brazzaville)], Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Uganda—and to use these countries as bases for supplying arms, materiel, and guerrilla-warfare expertise to the anti-government forces in the Congo. This strategy worked successfully enough to frustrate the pacification efforts of the legal Congolese government for four years, but it finally collapsed in 1965.

Undaunted by this failure, however, Peking then prepared to redirect its thrust toward potentially flammable southern Africa. The PRC carefully nurtured friendships with Tanzania, Zambia, and the Congo (Brazzaville) and pursued policies designed to build up the economic and political indebtedness of their leaders to China. From bases in these countries on the periphery of colonial and minority-ruled Africa, Peking has sponsored liberation movements which are a constant threat to the target governments.

China's efforts to foster revolutionary movements in Africa have

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not been a total success. The leaderships in a majority of the newly-independent countries were not ready for revolutionary change, and in several countries initially under radical leaders—Ghana and Mali are classic examples—these leaders were subsequently replaced by more moderate ones. Too much overt intervention in internal affairs, an excessive emphasis on revolutionary change, and simple miscalculation cost China dearly during the initial stage of her African policy. But she has retrenched, redirected her objectives, and survived on the continent.

The broad scope and complexity of the PRC's African policies demand scholarly attention. Bruce Larkin, in *China and Africa, 1949-1970,* has presented an excellent and thoroughly documented analysis of these policies during at least the early stages of Peking's involvement. Mr. Larkin's approach is interesting in that he has developed a set of hypotheses applicable to Chinese foreign policy in general and has applied them to the PRC's African policies. One of these hypotheses is that there is a tension in overall Chinese foreign policy between short- and long-term goals: whereas, generally, Peking has tended —whenever necessary—to subordinate its long-term ideological objectives to short-term pragmatic considerations, in the African environment, it seems by and large to have given precedence to the former in opting for a policy of fostering revolutionary struggle rather than accepting piecemeal, evolutionary progress. In Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8, Mr. Larkin presents a carefully detailed, step-by-step study of China's political and economic advances in the various countries. He supports this account with a wealth of data concerning the roles of political and revolutionary organizations, the Chinese and African personalities involved, and the programs launched by the PRC in furtherance of Peking's policies.

There are, to be sure, certain weaknesses and shortcomings which, in the reviewer's opinion, seriously detract from the value of the overall work. An initial observation is that Larkin, while acknowledging that "specific and usually localized political breakdowns have occurred," tends to overemphasize the degree of political stability and economic advance prevailing in the newly-independent states, whose elite leaderships—he says—have for the most part enjoyed "uninterrupted tenure." If conditions of general political stability and economic progress did prevail, they clearly would inhibit Peking's policy advances in Africa; however, the fact is that the young African states have not been politically stable. In their short histories, nearly all of them have experienced political coups (whether successful or not), internal violence, and destructive political rivalries springing often from deep-rooted tribal antagonisms—all of which have created fertile ground for Chinese interference in local politics.

A second defect is the author's apparent minimization or downgrading of Peking's role in the Congo crisis. Mr. Larkin gives little credence to the wealth of evidence supporting the view that Peking furnished military equipment, money, and ideological indoctrination to the guerrillas fighting against the legal central government in Leopoldville; and he also tends to discredit charges that Congolese terrorist leader Pierre Mulele, a leader of the 1963-64 anti-government rebellion, acted as an "agent" for the Chinese. Yet evidence from Chinese as well as African and European sources provides strong confirmation of Chinese interference in the Congo crisis—a crisis that lasted five years and required the dispatch of a United Nations force to restore order.

THE MOST DISAPPOINTING chapter in Larkin's book, however, is one that deals with liberation movements directed against the remaining colonial or white-minority-ruled regimes of southern Africa. These movements are very real, and they have been in advanced stages of organization since the mid-1960's. Their ideological orientations are divided between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese, but Chinese influence predominates. Larkin, however, while devoting considerable attention to the unseating of the ruling governments in the Cameroon Republic, the Congo (K), Rwanda, and Niger, has litle to say about the liberation movements in Rhodesia, South Africa, Southwest Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. Yet this is precisely the area where China has recently been making her greatest political investment and is staking the success of her overall African policy. Mr. Larkin would have made a valuable contribution if he had given the same meticulous attention to Chinese Communist connections with potentially dangerous organizations in this part of Africa as he has to Chinese activities elsewhere on the continent, mostly in the earlier phase of Peking's involvement. The current literature still does not provide an adequate analysis of the various liberation movements, and it is a pity that Mr. Larkin did not

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devote his demonstrated scholarly expertise to filling the gap.

A major reason for this failure is that Larkin's book, though purporting to cover developments through 1970, is concerned primarily with events from the beginning of Chinese interest in Africa to approximately 1966. The immediate post-Cultural Revolution period is minimized, even though it witnessed highly important initiatives by Peking. It was during this period, indeed, that the most impressive and significant Chinese aid projects were developed—most notably, Chinese financial and technical assistance in constructing the strategic Tanzania-Zambia railway—and that many of the liberation movements were founded. Yet the PRC's mounting interest in Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution period is seriously understated by Mr. Larkin. A careful screening of the sources cited in the book reveals very few dated after 1966, and this obsolescence of much of the data employed by the author imposes serious limitations on his analysis of post-Cultural Revolution PRC strategy and policies in Africa.

In his concluding chapter, entitled "Prospects and Probabilities," Mr. Larkin obviously remains skeptical of the PRC's capability to acquire a significant degree of political influence on the continent. "One reason that China's African interest is politically significant," he writes, "is that certain key states, including China herself, act as if it were." Yet, the realities of both the earlier and the post-Cultural Revolution phases of China's African activities suggest that these activities do have extreme political significance. Larkin's tendency to underestimate Chinese strategic intentions and capabilities is reflected in his analysis of Lin Piao's famous 1965 essay, "Long Live the Victory of People's War." He seriously questions whether this controversial document can be interpreted as proof of a Chinese Communist policy of actively encouraging revolutionary upheavals in the Third World; yet, a careful review of Peking's tactics in Africa seems to support a contrary view. This is not to say that the PRC seeks or possesses the capability to carve out an empire for itself in Africa under direct Chinese rule. The advancement of Peking's long-range objectives of global power and leadership of the international Communist movement would not require establishment of Chinese rule; it would only require the acquisition of control over certain key elements of the African regimes' policies, and such control could be achieved subtly, with little awareness on the part of the victims of what was happening. This possibility is not considered in Mr. Larkin's concluding assessment, which gives the impression that the makers of Chinese foreign policy lack common objectives and unity of purpose. "This study demonstrates," the author writes, "that China's motives are mixed and that popular African governments, with wisdom and judicious precaution, can conduct relations with China which give play primarily to those Chinese motives which are consistent with African aims." In the reviewer's opinion, however, this is an excessively optimistic view which does not take adequately into account either the potentialities of the Chinese-supported liberation movements or the threat to those countries where the Chinese are working to insinuate their influence covertly and by economic means.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of *China and Africa, 1949-1970*, Mr. Larkin has made a valuable and significant contribution to our knowledge in an area of growing importance. In many respects his work is outstanding, providing both the casual reader and the expert with a thoughtful approach to a very complex problem. The hypotheses defined in the first chapter are carried through the book and provide excellent tools of analysis. For one, however, this reviewer would like to see Mr. Larkin present a second edition focusing more on current developments and placing greater stress on the realities rather than the theoretical aspects of China's African policy.

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Soviet Studies of Cuba

By Leon Gouré

A. D. BEKAREVICH: *Kuba, vneshneekonomicheskie otnosheniia* (Cuba, Foreign Economic Relations), Latin American Institute, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1970.
V. V. VOLSKY, *et. al.*, Eds.: *Kuba, 10 let revoliutsii* (Cuba, Ten Years of Revolution) Latin American Institute, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1968.

LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES have been enjoying a certain vogue in the USSR, a trend that reflects the Soviet regime's growing interest in the region as a locus of anti-imperialist struggle at the "strategic rear" of the United States. Among signs of this trend, the Latin American Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR has put out a special journal entitled *Latinskaia Amerika* since 1969. The Institute has also published a growing number of studies on the various countries of Latin America.

Yet contrary to what one might expect, Soviet works on Cuba are relatively few in number, especially those dealing with developments since Castro's revolution of 1959. Soviet students of Latin America appear to suffer from a "two-camps" view of the world—also entertained by a number of Western scholars—that impels them to classify Cuba as one of the socialist countries and as separate from other underdeveloped countries, as well as from the rest of Latin America. But the main reason for the relative dearth of Soviet published works on Cuba may be that there is not all that much to write about. Try as he might, the Soviet scholar must experience difficulty in finding much to praise in Castro's achievements or in foreseeing an early solution of Cuba's social and economic problems. There are really only two topics which Soviet students of Cuba can treat with relative ease: the first is the prerevolutionary period and the revolutionary struggle; the second is the generosity of Soviet aid to Cuba. Even in these cases, certain controversial aspects—such as Castro's political differences with and insubordination to Moscow, his personalistic style of economic management, or the Soviet use of economic leverage to "persuade" him—have to be largely ignored.

Understandably enough, Soviet writings reflect both interest and embarrassment in dealing with developments in Cuba. The interest stems from the unanticipated emergence of a Communist enclave in an area of predominant US influence and from the fact that Cuba represents an important Soviet experimental effort to sustain a distant and economically (as well as politically and militarily) vulnerable client—a client, moreover, whose evolving experience poses many challenges to Soviet concepts of the proper non-capitalist path of development for underdeveloped countries. In the introduction to his work, A. D. Bekarevich notes that given the character of Cuba's economy, the island's foreign economic relations "have been the focal point where the role . . . of the socialist camp, above all the Soviet Union, . . . in the deepening of the revolutionary process in Cuba, on the one hand, and the United States' counterrevolutionary and reactionary nature, on the other, have been expressed with the greatest force." The author also claims that the course of Soviet-Cuban relations can serve as a model for other underdeveloped countries whose economies are characterized by "monoculture, reliance on monopoly capital in the sphere of production, and a one-sided dependence in their foreign trade on markets in a few imperialist states." According to both works under review, Cuba's experience demonstrates that a radical shift of foreign economic ties away from dependence on capitalist states and toward cooperation with socialist states is crucial for the development of a national economy and the construction of a new society in Third World countries.

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IN THIS RESPECT, the lack of significant success in Cuba's economic development, despite the shift in its foreign alliances and relations, is precisely what causes embarrassment to Soviet observers. Predictably, the authors of both books denounce—at considerable length and in some detail—the record of US "exploitation" of the island, citing mainly postrevolutionary Cuban sources. The US is specifically condemned for having imposed a "monocultural" (i.e., single-crop) economy on Cuba, which, in Bekarevich's words, became "one of the first elements of that model of an international division of labor which the North American imperialists foisted upon the Latin American countries." However, the authors find it much harder to explain why the drive in the early 1960's for Cuba's industrialization failed, and especially why the island economy's much-condemned dependence on sugar has been revived as a virtue and an asset under the principle, this time, of a "socialist division of labor." It is asserted that the Soviet bloc offers Cuba a large market for its sugar; but there is no mention of the USSR's own self-sufficiency in and continuing expansion of domestic sugar production, in view of which the so-called socialist division of labor is largely fictitious.

The Soviet scholars have equal difficulty explaining why the complete nationalization of Cuba's economy, the state monopoly over foreign trade, the long-term trade agreements with the Soviet bloc, and the fixed prices which the latter pays for Cuban sugar (thus making the island's economy independent of the price fluctuations on the world sugar market) have not resulted in better Cuban planning and performance. While Cuba's growing trade deficit can be cited to underscore the "generosity" of the Soviet Union, it also calls attention to the failures of Castroite economic planning. Bekarevich notes that the principle of balancing exports and imports "was not followed in Cuba" and that in the period 1959 to 1966 the value of the island's annual exports never reached the level of 1958 exports, although the Soviet Union was buying Cuban sugar at a rate above world market prices most of those years. That Cuba's repeated failures to meet its commitments has been a growing source of irritation to Moscow was acknowledged by Castro to a correspondent of the Soviet journal *Ogoniok* in June 1970; in the course of an interview, he remarked that he could understand why "very naturally and justifiably a certain skepticism has developed concerning our economic plans."

According to Bekarevich, the fixed price of 6.11 cents per pound paid by the Soviet Union for Cuban sugar cost the USSR $730.1 million over the period 1960-67. It is worth noting that other East European countries have been somewhat less generous. Thus, Bulgaria is said to have paid 5.15 cents per pound in the same period, while East Germany lowered its price from the original 6.11 cent level to 5.53 cents per pound after 1966. Even so, these prices were considerably above world market prices.

Although a 1971 Soviet review of Bekarevich's study bills it as "up-to-date research on Cuba" (*International Affairs,* No. 8, 1971), the data cited by the author, like those in the Volsky study, are largely limited to the period prior to 1967. Still, the studies are not without some value despite their biases and omissions. They offer a detailed account of a number of developments in various sectors of the Cuban economy and, in the case of the Volsky study, in the sphere of education and culture as well. Much of the data is gleaned from Cuban sources, some of which have not been available to Western scholars. The authors also treat a number of questions which are seldom touched upon in Western studies. For example, Bekarevich discusses the problem of establishing a spare-parts industry in Cuba after the US ceased to provide spare parts for American-made equipment. This problem—and the Soviet experience in attempting to solve it—is significant not only for Cuba but for other underdeveloped countries which might be tempted to imitate the Castroite course.

Both studies ascribe great significance to Cuba's potential as a source of nickel, cobalt and other non-ferrous metals, viewing these ores as a major item in future Cuban foreign trade. Considering the Soviet Union's promotion of this industry in Cuba, it is interesting to note that for a number of years the Soviet share of the island's exports of ores did not keep pace with the growth of production. Specifically, from 1964 to 1969 Soviet purchases (including non-ferrous metal ores and concentrates) remained at an average of 26 million rubles per year. Presumably the USSR was forced repeatedly to forego a portion of projected deliveries so as to allow Cuba to obtain much-needed hard currency through sales in non-Communist countries. This situation changed rather dramatically in 1970-71, with Soviet imports of such products suddenly rising to a value of 98.9 million rubles—

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one of many indications that Moscow has begun to make larger demands on Havana.

ACCORDING TO Volsky, the ultimate objective of Soviet policy is the transformation of Cuba's economy "into an integral part of the world socialist economy." Meanwhile, he asserts, Soviet bloc aid is helping Cuba "overcome the difficulties connected with the deficit in foreign trade." Whether or not this eventually proves true, for the present the process of overcoming the deficit apparently involves its further growth. Soviet deliveries to Cuba have continued to increase (though at a lesser rate than projected[1]), contributing to a trade deficit of $350 million in 1971. Neither the authors nor any other Soviet sources have ventured to predict when a balance will be reached in Soviet-Cuban trade, nor has anything been said about how Cuba will repay (if it ever does) its debt to the Soviet bloc, already totalling some $3 billion.

Bekarevich maintains that "as with every other socialist country, Cuba has no need to strive for economic self-sufficiency." But he hastens to add that the "list" of items being exported to Cuba from the USSR "can and must be constantly reduced" as a consequence of increases in Cuban production. While current trends in Soviet aid to Cuba offer no signs of such a curtailment, some changes in the "list" may occur in the not too distant future, as various new plants, built with Soviet-bloc aid, finally begin to operate.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has been very generous in its economic aid to Cuba. This "largesse" has provided grist for the Soviet propaganda mill, which seeks to persuade other Latin American and Third World countries that the establishment of trade and economic ties with the Soviet bloc is essential if they are to reduce their dependence on the capitalist powers and attain "true independence." Soviet sources frankly acknowledge that Moscow views economic relations with the developing countries mainly in political terms, as an "integral part of the struggle between the two world systems, socialism and capitalism," counting on the establishment of such relations to "undermine" these countries' economic and political ties with the West.[2] The Cuban experience shows, however, that the Soviet Union ultimately extracts a heavy price for its aid. Bekarevich mentions that the long-term Soviet-Cuban trade agreements served as a "sort of instrument of indirect coordination of the national economic plans of both countries." With the establishment of an intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban planning commission in December 1970, such coordination ceased to be "indirect"—a trend which climaxed most recently in Cuba's formal entry into Comecon. Thus it has become ever more apparent that the price of Cuba's independence from exploitation by Western "monopoly-capitalism" is its increasing economic—as well as political—integration into the Soviet bloc.

[1] Though the value of 1971 Soviet exports to Cuba increased 22 million rubles over the 1970 level, this represented a significant default on the USSR's promise to increase deliveries by a value of 100 million rubles.

[2] *E.g.*, see *Izvestia* of Feb. 15 and July 2, 1972.

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Notes & Views
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NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

MODELS AND ANALOGIES

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Harvey Fireside's generally negative appraisal of John S. Reshetar, Jr.'s *The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the USSR* in his provocative review-essay on methods of analyzing Soviet affairs (*Problems of Communism,* May-June 1972) moves me to dissent on two points.

First, Fireside attacks Reshetar's application of some six models (theories) of Soviet politics. Contending that all present models are subject to "basic design flaws," he deems their fundamental defect to stem from the fact that as distortions of reality they ultimately serve as "defenses of our positions in society." This severe attitude would deny their redeeming features—for example, in making assumptions explicit, suggesting hypotheses, measuring change, and facilitating comparisons—and would fly in the face of Alex Inkeles' observation that "most social scientists approach the subject they are studying with some kind of conceptual scheme." Surely it is utopian to urge abandoning all use of models. If this is the case, should we not applaud rather than condemn reasoned evaluations of competing models of Soviet politics?

Secondly, he criticizes the author's "centralist" conception of Soviet politics for minimizing the importance of post-Stalin reforms and downgrading the possibility of major change. But in arguing for a broader view of past reforms and future possibilities, he states: "They [Reshetar's centralist concepts—PSG] are based on a persistent treatment of the party as a 'secular priesthood' and 'a small minority of the population' despite the surge of membership beyond the 14-million mark and what this figure portends in terms of expanded civic participation." This line of reasoning elicits the following comment.

Regarding the secular priesthood, Reshetar merely states that "in certain respects" the party has resembled a secular priesthood expected to be dedicated to dogma and to proselytize on its behalf. The analogy between communism and religion is apt and familiar from such works as Nicolas Berdyaev's *The Russian Revolution* and Eric Hoffer's *The True Believer.*

As for the small minority of the population, the 14-million figure testifies both to the success of the leadership in broadening party membership *and* to its determination to maintain the party as a relatively small (presently 6 percent of the population) "leading core" of the society.

Considering what this growth portends, we should take into account the exchange of party documents scheduled for 1973-74. A *Pravda* editorial of June 24, 1972, indicates that the party leadership intends—among other things—to weed out passive, indifferent members. "If you are a Communist," it declares, "your duty is not to shirk difficulties, not to say yes to backward sentiments, but to be a conscientious and active party fighter." It particularly recommends that the *raikoms, gorkoms,* and primary party organizations hold individual discussions that will "make a deep impression on the consciousness of party members and candidates, facilitating the growth of their productivity and public activity, raising responsibility and discipline." Significantly there is not a single word about augmenting party membership.

Even assuming that the party grows in relation to the population during the 1970's, we should be cautious about interpreting such a development as "expanded civic participation." We must not forget that civic participation has a different meaning in the USSR, that may be called totalitarian as compared with democratic countries. The crucial question is not how many citizens participate—whether in the form of plebiscites and referenda or in mass organizations such as parties, youth corps, and trade unions—but what is the quality of their participation. Does participation conduce to making government responsible to broad sectors of the population, or does it merely serve to reinforce the position of a narrow, self-perpetuating ruling elite? Unless there is a radical transformation in the function of civic participation in the USSR, we cannot share Fireside's conclusions as to the import of expanded CPSU membership.

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PROF. FIRESIDE REPLIES: Professor Gillette's comments illustrate the stereotypic and ethnocentric premises underlying many so-called models of Soviet society. Echoing Reshetar, Gillette rests his case on a distinction between "civic participation in . . . totalitarian as compared with democratic countries." This loaded categorization, reflecting the anti-Stalinist reflexes of the Cold War, is exactly what my review sought to reject as no longer appropriate.

Alex Inkeles, in the 1966 essay cited by Gillette, scored the totalitarian model for being "insensitive to the

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sources of support for the Soviet regime" and for having "seriously neglected the degree of Soviet development." Further, he found the model blind to the "continuous process of social experimentation" in Soviet life and, finally, faulted it for being "historically limited," not attuned to the "profound changes in the Soviet social structure . . . after the death of Stalin." With all these points, my review, if not Reshetar's book or Gillette's defense, is in accord.

Inkeles went on to suggest a "development model" as more suited to the present, and a model of "a mature industrial society" as more appropriate to the future. To the degree that they add flexibility to Soviet studies, these models may be considered moves in the right direction; to the extent that they rest on unproven assumptions and again implicitly set up the US system as a paragon of development, they, too, can act as blinders.

Is it really "utopian to urge abandoning all use of models"? There are scores of works on British, French, and US politics that have dispensed with systemwide images quite nicely. Much of the seminal research in comparative politics has been done on the level of what Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown termed "narrow-gauge" and "middle-range theory," as well as through a "policy-centered approach." From such a research mix could, I feel, emerge the "modest hypotheses" of Soviet processes and institutions enumerated in my review. A moratorium on models might further help bring students of Soviet politics into the interdisciplinary and cross-cultural discussions with fellow social scientists from which they have been isolated.

Analogizing the party to a "secular priesthood" may have been apt for Berdyaev in the mid-1940's, as it had been for Boris Souvarine a half-dozen years before. It seems to mystify rather than enlighten recent observers of old apparatchiks, new technocrats, and the many other components of the current party conglomerate. T. H. Rigby, for example, has described the sevenfold increase in party enrollment since those days, making one of every twelve Soviet adults a member by the mid-1960's. Of itself, as well as compared with politically active sectors of Western European and US populations, this proportion appears to be anything but "a small minority."

The figures demonstrate what I meant by "expanded civic participation." Gillette's attempt to draw me into a defense of its "quality" obscures the simple issue. That substantially broadening the party base "merely" strengthens the elite is questionable. For one thing, wider recruitment opens up channels of mobility, so that the elite is no longer automatically "self-perpetuating." For another, the mass membership is involved in periodic mobilization campaigns, which, as Rigby has indicated, "may serve as one of the main devices for citizen participation in the political culture."

The pending exchange of party documents alluded to by Gillette is neither a bolt from the blue nor a reincarnation of Stalinist purges. It is rather one of the "alternating periods of . . . membership stability or contraction" described by Rigby, not detracting from his overall prediction of "further substantial growth in the CPSU membership." That such massive growth for a generation of new members entails qualitative changes in the nature of the party seems to me an inescapable conclusion.

The boost in the priority of consumer goods for the present Five-Year Plan appears to be one sign that the regime has become more responsive, if not yet responsible, to its people. The greater benefits given to collective farmers and the new educational reforms are further indicators of this trend. I am, of course, as aware as Gillette that in the area of civil rights there are still serious gaps in Soviet development, though the recent US record toward blacks and war resisters allows no grounds for smugness on that score. As to the "narrow" nature of the Soviet ruling elite, I await comparative data on such "democratic" states as Greece or South Africa, Rhodesia or South Vietnam.

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SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

TO THE EDITORS: While I agree with the broad outline of Mr. W. J. Barnds' article on "Moscow and South Asia" (May-June 1972), I think he creates a slightly false impression at one point. He correctly traces the evolution from early 1965 of a dualistic Soviet policy embracing both India and Pakistan and points to the contrast between the neutralist policy of the USSR during the 1965 war and the partisan stance adopted in the 1971 crisis. However, his article suggests that the policy which emerged in 1965 met with no serious setback until the deterioration of Soviet-Pakistani relations in 1971. He states (p. 24) that "the Soviet rulers quickly recognized that, with India threatened and Pakistan in turmoil, their policy of maintaining good relations with both was no longer tenable" and places as a footnote to this the remark that "the USSR had continued to cultivate Pakistan after Ayub was overthrown."

This is only a half-truth. When the Indian Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh, visited Moscow in September 1969, he thought he detected the setting in of a "certain disenchantment" in Soviet-Pakistani relations. (*The Times of India*, Sept. 16, 1969). While this may have been the product of wishful thinking on his part, there is other evidence which suggests that his suspicions were well-founded and that Soviet-Pakistani relations and the Tashkent policy based thereon had already suffered a fairly serious setback as early as the summer of 1969. This is made quite clear by the history of the Soviet-Pakistani arms deal. When Yahya, as Commander-in-Chief, negotiated the deal in 1968, it was agreed that the arms would arrive in three shipments—in February, May and August 1969. It is known that while the first two shipments were delivered, the August shipment never materialized. (This story may be traced: *The Times of India*, Sept. 20, 1969; New Delhi Radio, April 18, 1970; *ibid.*, June 29, 1970; *The Times of India*, Oct. 29, 1970; *ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1970; *Pakistan Times*, Nov. 6, 1970.) Whether this change of heart on the part of the Soviet Union merely reflected caution in her attitude to Yahya's accession to the presidency, or—more probably—was calculated as a retort to Pakistan's refusal to participate in the regional economic cooperation proposed by Mr. Kosygin during his South Asian tour of May 1969, does not immediately affect the issue.

Again, a change in the degree of Soviet cultivation of Pakistan about 1969 is reflected in the propaganda activities of the Soviet media.

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One method of displaying the sincerity of Soviet intentions towards Pakistan was to attack the secessionist movement in what was then East Pakistan. Thus on March 16, 1967, Radio Peace and Progress voiced the opinion that "the reactionaries from the Awami League have exposed themselves for the whole country to see as American hirelings and traitors of the nation's unity." But by August 14, 1970, the same station had adopted the line that the Awami League is to be found "standing in the vanguard of the left-wing forces" and that it is headed by the "distinguished E. Pakistani politician Mujibur Rahman," a view which would not have been greeted with much enthusiasm in Islamabad.

Therefore, while I agree with Mr. Barnds that the Soviet Union continued to cultivate Pakistan after Ayub was overthrown, I suggest that there was a marked diminution in the extent of cultivation in these important areas. For the sake of a general understanding of the evolution of Soviet policy in South Asia between 1965 and 1971 and, more particularly, for an understanding of the Soviet position in the 1971 crisis, the existence of this earlier Soviet disenchantment with Pakistan should be recognized.

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MR. BARNDS REPLIES: Mr. Clark brings out a useful point in describing the evidence of difficulties in the Soviet-Pakistani arms supply relationship during 1969-1970. However, I would differ with him about the cause of these difficulties and on their meaning for relations between the two countries. The Soviet approach to supplying arms to Pakistan was a cautious probe begun in 1966 and designed for two purposes: (1) to induce Pakistan to close the United States electronic intelligence facilities at Peshawar; and (2) to see if Pakistan's dependence on China for arms could be substantially altered. The Soviet move achieved the first objective in 1968, when Pakistan announced that the Peshawar installation would close the following year. But Pakistan's continued receipt of Chinese arms must have soon made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the Pakistanis had no intention of so reducing its links to China as to become unduly dependent on Moscow. (Pakistan's experience of being completely dependent on a single supplier—the United States—during the 1965 war argued strongly against putting the country in a similar position again.) Under such circumstances, Moscow probably saw little to be gained by moving ahead with a program that was causing trouble in its relations with India.

Such an interpretation seems more plausible than one attributing the difficulty to Pakistani opposition to Kosygin's proposal for regional economic cooperation in South Asia. If the Soviets had been primarily concerned about this problem, it seems unlikely that they would have agreed to provide Pakistan with a million-ton steel mill in 1970. Thus Moscow continued to cultivate Pakistan after Ayub's fall, but with a clearer realization of the limits of such a policy.

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CHINESE CITATIONS

TO THE EDITORS: I was naturally pleased with the generally favorable tone of Jerome Ch'en's review of *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965* (*Problems of Communism,* July-August 1972). But there is one particularly painful error that should be corrected. Professor Ch'en writes (p. 84) that Anne B. Clark and I "omit reference to the writings and publications of Communist leaders." I could not have been more surprised if he had said the volumes were printed on chartreuse paper!

I am not armed with a statistical study, but there must be a *thousand* specific books and articles cited. One need not go beyond the first two biographic entries (Ai Szu-ch'i and An Tzu-wen) to see how many works are mentioned. For reasons of style, some citations are general—as in the biography of Ai, where we note that the first seven issues of the key journal *Hsueh-hsi* contain five articles or speeches by Ai. On the other hand, just two pages later (pp. 4-5 in the dictionary), the reader will find a consecutive listing of no less than 16 articles by An Tzu-wen—each with a specific reference in English or Chinese or both.

Great pains were taken to include these citations because we wanted to enable readers to pursue subjects further. To use the case of An Tzu-wen again, it is clear that he played a major role in party organization work. Thus, if the reader wishes, he can pursue the subject of organization by reading scores of pages directly from the pen of An himself by referring to the articles cited.

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PROF. CH'EN REPLIES: I am sorry to have caused Mr. Klein to suffer from my remark. While admitting that he has a point and that he may have justifiable criteria for selecting the literary works by Chinese Communist leaders for inclusion in his biographies, I think he must agree that a collation with Huang Chen-hsia's compilation will bear out what I have said. Huang does give much fuller information in this regard.

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